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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation addresses the emerging area of research on discrete emotions and 
decision-making in organizational settings. The focus is the role of four classes of 
emotions, achievement, approach, resignation, and antagonistic and the different 
influences these may have on team decision-making processes, such as sharing 
information, generating alternatives, evaluating alternatives, and team cohesion. For each 
class of emotions, four hypotheses were established, in order to investigate the 
relationship between the class of emotions and each decision variable. Three levels of 
analysis were considered: individual, team, and group consensus level. Three types of 
emotion scores were computed to address memory issues in self-report: mean, maximum, 
and last scores. A measurement tool for class of emotions, the Emotion Wheel, was 
construct validated. A questionnaire for decision-making variables was developed. 
Respondents, 106 managers attending executive development seminars, took part to this 
study. They were distributed in 4 to 7 person-teams. Team members operate as a self-
managed team that acts like a board of directors of the company they have to manage 
during a business simulation. The business simulation that was used aimed to help 
participants see the integration of different functions and competencies necessary to run a 
multinational organization. It is a complex, large-scale simulation that requires complex 
decision-making strategies to deal with multiple inputs, unpredictable events, and 
competing groups. The main results were: 
Although achievement emotions are very important for the well being of an individual, 
and for his/her self-esteem, they can have a negative relationship with decision-making 
processes at the collective level, particularly at high levels of intensity. 
Collective approach emotions appear to be an enhancing factor, in the context of which 
team members are willing to compete as successfully as possible with both the capability 
to generate new alternatives and to go through the painstaking analysis and review of 
alternatives. Yet, high levels of intensity at the aggregated team level relate negatively to 
decision-making processes. 
Collective resignation emotions relate to alternative generation and to team cohesion 
positively and consistently over time. Contrary to the results found with achievement, 
approach, and antagonistic emotions, no high levels of intensity of resignation emotions 
were reported. Thus, these findings corroborate the fact that a moderate level of emotions 
can contribute to effective decision-making. 
Individual antagonistic emotions relate to alternative generation and to alternative 
evaluation positively when team members have worked a long time enough together. 
Adversely, when team members are starting to work together, antagonistic emotions 
relate to alternative evaluation and to team cohesion negatively. An intense level of 
collective antagonistic emotions is negatively related to all decision-making processes. 
 
Implications for future theory and research are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to determine the extent to which emotions have an 
influence on decision-making processes in management teams. Four different classes of 
emotions are considered1: achievement emotions, approach emotions, resignation emotions, 
and antagonistic emotions. Four decision-making processes2 are considered: sharing 
information, alternative generation, alternative evaluation, and team cohesion. This research is 
field-based and exploratory. Managers reported their emotions repeatedly during 8 days while 
engaged in an intense decision-making situation in an executive workshop. While individual 
processes are important and also addressed in this research, the thrust will be to discover how 
emotions combined in a collective dynamic process can impact managers’ decision-making 
processes. As organizations increasingly evolve towards a greater team orientation, it appears 
relevant to better understand shared processes, whether emotions or other team processes. 
Recently, researchers have investigated the extent to which individual affects, moods, 
or emotions of team members combine into a collective process that influences how teams 
operate. Researchers who have addressed collective affect3, propose different viewpoints on 
how this process occurs. De Rivera (1992) defines emotional climate as the emotional 
relationships between members of a nation. Paez, Asun, and Gonzalez (1995) posit that an 
emotional climate is based on shared emotions, beliefs, and social representations, and that it 
represents a collective phenomenon that is not just an aggregation of individual emotions. 
Barsade (2001)4, using Hatfield’s (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) definition of 
emotional contagion (a process of unconscious and automatic mimicry of other’s nonverbal 
behavior), studies emotional contagion in work groups. Bartel and Saavedra (1998, 2000) 
define collective moods as moods shared by group members. George (1990) defines affective 
tone as consistent affective reactions within the groups. Totterdell, Kellett, Teuchmann, and 
Briner (1998) define mood linkages as similar interpersonal mood influences that operate 
within work teams. 
                                                   
1 Defined in section 1.1. 
2 Defined in section 1.3. 
3 Affect is used here as a general term including various affective constructs: emotion, mood, affect disposition, 
or affective attitude. Later on, definitions of affect, mood, and emotion will be given separately in the 
introduction and in section 1.1. 
4 I started to use this paper when it was at the stage of a working paper in 1998. Then it became a submitted 
manuscript in 2001, it has now been published in 2002. In the text, I refer mostly to the 2001 version. Both the 
2001 and 2002 references are provided in the reference list. 
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Within this diversity of frameworks, some of these studies have been able to find an 
influence of collective affect on teams’ processes or outputs. For example, positive emotional 
contagion is positively related to the level of cooperative behavior in the group and to a 
greater task performance, and is negatively related to group conflict (Barsade, 2001). Pleasant 
moods enhance the quality and the efficiency of group performance, whereas unpleasant 
moods enhance the group’s motivation to reach its goals and to provide the targeted quantity 
of products or services (Bartel & Saavedra, 1998). Positive affective tone is negatively 
correlated with absenteeism and negative affective tone is negatively correlated with prosocial 
behavior (George, 1990). However, these studies examine the influence of collective affect on 
various team processes and outputs, but not its influence on team decision-making processes. 
Other studies in the group and group decision-making literature have accounted for the 
affective side of teamwork. Although collective affect has not been explicitly addressed, a 
process of affective influence may take place that would lead team members to either like or 
dislike each other, or to be satisfied or dissatisfied with the team. In these studies, affect is 
studied in relationship with team processes or outputs. Heath and Jourden (1997) found that 
group activity enhances positive affect (what they describe as “the enthusiasm effect”) but 
more importantly it buffers team members from translating the negative affect generated by 
post-performance disillusionment into negative performance evaluations. Other affective 
dimensions include: a) satisfaction with the leader and confidence in the group decision 
(Peterson, 1997); b) affective acceptance of other team members, which is considered to be 
essential to decision quality in top management teams (Amason, 1996); c) “group affect” 
defined as friendliness, enjoyment, and the extent to which group members like each other 
(Priem & Price, 1991), which decision-makers expect to be higher when they make their 
decisions based on consensus, compared to more conflict-inducing decision making 
conditions; and d) affective or socio-emotional conflict, defined as a dysfunctional type of 
conflict, based on personal incompatibilities, disagreements, or criticisms, including an anger 
dimension, which appears to be detrimental to decision quality (Amason, 1996; Devine, 1999; 
Priem & Price, 1991). These studies examined group decision-making processes influenced 
by some form of affect, but not by collective emotion. 
Studies addressing explicitly or implicitly the issue of collective affect influencing 
team processes or outputs, such as cooperative behaviors, absenteeism, conflict or acceptance 
of decisions, for example, have been dealing primarily either with mood, or affect, but not 
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emotion. The studies focusing on mood defined it as an enduring and diffuse affective state, 
often without having any particular object or focus (.e.g., Bartel and Saavedra, 2000). The 
studies focusing on affect defined it a personality trait (e.g. George, 1990), and measured it 
along Positive Affect/Negative Affect dimensions (see Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
However, the findings on mood and affect may not generalize to emotion. Emotion is defined 
in this research as a complex phenomenon, with a series of interrelated changes in five 
different subsystems of the organism’s functioning: cognition, physiological arousal, action 
tendencies, motor expression, and subjective feeling (Scherer, 1984a). Frijda (1986) defines 
action tendencies as states of readiness “to execute a given kind of action.” (p. 70). Action 
tendencies are a relevant feature of emotion when it comes to understanding potential or 
actual behaviors in the context of a decision-making task and at the team level. 
Emotion theorists have suggested the need for research addressing the influence of 
emotion on decision-making (e.g., Ellsworth, 1991; Ketelaar & Clore, 1998). At the 
individual level, for example, Lerner and Kelter (2000) have shown that fearful individuals 
make more pessimistic judgments about future events, whereas angry individuals make more 
optimistic judgments. At the group level, group decision-making research takes emotion in 
consideration, for example the effects of anger (e.g., Amason, 1996; Janis, 1989; Priem & 
Price, 1991), or of fear, shame, guilt, and elation (Janis, 1989). Emotion words are used, yet 
often without being defined precisely. 
In summary, very little empirical work has been done on collective emotion and its 
influence on team decision-making processes. Thus, the objective of this research is to 
address this issue and to determine the extent to which different classes of emotions influence 
decision-making processes in management teams, at the individual and at the team level. 
In chapter 1, the literature respectively on (a) emotion at the individual and at the 
collective level, (b) group decision-making, (c) emotion and decision-making at the individual 
level, (d) emotion and group decision-making will be reviewed. In chapter 2, the objective of 
this research and hypotheses will be presented. In chapter 3, the method used to address these 
hypotheses will be described. In chapter 4 the results will be presented, and in chapter 5 
discussed. Finally in chapter 6, the limitations of the present research, and the implications 
and recommendations for future research will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
1.1. Emotion 
The purpose of this chapter is first, to review definitions of emotion with an emphasis 
on the most relevant features for the present study, and second, to propose four classes of 
emotions: achievement, approach, resignation, and antagonistic emotions. Each one of the 
classes will be defined and reviewed. The concept of classes of emotions was initially 
proposed by Scherer & Tran (2001) to describe the impact certain emotions could have on 
organizational learning. Classes of emotions are relevant in applied settings for three reasons. 
First, with two classes of positive emotions and two classes of negative emotions, this 
classification departs from a traditional positive/negative dichotomy (see Scherer, 2000). 
Second, as the main interest in this study is collective emotions, or emotions felt by team 
members, it is relevant to group certain emotions sharing common features and behavioral 
outcomes, for example to describe an emotional climate (see chapter 1.2. for a definition). 
Third, as shown below, there are theoretical as well as empirical reasons, to propose these 
classes of emotions. Each of the classes of emotions studied here is composed of four 
emotions. This is not to suggest that these sixteen emotions are the only ones that are covered 
by the four classes, but they have been selected as examples because they represent modal 
emotions (see section 1.1.1 for a definition). 
 
1.1.1. Definitions and Relevant Features of Emotion 
This section describes a general definition of emotion, with the corresponding 
theoretical basis, and definitions of other affective constructs (i.e. affect and mood). Two 
features of emotion, action tendencies and emotion’s social role, will be described, as they are 
relevant features for the present research. 
 
1.1.1.1. Definition 
Despite the fact that emotion has long been a neglected topic for researchers (Izard, 
1991), knowledge about emotions has recently developed significantly. Emotion researchers 
have converged towards defining emotion as a complex phenomenon involving different 
subsystems of the organism’s functioning - cognitive, physiological, action tendencies, motor 
expression, and subjective feeling (Frijda, 1994; Izard, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 
1984a), also referred to as the componential model of emotion (Scherer, 2000). 
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Componential theories of emotion (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1987; Lazarus, 
1991b; Roseman, 1984; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Scherer, 1984a; Scherer, 1988, 
1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; VanReekum & Scherer, 1997) provide the theoretical basis 
on which the present research relies. They particularly focus on the cognitive component of 
emotion, demonstrating theoretically and empirically that cognition and emotion are 
interdependent. Emotional responses are elicited by individuals’ subjective evaluation of an 
event that is relevant to their needs or goals. The ways in which people appraise an event will 
determine the emotion they will feel. The appraisal process provides great behavioral 
flexibility to humans, as it is linked to their capability of learning from experiences and 
adapting, by judging what is harmful or what is beneficial (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 
1991b). Scherer (1984a; 1994) posits that each of these appraisals leads to a different 
emotional response, which could lead in theory to an infinite number of emotions. However, 
Scherer, in convergence with other appraisal theorists, acknowledges the existence of emotion 
families or prototypes (Scherer, 2000). He proposes the term of “modal” emotions, defined as 
the outcomes of frequently occurring patterns of appraisal or else, prototypical patterns of 
appraisal (Scherer 1994; Scherer, 2000; Scherer & Ellsworth, 2001). The notion of modal 
emotions is central to the present research as the sixteen emotions described and measured are 
representative of modal emotions. 
Emotion, and namely modal emotions, is distinguished from affect and mood, two 
affective constructs widely used in organizational psychology and social psychology in 
general Scherer (2000) and in relationship to decision-making in particular. Emotion is 
episodic, which conveys the idea of a dynamic process, with a beginning and an end, and of a 
relatively brief duration (see Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Frijda, 1994; Kirouac, 1995; Scherer, 
1996). Emotion is event/object specific (Lazarus, 1991b), has usually a definite cause and a 
cognitive content (Forgas, 1991), therefore its implications on behavior are focused and 
specific (Frijda, 1986; Ketelaar & Clore, 1998). Affect is a term that can refer to (a) feelings 
implying pleasantness or unpleasantness in a broad sense (Frijda, 1994), (b) a personality trait 
dimension (Diener, Smith, & Fujita, 1995; Watson et al., 1988), or (c) an attitude (Scherer, 
2000). Affect is also used as a general term that includes mood and emotion (Kirouac, 1995). 
Mood is a diffuse affective state, low in intensity, relatively long-lasting, often without any 
particular object or focus, with even an unknown antecedent source (Forgas, 1991; Frijda, 
1994; Izard, 1991; also see Ekman, 1994). The argument in favor of mood rather than 
emotion provided by organizational psychologists is that it is more representative of daily 
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common place feelings, less intense, and of a less brief nature than emotion, therefore easier 
to measure (see Barsade, 2001; Kelly and Barsade, 2001). 
 
1.1.1.2. Action Tendencies 
Lazarus (1991a) suggests that one must have a stake for an encounter to generate an 
emotion, and this stake generates an action tendency. Action tendencies are particularly 
relevant to the present study, as they are precursors to potential overt behavior, which is in 
turn observable, or at least detectable through indirect indices such as the implication in team 
activities. However, action tendency and overt behavior should not be confounded. As 
Scherer (1996) states, 
“It is important to note that most emotion psychologists distinguish action tendencies from overt 
instrumental behaviour. The actual running or hitting are not generally considered to be components of 
emotion but rather are seen as behavioural consequences of emotion.” (p. 284). 
Indeed, any action tendency can be concealed or mediated by coping or regulation 
mechanisms (Lazarus, 1991b). For example, the central action tendency of anger is attack but 
it can be transformed into passive aggressive behavior or even be completely inhibited with 
contradictory behaviors, such as speaking slowly or trying to relax (Averill, 1983). Action 
tendencies are states of readiness to execute some kind of action supporting an object goal 
(Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Frijda et al. (1989) found that subjects 
predicted respectively 34.5% and 46.3% of 32 emotions with action readiness cues given to 
them, respectively for the two studies conducted. On the basis of these results, the authors 
concluded that emotional experiences consist of both appraisal and action readiness. 
 
1.1.1.3. The Social Role of Emotion 
Emotions have an important social role, as stated by Izard (1991): “the expressive 
behavior associated with emotions constitutes the signal-sending aspect of vitally important 
social communication systems.” (p. 51) Emotion researchers recognize that most emotions are 
brought into play by the actions of others, hence influencing and being influenced by the 
course of interpersonal relationships (Ekman, 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Lazarus, 
1991a). Kemper (1991), in his power-status approach of emotions, suggests that a large 
number of human emotions are the result of “real, anticipated, imagined, or recollected 
outcomes of social relations.” (p. 333). De Rivera (1984) shares this point of view as he 
considers emotion to be a characteristic of a person-other(s) relationship. Frijda and Mesquita 
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(1994) argue that emotions are social events because they occur in the context of socially 
shared meaning. The social role of emotion has to be understood in the light of ongoing 
interchanges between the individual and others and the mutual influence that each party’s 
attitudes or actions may have on the other. This aspect of mutual influence is important when 
considering emotions occurring in a team context. 
In summary, emotion is a dynamic process (Scherer, 1994), triggered by a specific 
object or event, during an interaction with the environment or with others, limited in its 
duration, and having specific action tendencies, and behavioral consequences, which may 
vary depending on the intensity of the emotion felt. These behavioral consequences in turn 
impact the relationships one has with others, as others will react according to the signals they 
perceive (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Certain emotions share similar patterns of appraisal, 
including action tendencies, and behavioral consequences, thus it is posited that these 
emotions can be grouped in classes. The four classes of emotions proposed in this study will 
now be reviewed. 
 
1.1.2. Achievement Emotions 
Achievement emotions include emotions such as pride, elation, joy, and satisfaction5. 
There are theoretical and empirical justifications for grouping these emotions under the same 
banner. Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor (1987) and Scherer (1984a) conducted 
categorization studies where subjects had to sort emotion words. Pride, elation, joy, and 
satisfaction were identified to be part of the same class, indicating that the association of these 
emotions makes empirical sense. Pride, elation, joy, and satisfaction share common 
characteristics. These are positive emotions, with an appraisal of rather high control over 
events and their consequences (Scherer, 1984a), enhancing self-esteem and well-being: pride 
is associated with the enhancement of ego-identity (Lazarus, 1991a) and self-esteem 
(Zammuner, 1996); elation gives one the feeling of living fully (Izard, 1991); joy makes one 
feel confident, comfortable and boosts self-esteem (Frijda, 1987; Izard, 1991); and 
satisfaction is conducive to a feeling of fulfillment and well-being (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 
1991a). 
                                                   
5 As mentioned p. 4, these four emotions do not represent an exhaustive list of achievement emotions, but rather 
represent prototypical achievement emotions. This comment is valid for all four classes of emotions presented in 
this chapter. 
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The behaviors and/or action tendencies associated with pride, elation, and joy are 
being exuberant, expansive, excited (Frijda et al., 1989; Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991a). 
Satisfaction is associated with serenity, relaxation, and openness (Frijda et al., 1987; Izard, 
1991). 
Achievement emotions occur at both the individual and the collective level: when 
feeling pride one endorses the credit for the achievement but pride can also be felt collectively 
and the whole group’s identity becomes heightened (Lazarus, 1991a); joy and satisfaction 
give a sense of accomplishment when a job is well done, or when a new task or an intellectual 
challenge have arisen, given oneself or the group a sense of worth and competence (Izard, 
1991). Elation and joy are important emotions that strengthen bonds between people: one is 
more open, receptive, participative (Frijda, 1986), caring for others, which leads to solidarity 
with others (Kemper, 1991) and one is more amenable to celebrate with others (De Rivera, 
1984). Achievement emotions mark the celebration of success (Scherer & Tran, 2001). 
Achievement emotions may also have negative implications. They could imply 
overestimation of personal merit and encourage stagnation or complacency (Scherer & Tran, 
2001). When displaying pride, one can trigger envy or hostility in others (Lazarus, 1991a; 
Zammuner, 1996), which could lead to counterproductive conflicts. Elation can lead to 
boastful course of actions, which could be damaging for the individual of for the group (Janis, 
1982). Although joy encourages creativity and intuition, it can also slow down performance 
and decrease productive thinking (Izard, 1991). Satisfaction may prevent the individual or the 
group to make the effort to explore new alternatives (Scherer & Tran, 2001). 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the different aspects of achievement emotions. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Definitional Elements for Achievement Emotions 
Class Emotions Appraisal and definition Behaviors Positive aspects
* Negative aspects* 
Pride · Positive, high 
control 
· Sense of power 
· Exuberance, 
expansiveness 
· Bragging, 
assertiveness 
· Enhances ego/group 
identity (I/G) 
· Complacency (I/G) 
· Arrogance (I/G) 
Elation · Positive, high 
control 
· Stimulated 
· Exuberance, 
impulsivity, 
excessiveness 
· Gives the impression 
of living fully (I) 
· Display of attention to 
others and participation 
(I/G) 
· Risk to engage in 
boastful course of 
actions (I/G) 
Joy · Positive, high 
control 
· Sense of 
accomplishment 
· Excitement 
· Free activation, 
creativity 
· Wanting to be 
with others 
· Being generous, 
patient, tolerant, 
supporting (I/G) 
· Enhances creativity 
and confidence (I/G) 
· Wanting to celebrate 
with others (G) 
· Slowing down of 
productive thinking, 
lack of analysis (I/G) 
· Low concentration (I) 
 
 
 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENT 
 
 
 
 
EMOTIONS 
 
 
 
Satisfaction · Positive, high 
control 
· Sense of 
accomplishment 
· Openness, 
smiling 
· Marks the celebration 
of success (I/G) 
· Enhances sense of 
fulfillment and well-
being (I) 
· Stagnation, 
complacency (I/G) 
 
                                                   
* I indicates the implications for the individual 
 G indicates the implications for a group 
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1.1.3. Approach Emotions 
Approach emotions include emotions such as relief, hope, interest, and surprise. In the 
similarity judgment study done by Scherer (1984a), hope, interest, and surprise appear in the 
same class, except relief, and share common characteristics: they are positive, with an 
appraisal of a rather low control over events and their consequences (Scherer, 1984a) and 
have a future orientation. Relief, hope, interest, and surprise encourage exploration, 
development, and moving forward: relief occurs after a negative emotion, but something has 
changed for the better, distress diminishes (Lazarus, 1991a) and one is encouraged to move on 
to other activities; hope contains some uncertainty (Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman et al., 1996; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) but is a future-oriented emotion (Frijda et al., 1989; De Rivera, 
1984) and plays an adaptive role to pursue one’s goals (Ketelaar & Clore, 1998; Lewin, 
1948); interest is the emotion triggered when one feels engagement, fascination, and curiosity 
(Izard, 1991), it is typically associated with creative activities, with the development of skills 
and intelligence, the acquisition of new competencies, and persistence in effort (Izard, 1991); 
and surprise, also accompanied by uncertainty, keeps one alert and stimulated to cope with 
new and sudden events (Izard, 1991). 
The behaviors and/or action tendencies associated with hope and interest, are being 
vigilant, mobilized, committed (Lazarus, 1991a), attending, effortful, energetic, motivated, 
and involved (Izard, 1991; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Frijda, 1987; Smith and Ellsworth, 
1985). When feeling relief one is rather relaxed, showing signs of decompression (Lazarus, 
1991a) thus enabling the organism to regain energy for new events. When surprise is felt, 
there is little physical effort (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985) but it leads to a clearing of the mind, 
while gaining information (Roseman, 1984) and orienting oneself to the unexpected event 
causing surprise (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). 
In an organizational context, team members feeling relief for example after a task is 
finally accomplished or a reward has been granted would feel re-energized before moving to 
the next task. Hope and interest sustain the vigilance and the mobilization groups need to 
move forward. Paez et al. (1995) describe hope, in the context of Pinochet’s dictatorship in 
Chile, as a powerful social tool to make a group keep faith and committed to actions. Interest 
reinforces links between people, and as Izard (1991) explains, it is “a vehicle for the formation 
and maintenance of social units.” (p. 109-110). 
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Approach emotions can also have negative implications. Relief, if prolonged, can lead 
to withdrawal; hope can lead to unrealistic goals and inappropriate actions; interest, if too 
narrowly focused, can lead to unrealistic plans, scattered attention, blindness or dispersion of 
energy and attention (Scherer & Tran, 2001); surprise can lead to freezing (Roseman, 1984). 
Table 2 provides a summary of the different aspects of approach emotions. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Definitional Elements for Approach Emotions 
Class Emotions Appraisal and definition Behaviors Positive aspects
* Negative aspects* 
 Relief · Positive, low 
control 
· Relaxation, 
decompression 
· Enables the removal of 
distress (I) 
· Re-energize before 
moving to the next 
project (I/G) 
· Withdrawal (I/G) 
· Lack of energy (I/G) 
 
APPROACH 
Hope · Positive, low 
control 
· Uncertainty 
· Future-oriented 
· Vigilant, 
mobilized, 
committed 
· Ready to 
expand effort if 
necessary 
· Sustains group activity 
(G) 
· Motivates to move 
forward (I/G) 
· Enhances vigilance 
(I/G) 
· Pursuing unrealistic 
goals (I/G) 
 
EMOTIONS 
Interest · Positive, low 
control 
· Engaged 
· Approaching, 
exploring 
· Energetic, 
excited 
· Learning 
· Enhances creativity, 
curiosity (I/G) 
· Acquiring new skills, 
competencies (I/G) 
· Persisting in tasks, 
even tedious ones (I/G) 
· Dispersion of energy 
and attention (I/G) 
· Being too narrowly 
focusing on items to 
the detriment of others 
(I/G) 
 Surprise · Positive, low 
control 
· Uncertainty 
· Transient 
emotion 
· Orienting 
oneself 
· Attending 
· Helps to deal 
effectively with new 
and sudden event (I) 
· If leading to fear, risk 
of panic (I/G) 
 
                                                   
* I indicates the implications for the individual 
 G indicates the implications for a group 
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1.1.4. Resignation Emotions 
Resignation emotions include sadness, fear, shame, and guilt. In the Scherer (1984a) 
similarity judgment study, the four emotions appear in the same class, confirming empirically 
the shared common characteristics: they are negative emotions, with an appraisal of low 
control over events and their consequences (Scherer, 1984a). Resignation emotions lead to 
reduced activities and efforts, little innovation, and internal focus. Sadness is felt when 
something is lost in one’s life, a dear one, a job, a reputation or social status (Kemper, 1991; 
Lazarus, 1991a; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Scherer, 1984a), and is typically associated with 
resignation and sense of failure; fear triggers a sense of threat (Oatley & Duncan, 1994), of 
uncontrollability (Frijda, 1987) and a desire to preserve integrity (Paez et al., 1995); shame is 
felt when a negative evaluation of the global self is involved (Lewis, 1993; Tangney, 1999): 
one feels humiliated, worthless in the eyes of the self and others (Niedenthal, Tangney, & 
Gavanski, 1994), causing a temporary inability to think logically and efficiently (Izard, 1991); 
and guilt, which also involves negative self-evaluation but related to specific actions and 
behaviors (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heartherton, 1994; Lewis, 1993), makes one feel remorse 
and regret with recurrent thoughts about wrongdoing (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 
1996; Tangney, 1999). 
The behaviors and/or action tendencies associated with fear are avoidance and escape 
(Frijda, 1987; Ketelar and Clore, 1998; Lazarus, 1991a). Fear narrows thoughts, which can 
limit the number of alternative options for action (Izard, 1991), but can also serve as a signal 
function for obtaining relevant information from the environment (Paez et al., 1995). 
Behaviors associated with sadness are withdrawal, apathy, and appeal for support (Frijda et 
al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991a), which help the organism to save energy, in order to adjust to new 
conditions (Kemper, 1991). When feeling shame, one wants to hide (Frijda, 1987; Tangney et 
al., 1996); one is either unable to speak and is confused (Lewis, 1993) or on the contrary, one 
has a rapid, repetitive, even obsessive speech (Scheff, 1990). The main behavior characteristic 
of guilt is reparative action (Lewis, 1993; Tangney, 1999). Resignation emotions strengthen 
the bonds between the members of a group: sadness leads to protective behavior and 
reinforces social cohesion (Paez et al., 1995); fear restrains aggressive behavior (Ketelaar and 
Clore, 1998) and reunite the members of a group as well (Paez et al., 1995); shame 
encourages prosocial behavior (Lazarus, 1991a) and acts as a force of social cohesion too, 
enhancing conformity and individual responsibility (Izard, 1991); guilt increases compliance 
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(Carlsmith & Gross, 1969), reinforces social bonds, with a sense for interpersonal obligation 
(Baumeister et al., 1994) and empathy (Niedenthal et al., 1994). 
Resignation emotions have other positive implications. They provide a recuperation 
time, where one can readapt to new conditions, and prevent one from embarking on ventures 
that are too risky (Scherer & Tran, 2001). Sadness slows the pace down, and one is led to 
replace unattainable goals by attainable ones (Levine, 1996). Fear makes one think more 
carefully about risks, thus it is an adaptive emotion (Izard, 1991). Fear also has a useful 
signaling function, which enables the organism to get information from the environment (Paez 
et al., 1995). Shame leads to self-improvement in order to avoid the sense of incompetence 
brought by the shame experience (Izard, 1991), it helps restore one’s ideal and identity (De 
Rivera, 1984). Finally, guilt prevents one from acting destructively against others (Kemper, 
1991). 
Table 3 provides a summary of the different aspects of resignation emotions. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Definitional Elements for Resignation Emotions 
Class Emotions Appraisal and definition Behaviors Positive aspects
* Negative aspects* 
 Sadness · Negative, low 
control 
· Loss 
· Withdrawal 
· Resignation, 
powerlessness 
· Possibility to adjust to 
new events, review 
objectives realistically 
(I/G) 
· Reinforces social 
bonds and support (G) 
· Sense of failure, like 
nothing can be done 
(I/G) 
 
RESIGNATION 
Fear · Negative, low 
control 
· Threat, 
uncertainty 
· Avoidance, 
escape 
· Protect oneself 
· Reunification of group 
or country (G) 
· Restrain aggressive 
behavior (I/G) 
· Think carefully about 
risks (I/G) 
· Triggers tunnel vision 
(I/G) 
· Freezing /I/G) 
 
EMOTIONS 
Shame · Negative, low 
control 
· Humiliated, 
feeling 
incompetent 
· Hide or 
wanting to hide 
· Shrinking of 
the body 
· Enhances conformity 
and individual/social 
responsibility (I/G) 
· Improvement of self (I) 
· Speech disruption (I) 
· Obsessive speech (I) 
· Painful (I) 
 Guilt · Negative, low 
control 
· Done something 
morally 
reprehensible 
· Thinking 
· Confessions, 
apologies, 
reparative 
actions 
· Encourages 
reconciliation and 
empathy (G) 
· Enhances compliance 
with group norms 
· Feeling isolated (I) 
· Rumination (I) 
 
 
                                                   
* I indicates the implications for the individual 
 G indicates the implications for a group 
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1.1.5. Antagonistic Emotions 
Antagonistic emotions include envy, disgust, contempt, and anger. Both theoretical 
and empirical sources help demonstrate that these emotions as part of the same class. Disgust, 
contempt, and anger have been described by Izard (1991) as the hostility triad; that is, there is 
an observable pattern that these three emotions often occur together, even if each one retains 
its own characteristics. In Shaver et al. (1987) and in Scherer (1984a), subjects have classified 
envy, disgust, contempt, and anger in the same classes. Antagonistic emotions share common 
characteristics: they are negative, with an appraisal of high control over events and their 
consequences (Scherer, 1984a). Antagonistic emotions enhance aggressiveness, which could 
nurture a blind desire for retaliation and potential fighting (Scherer & Tran, 2001). Envy is felt 
when one wants what someone else has (Lazarus, 1991a) and one feels inferior (Parrott & 
Smith, 1993). If associated with anger, envy includes potential attack (Lazarus, 1991a) and if 
felt for a long period of time, it can poison all relationships (Lazarus, 1991a), with family, 
friends, or colleagues at work. Disgust6 is felt when one is facing something considered 
repulsive (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). If combined with anger, disgust with oneself or with 
members of the group can provide motivation for attack or destruction (Izard, 1991). 
Contempt is referred to as the “cool” emotion of the hostility triad: one feels superior and 
triumphant, but rather than attacking, one may use other indirect strategies such as outcasting 
or humiliation (De Rivera, 1984; Izard, 1991). Anger is the emotion triggered when one feels 
something wrong has been done, by oneself or by others, that could be considered as an 
offense (Lazarus, 1991a), with a feeling of injustice or unfairness (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 
1991a; Scherer, 1984a; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). There is a belief that one has control over 
the situation (Lazarus, 1991a), and can do something to restore one’s threatened goals 
(Levine, 1996). 
The behaviors and/or action tendencies associated with anger are antagonistic: one is 
ready to strike out or attack (Frijda et al., 1989; Kemper, 1991; Lazarus, 1991b; Levine, 
1996). However, anger is often inhibited for social reasons, as physical aggression incurs 
social disapproval or even punishment (Lazarus, 1991a). Thus, it may be replaced by verbal or 
symbolic aggression (e.g., the denial or removal of some benefit held by the anger instigator), 
by being very calm to compensate (Averill, 1983); or by passive aggressive behaviors (e.g., 
counter-implementing an order given by the boss or playing sick (Lazarus, 1991a)). 
                                                   
6 In the context of this study, moral disgust will be considered as the likelihood of the participants to be exposed 
to something physically noxious being close to zero. 
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Antagonistic emotions can also have positive implications. They can help group 
members to gain confidence and the right amount of energy to achieve their goals together, 
and to eventually counter-attack (the enemy, competition) with the objective of winning. Envy 
can lead to emulation of a positive accomplishment in order to get admiration from peers 
(Lazarus, 1991a); disgust can serve as a signal for the individual or the group to change their 
attitude or behavior, or to risk rejection if they do not, as for example maintaining a lower 
level of pollution (Izard, 1991); contempt also contributes to maintaining social norms by 
putting pressure on deviant individuals (Izard, 1991); and finally a little anger increases self-
confidence in certain situations (Izard, 1991), which is necessary to react to aggression or 
attack from others. The group may gain cohesiveness as anger can reinforce group values (De 
Rivera, 1984). 
Table 4 provides a summary of the different aspects of antagonistic emotions. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Definitional Elements for Antagonistic Emotions 
 
Class Emotions Appraisal and definition Behaviors Positive aspects
* Negative aspects* 
 Envy · Negative, high 
control 
· Sense of 
inferiority 
· Mobilization 
· Yearning 
· With anger, 
potential attack 
· Effort towards 
emulation to improve 
self or team (I/G) 
· If prolonged, could 
poison relationships, 
with friends or 
colleagues (G) 
 
ANTAGONISTIC 
Disgust · Negative, high 
control 
· Repulsion 
· Hostility triad 
· Rejection 
· With anger, 
potential attack 
· Signals “poisonous” 
others (G) 
· Risk of being rejected 
by the group (G) 
 
EMOTIONS 
Contempt · Negative, high 
control 
· Hostility triad 
· Indirect 
aggression 
· Despise 
· Maintains group 
conformity (G) 
· Prejudicing other 
groups (G) 
 Anger · Negative, high 
control 
· Hostility triad 
· Sense of 
unfairness 
· Attack 
· Verbal or 
symbolic 
aggression 
· Passive 
aggressive 
· Improves self-
confidence (I/G) 
· Helps reinforcing team 
values (G) 
· In case of attack, one 
can get punished, 
socially disapproved or 
undergo retaliation 
(I/G) 
 
                                                   
* I indicates the implications for the individual 
 G indicates the implications for a group 
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1.1.6. Summary 
Emotion is a dynamic process, involving several sub-systems of the organism: 
cognition, motor expression, physiology, action tendencies, and subjective feeling (or 
conscious awareness). What differentiates an emotion from a mood or an affect is the fact that 
emotion is object or event related and is of brief duration. The most salient aspects of emotion 
for the present study are the actual or potential behavioral consequences, as they influence 
present and future interactions between individuals. 
A non-exhaustive number of modal emotions currently treated in the literature can be 
grouped in four classes of four emotions each. Achievement emotions (for example pride, 
elation, joy, satisfaction) occur in situations when people have a sense of accomplishment, 
personally or professionally, and a desire to celebrate successes with others. Approach 
emotions (for example relief, hope, interest, surprise) occur in situations when people are 
attentive, alert, exploring, wanting to learn, and looking forward to the future.  
Resignation emotions (for example sadness, fear, shame, guilt) occur in situations 
when people suffer some kind of a loss, personally (death of a parent, loss of a friend or lover) 
or professionally (loss of a job, restructuring of one’s company, loss of colleagues, or 
financial drawback). Antagonistic emotions (for example envy, disgust, contempt, anger) 
occur in situation when people think theirs or themselves have been harmed, morally or 
physically, and that the cause of this harm is unfair.  
In essence, emotions are tightly intertwined with every aspect of life. This does not 
only occur at the psychological level, but it also seems to occur at the collective level, where 
emotions either are shared or transmitted from one individual to another within a group. This 
aspect of emotion is reviewed in the next section. 
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1.2. Emotion at the Collective Level 
Le Bon (1896), in his work on crowds, studied the idea of emotions occurring at a 
collective level. According to Le Bon, the crowd submerges the rationality of its members, 
and each individual’s consciousness is replaced by a ‘collective mind’ in which sentiments 
and ideas of all the persons composing the crowd take the same direction. Le Bon described 
this phenomenon as contagion. In the same vein, McDougall (1920/1973) attributed emotional 
contagion to the racial similarity of the members of a group, which would determine the speed 
at which people would be affected by others’ emotions. He considered emotions as being 
inherently contagious: an emotion is triggered in one individual by the expression of the same 
emotion in another. Both Le Bon and McDougall suggested that the results of emotional 
contagion tended to be irrational (i.e., leading to behaviors which could be perceived as out of 
control). These two authors have remained a reference to contemporary researchers who 
address collective emotion, despite the fact that both the emergence of cognitivism in the 
1960s (Scherer, 1984b) and the efforts to provide operational definitions of constructs (Luft, 
1970) led to a more rational view of human behavior (Scherer, 1984b). On the one hand, the 
term ‘group mind’ was not generally accepted, and was considered too vague and too mystical 
(Luft, 1970), or even mere metaphysics (Lewin, 1948). On the other hand, social 
psychologists studying group dynamics continue to recognize, explicitly or implicitly, the fact 
that something “affective” occurs during interactions and/or tasks performed in groups 
(Anzieu & Martin, 1994). The following two paragraphs review these social or group aspects 
of emotion. 
Redl (1942, as cited by Anzieu & Martin, 1994) identified three types of emotional 
phenomena relevant to groups: (a) constituent group emotions, the basis for the group 
formation; (b) secondary group emotions that develop from these forming processes; and (c) 
emotional contagion, the propagation of someone’s behavior in the group to another person or 
to the whole group. Lewin (1947; 1951/1975) demonstrated in his studies on food habits how 
change could be successfully implemented by provoking an emotional catharsis among 
members of a constituency to break down prejudice and change habits. In his paper on group 
morale (Lewin, 1948), he reported studies showing how the atmosphere deteriorated in a 
family after the father had lost his job: the father lost hope, and his low morale spread to the 
children and the whole family consequently had a low morale. Bales (1950) identified positive 
and negative socio-emotional types of interactions in his analysis of interaction processes in 
small groups. Luft (1970) described his concept of habeas emotum as the emotional freedom 
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of having emotions and of expressing one’s own emotions, unless it limits the expression of 
someone else’s emotions. This concept could be linked to emotion regulation, and to mutual 
emotional influence processes. Pagès (1975), in his work on affective life of groups, defined 
group affect as an often-unconscious feeling that is dominant at some point in time, that rules 
the life of the group, and that is shared by all members of the group. He also described how 
group members tend to converge as they work together: group members cooperate more and 
more while accomplishing the task, having increasingly similar views, and the group affect, 
previously at the unconscious level, becomes conscious. St-Arnaud (1978) identified group 
climate as the social-emotional dimension of small groups, and affective energy, as the 
subjective need of group members to love and to be loved. In addition, early research on 
group cohesion (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Festinger, 1950) laid its foundation on the 
affective bonds between group members. This point will be addressed in section 1.3.4. 
Schachter (1959) extended Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory and applied it 
to emotion in his work on affiliation. When confronted with a novel threat, an individual 
seeks affiliation with similarly threatened others, not so much to be reassured, but rather as a 
mean to socially evaluate him/herself, and to obtain cognitive clarity about bodily arousal 
consequent to the threat. Comparing oneself with others indeed helps to determine the label 
for and appropriateness of one’s emotional state. Furthermore, Schachter posited that 
affiliation would lead to the homogenization of emotional state, due to the fact that 
individuals tend to try to bring others closer to their own emotional state (such as in 
Festinger’s model of social comparison, where people either change their opinion, try to 
change others’ opinions, or reject comparison with individuals that are very different from 
oneself). Gump & Kulik (1997) hypothesize that affiliation could be linked to emotional 
convergence or contagion. This idea is actually embedded in Schachter’s (1959) conclusions, 
as he says: “(…) it could expected that the emotions would be particularly vulnerable to social 
influence. It may be this presumed vulnerability that will eventually help us understand 
phenomena of emotional contagion such as panic and riots.” (p. 128). Schachter’s work 
continues to be influential in contemporary research, as it will be described in section 1.2.2. 
below. 
Recently, the notion of collective emotion has regained popularity among researchers 
who have investigated the extent to which individual affects, moods, or emotions are shared 
among members of a group, either small such as a work group, or large such as the population 
of a country. Wierba and Mackie-Lewis (1994) have defined group emotion as being the 
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‘neural glue’ of group entities. They have suggested that (a) there is a connection between 
group members’ emotions and the group’s emotion, and (b) the emotion of the group is 
different from the individuals’ emotions. They argued that the way group emotional 
connections are made is through the pursuit of a common activity, i.e. through interrelated 
behaviors encompassed in a common task. Similarly, Barsade and Gibson (1998), in their 
review of the state of research on collective emotion, argued that groups are emotional entities 
and that there is a reciprocal and interactive relationship between group member’s emotions 
and group emotion. They also considered group emotion to be the glue that bonds group 
members together, and that the understanding of group emotion is a way to better understand 
how groups develop and mature over time, implying a more dynamic approach. 
Several recent empirical studies coming from different perspectives have tested the 
existence of collective affect and will be reviewed next. 
 
1.2.1. Emotional Climate 
De Rivera (1992) developed the concept of emotional climate, and defined it as the 
emotional relationships between members of a society. De Rivera was interested in the 
emotional climate that arises in a nation. A nation’s emotional climate represents an aspect of 
its objective-behavioral environment; it affects and dominates people’s behaviors. A national 
climate is not simply an aggregation of all emotional relations. Similarly to the role emotions 
play for an individual, i.e. to maintain the individual’s identity and values (De Rivera, 1984), 
the emotions of a nation may contribute to maintain the political unity, or cultural identity, of 
the members of the nation. De Rivera (1992) describes climates of fear, security, instability, 
confidence, dissatisfaction, hostility, solidarity, and hope. 
Paez et al. (1995) extended De Rivera’s (1992) work and studied the emotional 
climate prevailing during the dictatorship of Pinochet in Chile. They defined an emotional 
climate as a state of collective mood, based on the predominance of certain emotions, of 
certain social representations, and of certain action tendencies that permeate the network of 
social interactions. They argued that emotional climates are collective phenomena, 
representing something more than just the sum of individual emotions. In their study, Paez et 
al. intend to use quantitative and qualitative methods to demonstrate that emotional climates 
are emergent processes, which have social functions. First, they selected four ‘basic’ 
emotions, fear, anger, sadness, and joy, based on Kemper’s (1991) social-interactional theory 
of emotion, and asked two social psychologists to give scores for these four emotions to the 
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prototypical right, center, or left-wing individual in Chile during the period 1973-1990. 
Second, the objective indicators of collective behavior are composed of the number of 
civilians killed by Army members, manifestations of collective violence such as riots for 
example, and the number of Army members killed for political reasons. Third, they also 
performed interviews. Paez et al. concluded that it is essential to gather collective indicators, 
interviews, polls, and expert judgments in order to be able to identify predominant emotional 
climates. In this specific study, they were able to find convergence between expert judgments 
of emotional climate and collective behavior indexes: anger in right wing individuals was 
related to repression against the left wing; fear in left wing individuals was related to civilian 
deaths; high anger, and low sadness and fear in left wing individuals was related to strong 
collective violence. In other words, sadness and fear were related to repression, whereas anger 
was related to political violence. Although fear was recognized as the dominant emotion in 
Chile during Pinochet’s dictatorship, Paez et al. concluded that the emotional climate was 
composed of an aggregate of the four basic emotions (i.e. as mentioned above, anger, fear, 
sadness, and joy). They also found that the behaviors related to such a climate continued to be 
displayed beyond the objective conditions that created it. In addition, contrary to Kemper’s 
prediction stating that when fearful, individuals seek support and contact, Paez et al. found 
that these behaviors did not appear under a climate of fear and anxiety, but were rather 
associated with anger and happiness. 
In summary, both De Rivera’s and Paez et al.’s perspectives provided interesting 
examples of multi-level research, with measures ranging from the individual level to the 
macro-level with broader sociological implications. De Rivera proposed a theoretical model, 
and drew attention to the methodological need to develop objective measures of emotional 
climate. Paez et al. (1995; 1997) did develop measures of emotional climate. The elements of 
their research relevant to the present study are the demonstration that emotional climates were 
formed by “an aggregate of the four ‘basic’ emotions” (p. 172), i.e. fear, anger, sadness, joy, 
accompanied by “specific ways of social interaction”, and “specific predisposition towards 
action” (p. 172). 
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1.2.2. Emotional Contagion 
Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson (1992; 1994) defined emotional contagion as the 
tendency to ‘catch’ another person’s emotions7. Hatfield et al. (1992) posited: “an important 
consequence of emotional contagion is an attentional, emotional, and behavioral synchrony 
that has the same adaptive utility (and drawbacks) for social entities (dyads, groups) as has 
emotion for the individual.” (p. 153) Hatfield et al. distinguished ‘primitive’ emotional 
contagion as being the unconscious and automatic tendency to mimic and synchronize other’s 
nonverbal behaviors (facial, vocal, postural), thus emotionally converging with others. 
Hatfield et al. reported research conducted in other domains (developmental, clinical, socio-
psychological, and psychophysiological) to demonstrate evidence of the existence of 
emotional contagion. As Barsade (2001) noted, Hatfield and her colleagues’ work examined 
less dramatic, yet more relevant effects of contagion with to day-to-day implications, 
compared to emotional contagion described by Le Bon (1896) or McDougall (1921). Selected 
organizational psychologists based their studies of emotional contagion on Hatfield et al.’s 
definition (e.g. Bartel and Saavedra, 1998, 2001; Barsade, 2001, see below). 
Gump & Kulik (1997) combined both Schachter’s (1959) emotional evaluation model 
(based on social comparison theory applied to emotion, see above, p. 21) and Hatfield et al.’s 
(1992; 1994) emotional contagion theory, to investigate the occurrence of these processes at 
the dyad level. First, their goal was to test Schachter’s affiliation hypothesis that anxious 
individuals will seek affiliation with similarly anxious others, who are subjected to the same 
anxiety-producing situation. Second, Gump and Kulik wanted to compare and contrast the 
social comparison model of contagion, which states that contagion occurs if two individuals 
find themselves together in the same emotional state, through a social influence process, and 
the primitive emotional contagion model, which occurs via unconscious facial and postural 
mimicry (thus without knowing in which emotional state the other person is a priori). In order 
to do so, they videotaped interactions of dyads while threat was induced experimentally. 
Affiliative behaviors were measured in terms of looking at the other, and of the time spent 
frowning versus smiling at the other. Gump and Kulik were able to confirm Schachter’s 
affiliation hypothesis, as threatened subjects seek affiliation with similarly threatened others. 
They were not able to find emotional contagion via mimicry. One can hypothesize that the 
                                                   
7 Emotion is defined here as indicated in section 1.1.1., i.e. a complex phenomenon including cognitive appraisal, 
physiological processes, action tendencies, subjective feelings, and expressive behaviors. 
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cognitive component of emotion was more dominant than the unconscious nonverbal mimicry 
component in the emotional contagion process that occurred. 
Bartel and Saavedra (1998; 2000) examined collective moods, drawing on both 
Schachter’s (1959) emotional evaluation model (that they name “emotional comparison”, 
based on the fact that social comparison processes are applied to emotion), and Hatfield et 
al.’s (1994) definition of emotional contagion to explain mood convergence. Bartel and 
Saavedra defined collective moods as moods shared by members of a group. First, their 
objective was to demonstrate mood convergence (with self-report measures), and that moods 
in work group are detectable by external observers. A team of observers was trained to code 
non-verbal behaviors (facial, vocal, and postural). To do so, they developed an Observer’s 
Guide to Work Group Mood based on Larsen and Diener’s (1992) circumplex model of 
emotion. Second, their objective was to determine whether stability of group membership, 
groups’ mood regulation norms (actually measured as the individual susceptibility to mood 
convergence), task and social interdependence among members promote mood convergence. 
Bartel and Saavedra did find mood convergence in work groups, and observers were able to 
detect different types of moods. Moods characterized by higher arousal were more accurately 
assessed. In addition, Bartel and Saavedra found that stability of work group membership, 
task and social interdependence were significant predictors of mood convergence. Group 
mood regulation norms influenced mood convergence only for high-energy moods (both 
pleasant and unpleasant). 
Barsade (2001) studied emotional contagion in groups and its influence on work group 
dynamics, i.e. cooperativeness, degree of group conflict, and individual satisfaction with 
performance. She proposed that mood8 contagion is influenced by two factors: the valence 
(positive or negative orientation) of the emotion, and the energy with which the emotion is 
expressed. Emotional contagion was measured with: (a) self-report measures of mood, based 
on adjectives from the Larsen and Diener’s (1992) circumplex model of emotion; and (b) the 
observation of facial expressions, body language, and verbal tone via videotapes recording 
group interactions (using the same observation criteria as Bartel and Saavedra (2000), see 
above). In her experimental study, Barsade found that: (a) emotional contagion did occur in 
groups; (b) unpleasant moods did not lead to greater contagion than positive moods; (c) the 
level of energy with which moods are expressed was an indicator of contagion processes, but 
                                                   
8 Barsade actually chose to focus on mood and not emotion (see definitions p. 5) but she uses both terms 
interchangeably. I will thus comply with her labels in describing her study. 
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a weak one; (d) positive emotional contagion lead to greater cooperativeness; (e) positive 
emotional contagion lead to lesser group conflict; and (f) positive emotional contagion lead to 
greater individual assessment of task performance. In her non-experimental study, Barsade 
found strong convergence of group members’ moods, also positively related to 
cooperativeness and perception of performance, and negatively related to group conflict. 
In summary, the three studies presented in this section addressed some aspect of 
affective contagion: Bartel and Saavedra, and Barsade focused on mood contagion; Gump and 
Kulik focused on emotional contagion, but did not specify how they defined ‘emotion’. Bartel 
and Saavedra found mood convergence in natural work groups based on the theoretical 
assumption that group members can ‘catch’ (Hatfield et al., 1994) nonverbal behaviors in 
other members, that in turn influence the type of mood they feel. Barsade found emotional 
contagion in groups, based on the theoretical assumption that contagion stems from different 
valences and different energy levels of affect; namely, positive emotional contagion was the 
most prevalent type of contagion and had the most significant effect on outcomes such as 
performance or helping behaviors. Gump and Kulik explored emotional contagion in dyads in 
an experimental context. They based their paradigm both on social comparison, applied to 
emotion, and on primitive emotional contagion via mimicry. Their study points out to the 
process of social influence, studied in the context of dyads, which principles could apply to 
teams. These three studies are relevant to the present research as they demonstrate the 
phenomenon of collective ‘affect’ occurring in groups or dyads. 
 
1.2.3. Affective Tone 
George (1990) defined affective tone as consistent affective reactions within the 
groups. George grounded her definition of affective tone in three theoretical frameworks: (a) 
Schneider’s Attraction-Selection-Attrition (ASA) model (as cited in George, 1990), which 
implies that similar people tend to find themselves together in certain organizational settings; 
(b) group socialization, which implies that newcomers in organizations learn group values, 
norms, and standards (e.g., George, 1990); and (c) personality traits such as positive affect 
(PA) and negative affect (NA) (Watson et al., 1985; 1988), which implies an influence on the 
positive and on the negative affective tones of groups. George suggested that ASA might 
allow similarity of personality within work groups. She posited that the number of people 
having either one of the personality characteristics would be positively linked to the 
corresponding affective tone, i.e. if there were a majority of individuals with PA in the group, 
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the affective tone of the group would be positive. Conversely, if there were a majority of 
individuals with NA, the affective tone would be negative. Group socialization influences 
both affect and outcome variables, i.e. prosocial behavior (measured in the study as helpful 
behaviors towards customers) and absenteeism. George was able to find affective tone in 
these groups and her hypothesis of matching personality traits (PA and NA) with affective 
tone was confirmed. Negative affective tone was found to be negatively related to prosocial 
behavior and partially related to absenteeism. Positive affective tone was negatively related to 
absenteeism. 
George’s study represents a reference in the domain, as it is one of the first studies to 
empirically measure collective affect and using multi-level analyses (at the individual and at 
the group level of analysis), elements that are relevant to the present research. 
 
1.2.4. Mood Linkage 
Totterdell et al. (1998) defined mood linkage as interpersonal mood influences that 
operate within work teams over time, as team members work together and share life events. 
Their moods will become linked together and temporally synchronized. For mood linkage to 
occur, two processes are necessary: not only shared life events, to which team members will 
respond similarly, but also interpersonal mood influences, which are the result of verbal and 
nonverbal, conscious and non conscious interactions between team members9. Totterdell et al. 
were interested to find out whether the strength of association between individual mood and 
the moods of teammates depends on the individual’s commitment to the team and his/her 
perception of the team climate. They also posited that an individual whose mood is not 
synchronized will experience more trouble with his/her teammates, and that the level of 
synchronization is inversely related to the amount of daily hassles10 an individual may 
experience with his/her team. Finally, they wanted to investigate the role of conscious 
processes in mood linkage. They used both daily measurements (i.e., diary methodology) and 
the Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999), which 
was designed to measure moods and emotions at some precise moments in time. In the first 
study, Totterdell et al. found a synchronization between individual moods and the collective 
moods of their teammates, in other words, the individuals’ moods were more related to the 
                                                   
9 Totterdell et al. refer to non conscious processes as primitive emotional contagion (see Hatfield et al., 1994); 
even though they do not specify a term for conscious processes, these can be related to emotional comparison 
(see Gump & Kulik, 1997). 
10 Totterdell et al. operationalized shared life events as sharing negative events, i.e. daily hassles, and not sharing 
positive life events. 
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moods of their teammates than to the moods of individuals belonging to other teams. The 
positive correlation between individuals’ moods and teammates moods occurred regardless of 
the number of shared daily hassles, and were even greater in case of older individuals who 
were more committed to the team, perceived a better team climate, and experienced fewer 
hassles with teammates. In the second study, Totterdell et al. were able to conclude that it is 
possible for people to consciously process information about other people’s moods and make 
a reasonable judgment about them. Conscious processes may explain interpersonal mood 
influence within teams in this case. 
Totterdell et al. looked at the effect of mood over a certain period of time. The 
repeated measurement methodology represents the most relevant aspect of this study to the 
present research. The second important point is the fact that further empirical evidence is 
provided that team members’ affective states or processes are interconnected, namely in a 
context where team members work together intensively. These findings are consistent with 
Bartel and Saavedra’s findings regarding the high level of task interdependence implying a 
greater degree of mood convergence. 
 
1.2.5. Summary 
Progress has been made in better understanding the collective affective processes, not 
only in their extreme forms, but in daily life and work settings as well. Table 5 shown below 
summarizes definitions from 1896 to present. Even though current researchers have named 
collective emotion with different labels (e.g. affective tone, mood linkage, mood 
convergence), there is still a distinct red thread throughout all the definitions: the idea of 
contagion, which involves transmission of affect from one individual to another by various 
channels (facial, vocal, postural, behavioral, conscious, non conscious) and sharing of affect11. 
Concomitantly, the contagion or the sharing lies on the interrelationships between group 
members and the fact that they do something together (i.e., they have a common goal for a 
common task). The collective affect then takes on a quality of its own, distinct from 
individual affects. Some researchers conjecture that the sum is different from the parts. 
(Smelser, 1963), in his theory of collective behavior, argued that several determinants of 
collective behavior are necessary but for the latter to actually materialize, the determinants 
must combine in a definite pattern. This particular constellation of determinants would rule 
out any other alternative. 
                                                   
11 Including mood and emotion. 
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In this study, ‘collective emotion’ is defined as shared emotions embedded in 
interrelated behaviors associated with the accomplishment of a task over time. 
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Table 5 
Review of Definitions of Collective Emotion 
Authors Construct Emergence process Effects or functions 
Le Bon (1896) Emotional contagion Each individual’s consciousness is replaced by 
a ‘collective mind’ 
· Sentiments and ideas of all the persons 
composing the crowd take the same 
direction 
· Leads to unpredictable shifts in collective 
behavior 
 
McDougall (1920) Emotional contagion An emotion is triggered in one individual by 
the expression of the same emotion in another 
 
Constitutional or racial similarity determines 
the rapidity at which a suggestion takes hold 
Redl (1942) Emotional contagion The propagation of someone’s behavior in the 
group to another person or to the whole group. 
Contagion can be positive or negative 
Contagion can often be beneficial to the 
functioning of the group 
Schachter (1959) Affiliation An individual will seek affiliation with 
“similarly feeling” others, not so much to be 
reassured, but rather as a mean to socially 
evaluate him/herself 
Obtain cognitive clarity about bodily arousal 
consequent to the emotion felt 
Pagès (1975) Group affect An often-unconscious feeling is dominant at 
some point in time, rules the life of the group, 
and is shared by all members of the group 
 
George (1990) Affective tone A consistent or homogeneous affective 
reaction within a group 
People with similar affective reactions should 
behave in a similar way 
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Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson (1992) 
Emotional contagion 
 
 
 
 
 
Primitive emotional 
contagion 
· The tendency to ‘catch’ another person’s 
emotions (his or her emotional appraisals, 
subjective feelings, expressions, patterned 
physiological processes, action tendencies, 
and instrumental behaviors) 
· The tendency to automatically mimic and 
synchronize movements, expressions, 
postures, and vocalizations with those of 
another person and, consequently, to 
converge emotionally 
 
De Rivera (1992) Emotional climate The emotional relationships between people 
supporting a cultural identity or political unity, 
e.g. climates of fear, security, solidarity, 
instability, confidence, dissatisfaction, 
hostility, hope 
The emotional climate affects everyone in a 
given environment and becomes a 
characteristic of a society 
Wierba and Mackie-
Lewis (1994) 
Group emotion · Is the neural glue of group entities 
· There is a connection between group 
members’ emotions and the group’s 
emotion, yet they are different 
Group emotion is made possible through 
interrelated behaviors associated with the 
pursuit of a common task 
Paez, Asun, & Gonzalez 
(1995) 
Emotional climate A state of collective mood, characterized by: 
· The predominance of certain emotions 
(for instance, happiness and anger, versus 
sadness and fear) 
· The predominance of social 
representations or a group of beliefs held 
about the world (positive, trust, versus 
negative, mistrust) and of the future 
(optimistic, hope, versus pessimistic, 
despair) shared by a specific subculture 
· And by the predominance of certain 
action tendencies that will permeate the 
network of social interactions 
· Emotional climates are accompagnied by 
specific ways of social interaction and by 
specific predisposition to action 
· Behaviors related to a given emotional 
climate continue to be displayed beyond 
the objective conditions that created it 
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Gump & Kulik (1997) Emotional comparison 
and contagion 
· Emotional comparison: individuals in a 
certain emotional state seek affiliation 
with others in a similar emotional state 
(Schachter, 1959); 
· Primitive emotional contagion: 
unconscious facial and postural mimicry 
(Hatfield et al., 1992) 
 
Totterdell, Kellett, 
Teuchmann, & Briner 
(1998) 
Mood linkage · People interact over a period of time 
· Linkage refers to a general process known 
as mutual entrainment, in which one 
rhythmic process causes or is caused to 
oscillate with the same frequency as 
another (= synchronization) 
· Shared affect is based on shared life 
events and both conscious and non 
conscious mood induction processes 
· People reciprocally influence each other’s 
moods 
· The mood linkages between individual 
moods and team moods are even stronger 
when team members are older, committed 
to the team, perceived a better team 
climate, and experienced less hassles with 
team members 
 
Bartel & Saavedra 
(1998; 2000) 
Convergence of moods 
in groups 
· Work group moods are constructed socially, 
involving the complex interplay of 
contagion and comparison processes that 
are triggered by behavioral expressions of 
mood 
· Group moods are diffuse and relatively 
enduring affective state that are shared by 
group members 
· Moods characterized by higher arousal are 
easier to assess by external observers 
· Stability of work group membership, task 
and social interdependence influence mood 
convergence 
· Group mood regulation norms influenced 
mood convergence only for high-energy 
moods (both pleasant and unpleasant) 
 
Barsade (2001, 2002) Emotional contagion · “… a process in which a person or group 
influences the emotions, or behavior of 
another person or group through the 
conscious or unconscious induction of 
emotion states and behavioral attitudes” 
(Schoenewolf, 1990, as cited in Barsade, 
2002) 
· Emotions are shared 
 
Positive emotional contagion leads to: 
· Greater cooperativeness 
· Lesser group conflict 
· Greater individual assessment of task 
performance 
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None of the studies reviewed above directly address (a) emotion, or (b) emotion within 
and among a team involved in a decision-making situation. Group decision and its main 
processes will now be reviewed, before emotion and decision-making can be in turn reviewed. 
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1.3. Group Decision-Making 
Group decision-making had a tradition of research in social psychology (Messick, 
Moore, & Bazerman, 1997; Samuelson, 1992; see Brandstaetter, Davis, & Stocker-
Kreichgauer, 1982 for a review). Reviews have underlined the fact that small group research 
in social psychology has waned over the years, but has been revitalized within the domain of 
organization psychology (Davis, 1996; Ilgen, 1999; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Simpson & 
Wood, 1992), as Steiner (1986) had partially predicted. The trend is indeed to use teams in 
organizations more heavily (Bettenhausen, 1991; Guzzo, Salas, & Associates, 1995; Ilgen, 
1999; Paulus, 2000). The current assumption is that groups make better decisions than 
individuals (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Shaw, 1981). For historical reasons, there is also 
probably a desire to avoid the dominance of autocratic individuals who decide for everyone 
else (Davis & Hinsz, 1982). Thus, teams making important strategic decisions are seen as 
crucial to the sustainability of organizations (Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). 
The particular focus in this study is strategic decision-making observed in a 
naturalistic decision-making framework. In other words, naturalistic decision-making is the 
environment in which decisions are made, and strategic decision-making refers to the specific 
type of decisions12. A strategic decision is defined as an important decision, that deals with 
complex and ambiguous issues, and requires the commitment of a large amount of resources 
from the organization (Amason, 1996; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Théorêt, 1976). The 
complexity and ambiguity surrounding a strategic decision is usually too overwhelming for 
only one person do deal with it, thus strategic issues are often handled by top management 
teams (Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 1989). Priem and Price (1991) point out that in 
strategic decision-making, the “correctness” of a possible solution is difficult to verify. In her 
study on strategic decision-making in high velocity environments, Eisenhardt (1989) found 
that executive teams use real-time information, which gives them “an intimate knowledge of 
their business” (p. 555). They simultaneously generate and evaluate multiple alternatives 
because of time pressure, which enables them to process strengths and weaknesses quicker 
and make sure they don’t leave “a stone unturned” (p. 572). They focus their attention on their 
most experienced members’ opinion. They are used to work with each other in turbulent 
                                                   
12 Three types of decision are commonly distinguished: operational decisions, which deal with daily, routine 
issues; tactical decisions, which deal with medium-term, non-routine issues but not affecting the organization’s 
goals; and strategic decisions, which deal with long-term, affecting the organization’s goals (Furnham, 1997). 
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conditions, but to deal with high-stakes decisions, they have to cope with anxiety, actively 
deal with conflict resolution, and build confidence. 
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) departs from prescriptive decision-making 
theory (how decisions should be made) and from behavioral decision-making theory 
(assessing if actual decisions conform to prescribed ones). NDM is an extension of behavioral 
decision making theory, as it describes how people (usually managers) concretely make 
decisions, and implement them. It is concerned with practical knowledge and experience 
about real-world decision-making (Beach, 1997). Zsambok (1997) provides the following 
definition: 
“The study of NDM asks how experienced people working as individuals or groups in dynamic, 
uncertain and often fast-paced environments, identify and assess their situation, make decisions, and take 
actions whose consequences are meaningful to them and to the larger organizations in which they 
operate.” (p.5). 
The use of teams in organizations has become prevalent (Bettenhausen, 1991), and 
strategic decisions require to be made by teams given the high stakes involved (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Schweiger et al., 1989). Nevertheless, both advantages and disadvantages of team 
decision-making have to be considered. Decisions made by teams are thought to be 
advantageous for at least two reasons: the pooling of knowledge, expertise, and skills, and the 
commitment to the team and to its decisions (i.e. team cohesion). First, the pooling of 
knowledge, skills, and expertise is critical to the quality of decisions taken by teams, and this 
pooling can only occur if team members share information (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1997; 
Kim, 1997; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994; Stasser & Titus, 1985). In turn, the more 
diverse team members are (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Jackson, 1992; Jackson, May, & 
Whitney, 1995; Sessa & Jackson, 1995), the greater the potential amount of information could 
be pooled. Both pooling of knowledge and team diversity have been studied in interaction, i.e. 
to what extent diversity in teams influences the sharing of information processes (e.g., 
(Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996). Second, it has been argued that team 
members have a greater propensity to support group decisions if they participated and are 
listened to (Peterson, 1997), thus reinforcing the commitment to present and future decisions 
(Amason, 1996). These decisions, taken and accepted by all members, have better chances to 
be successfully implemented (Beach, 1997; Shaw, 1981; Zander, 1994). 
These advantages may become disadvantages. The diversity of perspectives, skills, 
expertise, opinions, status, have to be integrated, which can lead to dissent, disagreement, or 
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conflict. Although conflict in itself is presumed to help decision quality (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986; Schweiger et al., 1989; Sniezek, 1992), it can be 
detrimental as well, especially if group members get involve in personal disputes (Amason, 
1996; Priem & Price, 1991; Schweiger, et al., 1986, 1989). In naturalistic environments, team 
members are confronted to uncertainty and ambiguity, which can be a source of stress. In turn, 
stress and autocratic leadership in a highly cohesive group that feels invulnerable, can provide 
antecedents for what Janis has called “groupthink” (Janis & Mann, 1977; Janis, 1982) to 
describe defective decision-making. The group members favor unanimity above the realistic 
assessment of alternatives, thus suffering momentarily from a deterioration of mental 
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment (Janis, 1982). Other pitfalls of group decision-
making include group polarization and risky shift (Burnstein, 1982; Myers, 1982; Myers & 
Lamm, 1976), production blocking and free riding13 (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Kerr & Bruun, 
1983). 
Despite these possible drawbacks, group decision-making is considered as one of the 
more important aspects of group performance (Levine & Moreland, 1990), and of all 
managerial activities (Furnham, 1997). The processes usually involved are gathering and 
sharing information, creating and identifying alternative courses of action, choosing among 
these alternatives by integrating the diverse perspectives of members, and finally 
implementing the decisions (Guzzo et al., 1995). The prescriptive approach mentioned earlier 
has recommended a certain number of steps, a number oscillating between four and eight. 
Janis & Mann (1977) have extracted seven criteria from the extensive research literature on 
prescriptive decision-making14: Based on these seven steps, Janis has extracted four steps, 
which he considers as a descriptive model of decision-making ((a) formulating the problem, 
(b) using information resources, (c) analyzing and reformulating, (d) evaluating and 
                                                   
13 Both these concepts will be further defined in section 1.3.2. 
14 “The decision maker, to the best of his ability and within his information processing capabilities 
1. thoroughly canvasses a wide range of alternative courses of action; 
2. surveys the full range of objectives to be fulfilled and the values implicated by the choice; 
3. carefully weighs whatever he knows about the costs and risks of negative consequences, as well as 
positive consequences, that could flow from each alternative; 
4. intensively searches for new information relevant to further evaluation of the alternatives; 
5. correctly assimilates and takes account of any new information or expert judgments to which he is 
exposed, even when the information or judgment does not support the course of action he initially 
prefers; 
6. re-examines the positive and negative consequences of all known alternatives, including those originally 
regarded as unacceptable, before making a final choice; 
7. makes detailed provisions for implementing or executing the chosen course of action, with special 
attention to contingency plans that might be required if various known risks were to materialize.” (p. 
11) 
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selecting), and which, when carefully followed, characterize vigilant decision-making, 
preventing decision-making groups from committing major mistakes (Janis, 1989; Janis & 
Mann, 1977). Researchers have attempted to empirically test either all or part of these steps 
(e.g., Johnston, Driskell, & Salas, 1997; Leana, 1985; Peterson, 1997; Turner, Pratkanis, 
Probasco, & Leve, 1992). Because the prescriptive approach takes a long time in group 
decision-making processes and because strategic decision-makers in a naturalistic 
environment do not always have time to process all seven steps, some of the steps get 
truncated or overlooked. But one can argue that the core of group decision-making activities is 
alternative generation and alternative evaluation (Jackson et al., 1995). Indeed, even when 
team members have to identify the problem or discuss the objectives (or the strategy), they go 
through a process of proposing several alternatives, of evaluating each of these alternatives, 
and of contributing to the discussion with information they think could add value to the 
decision. Furnham (1997) summarizes decision-making as the process of generating 
alternatives and then choosing among them; Zander (1994) states that decision-making is the 
selection of a preferred solution from several alternative solutions. 
In summary, group decision-making is based on two core decision-making processes, 
alternative generation and alternative evaluation, supported by the sharing of knowledge, 
information, skills and expertise and by commitment of team members to each other and to 
decisions they make. The next section takes a closer review of the literature on these four 
processes is presented next, in the following order: sharing information, alternative 
generation, alternative evaluation, and team cohesion. 
 
1.3.1. Sharing Information 
One of the central aspects of team decision-making is information, whether 
information search (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Johnston et al., 1997; Peterson, 1997) or 
information processing (e.g., Dooley & Fryxell, 1999; Sniezek, 1992). In fact, the quality of 
the information resources available to team members may determine whether decision-making 
will be successful or not (Hirokawa, Erbert, & Hurst, 1996). There is a high expectation for 
groups to perform in their decision tasks more effectively than individuals would, providing 
they share their respective knowledge, skills, expertise, and abilities (Devine, 1999; Gigone & 
Hastie, 1993; Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Hollingshead, 1996; Kim, 1997; Larson, Foster-Fishman, 
& Keys, 1994; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 
Stasser & Titus, 1987; Williams, Mannix, Neale, & Gruenfeld, 1997; Wittenbaum, Hubbell, 
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& Zuckerman, 1999). This suggests that diversity of group members is an important factor for 
the quality of the decisions, although it does not preclude homogeneous teams to have diverse 
perspectives to share. Each member does not have the exact same amount of knowledge or the 
exact same amount of information in his or her possession (Hollenbeck et al., 1995; 
Wittenbaum et al., 1999). In addition, due to limits on information processing capabilities, 
group members, experts or not, may not be able to evoke all the relevant information they 
would want to consider (Browne, Curley, & Benson, 1997). 
Despite the promising potential to have more information resources available in a 
decision-making team, there is evidence that this potential remains often unrealized. The 
major findings by Stasser and Titus (1985) are that the sharing of information is inhibited by 
two kinds of hindrance: a) group members discuss shared information (i.e. information known 
by all the group members before the discussion starts) more than unshared information (i.e. 
information held only by one member); b) the discussion is biased in favor of the initial or 
current preferences of the group members, as developed by group members, based on some 
subsets of information that they are aware of before the discussion. Stasser and his colleagues 
have continued to investigate the first hindrance. Stasser and Titus (1987) found that there is a 
better chance for unshared information to arise in the discussion if the amount of information 
available to group members is not too high and if unshared information constitutes two-thirds 
of the total amount of information available. Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna (1989) found that the 
larger the size of the group, the less chances for unshared information to be brought in the 
discussion, and structuring the discussions only helps to further discuss already shared 
information. Stewart & Stasser (1995) suggest that when expert roles are assigned, more of 
the unshared information is recalled and correctly recognized by group members after the 
discussion. The fact that experts bring the unshared information forth is seemingly crucial, as 
group members will not give credibility to unshared information if not provided by a 
designated expert (Stewart & Stasser, 1995). Gigone and Hastie (1993; 1997) confirm that 
groups are unable to take uniquely held information into consideration for the decision, even 
if it has been shared during the discussion. Larson and his colleagues (Larson et al., 1994; 
Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998) 
also found that shared information is more likely to be discussed than unshared information. It 
is suggested that when the importance of the task is heightened, group members bring 
information forth at a slower rate and took longer to take the decision, indicating an effort to 
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make the decision carefully, but still with an advantage for shared information (Larson et al., 
1994). 
The second hindrance to effective sharing of information in groups is what Schulz-
Hardt et al. (2000) have called the “confirmation bias”: it means that individuals request or 
seek only information that will support a pre-selected alternative; to be in a group accentuates 
the tendency to prefer supporting information rather than conflicting information. Schulz-
Hardt et al. (2000) found evidence of this phenomenon in their studies, but only within 
homogeneous groups. Indeed, heterogeneous groups, defined in this particular context as 
groups comprising either one or two minority members, had less of a confirmation bias. Due 
to processes such as divergent thinking15 (Nemeth, 1986) or conversion theory16 (Moscovici, 
1980), minorities, even if they did not influence the whole decision of the group successfully, 
at least led the group to have a more balanced information search. This held true even for 
groups of experts. 
In the present study, ‘sharing information’ is defined as a concept including the team 
members’ willingness to share their particular knowledge, abilities, skills, and expertise with 
others and the sharing of any information, during a decision-making task, that could help the 
team make a better decision, as opposed to a decision influenced by the team members’ early 
preferences or opinions. 
 
1.3.2. Alternative Generation 
One of the two core processes of team decision-making consists of canvassing a wide 
range of alternative actions (Janis, 1982; Sniezek, 1992), of promptly generating innovative 
responses during discussions (Hackman & Morris, 1983), of having a greater quantity and 
variety of ideas (Zander, 1994), and of generating ideas about alternatives (Scudder, Herschel, 
& Crossland, 1994). 
Alternative generation serves a precise purpose within a decision-making task. Team 
members generate as many alternatives as they can, given the limits of their cognitive 
capabilities (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1976) or their degree of mental engagement 
(Scudder et al., 1994). The notion of innovation or creativity underlies the concept of 
alternative generation, but alternative generation cannot be equated to creativity. It is not 
                                                   
15 I.e., team members have diverging thoughts or cognitive representations about issues. 
16 I.e., consistent arguing minorities produce conflict that leads the group to have a more balanced approach on 
an issue. 
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creativity to produce something original per se, such as an art piece; but it is rather a focused 
type of creativity aimed at improving decision quality, by generating the largest amount of 
new ideas possible. Bearing that particular aspect in mind, group creativity in the context of 
organizations is thus defined as the divergent thinking or the ability of individuals to generate 
a wide variety of ideas or responses to a particular problem (Paulus, 2000). 
One particular method supposed to enhance the generation of alternatives is called 
brainstorming, practiced in groups. The goal is to generate as many ideas as possible without 
evaluating them in the first place to help find a solution to a problem (Osborn, 1957/1974). 
The process relies on the idea that generating alternatives is a contagious stimulation from one 
group member to the other. Osborn reported the efficiency of the method, based on the count 
of ideas generated. However, the method has been criticized, as further studies have not been 
able to find groups to be more prolific than individuals (Paulus, 2000). Several reasons have 
been proposed to explain why groups are not as successful in brainstorming: production 
blocking, social loafing and free riding are the most frequently mentioned (e.g., Bettenhausen, 
1991; Furnham, 1997; Levine & Moreland, 1990). Production blocking (Diehl & Stroebe, 
1997) refers to the fact that the larger the group, the more difficult it becomes to voice one’s 
ideas, resulting in a potential loss of resources. Social loafing (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 
1979) results from a lack of motivation of individuals when they see that their outputs get 
diluted in the group output. Free riding (Diehl & Strobe, 1987; Kerr, 1983; Kerr & Bruun, 
1983) results from a lesser effort on the part of individuals who estimate their contributions to 
be not so valuable when confronted to high performance-oriented group members. In addition 
to these obstacles, there are three more, described by Paulus (2000). Social anxiety of group 
members, or evaluation apprehension, is the fear of being evaluated by others in the group. 
Downward comparison occurs when the convergence of ideas among team members tends 
towards the low performing individuals, which impacts the group’s performance negatively. 
Illusion of productivity of the group means that group members overestimate their 
performance as a group. Paulus (2000) notes, that “the majority of people believe they would 
generate more ideas in groups than if they were alone.” (p. 241). 
In order to stimulate alternative generation in teams and counter the above-mentioned 
obstacles, some factors have been suggested. First, Paulus (2000) suggests that higher 
performance can be induced by upward social comparison, rendering team members more 
competitive. Paulus and Yang (2000) found that, providing team members are attending, 
active exchange of ideas among team members could lead to cognitive benefits through 
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mutual stimulation of ideas (idea developed earlier by Osborn, 1957/1974). Second, 
diversity17 of team members represents the ideal way of enriching the decision-making 
process, as briefly introduced at the beginning of this section. It is proposed that 
heterogeneous teams have the potential to be more innovative, thus ensuring a higher quality 
of their decisions (Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Jackson et al., 1995; Kim, 1997; Paulus, 2000; 
Sessa & Jackson, 1995). Diversity can be defined in various ways: diversity can be described 
in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, educational background and level, socioeconomic status, 
tenure and position in the organization (Sessa & Jackson, 1995). Thus the relationship 
between diversity and its various aspects and alternative generation can be very complex. For 
example, Watson, Kumar, and Michaelsen (1993) found that culturally diverse groups 
(members of different nationalities and ethnicities) were more effective in generating 
alternative solutions. 
Alternative generation is one of the steps in the prescriptive decision-making model, 
thus considered to take either too much time by some naturalistic decision-making researchers 
(e.g. Zsambok & Klein, 1997), or to be difficult due to the fact that decision-makers are not 
aware of all the existing alternatives (see March & Simon’s (1958) concept of bounded 
rationality). Either position seems too pessimistic. Eisenhardt (1989) has demonstrated that 
fast strategic decision-makers develop more alternatives than slow decision-makers, and the 
speed of their alternative generation leads to better decisions. Interviews of top management 
team members revealed that: (a) generating multiple alternatives helped executives to test 
their hypotheses and to ascertain whether they choose the most viable alternative(s) in the 
end; (b) generation multiple alternatives helped to prevent escalation of commitment by 
shifting opinions back and forth as opposed to remain anchored on one; and (c) generating 
multiple alternatives provided fallback positions, or else alternatives for contingency plans. 
Thus, not only is alternative generation not too time-consuming, but also it is essential to the 
quality of the decision-making process. 
In summary, research on brainstorming shows mixed results about the idea-generating 
capabilities of groups. Nevertheless, there are encouraging findings, demonstrating there are 
specific settings in which alternative generation is enhanced. 
                                                   
17 I will use the terms ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ interchangeably.  
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In this study, ‘alternative generation’ is defined as the ability of team members to 
generate as wide a range of alternatives and as great a number of alternatives as they can, in 
order to avoid being psychologically entrapped18 (Kameda & Sugimori, 1993) in too narrow a 
decision and to ensure no meaningful element has been overlooked which would have 
potential negative consequences for the quality of the decision. 
 
1.3.3. Alternative Evaluation 
The second core process of team decision-making consists of evaluating the 
alternatives proposed by the team members (Guzzo, Salas, and Associates, 1995; Hirokawa & 
Poole, 1996; Jackson et al, 1995). Alternative evaluation consists of carefully weighing the 
costs and the benefits, the positive consequences as well as the negative consequences of each 
alternative (Hollingshead, 1996; Janis, 1982, 1989; Janis & Mann, 1977; Maier, 1998); of 
thorough consideration of all available alternatives and of sufficient time devoted to evaluate 
each alternative (Johnston, Driskell, & Salas, 1997; Turner et al., 1992); and of systematic 
search for possible courses of action (McCauley, 1998). 
Evaluating alternatives requires effort. Hirokawa et al. (1996) suggest that the quality 
of group decision-making relies on a) the quality of effort provided by group members, as 
they have to proceed to painstaking examination and reexamination of information; b) the 
quality of thinking displayed by group members, that is their ability to make the appropriate 
inferences from the information available so adequate choice can be made among alternatives. 
Schweiger et al. (1986) suggest that a rigorous process of thorough evaluations and critiques 
of alternatives is necessary to reach a quality decision. Information is an important component 
of alternative evaluation: information should be analyzed while a choice is being made, and 
focusing on the relevant information contributes to the effectiveness of the decision process 
(Dean & Sharfman, 1996). 
Alternative evaluation is considered as one of the essential steps of vigilant group 
decision-making19 (Janis & Mann, 1977; Janis, 1989). Yet, should inadequate alternatives be 
discussed, the group may converge too quickly on a suboptimal solution (Scudder et al., 
1994), which in turn can be described as defective decision-making (Aldag & Fuller, 1993): 
group members limit their discussion to only a few alternatives, ignore new information 
                                                   
18 “Psychological entrapment refers to a faulty decision-making process “whereby individual escalate their 
commitment to a previously chosen, though failing, course of action in order to justify or ‘make good on’ prior 
investments” (Kameda and Sugimori, 1993, p. 282). 
19 See introduction section 1.3 for a definition. 
 43 
concerning the risks and drawbacks of the selected alternative, avoid information concerned 
the benefits of the rejected alternatives, and fail to develop contingency plans. One of the 
possible explanations for a group not to thoroughly evaluate alternatives could be that vigilant 
decision-making takes too much time and energy, especially in natural settings that typically 
involve time pressure as well as ambiguous information: group members may adopt shorter 
procedures (Johnston et al., 1997). Johnston et al. were able to find that teams using a more 
limited alternative evaluation procedure had a better performance than the teams using a more 
thorough procedure. Another possible explanation for a group not to evaluate alternatives 
optimally would be that team members focus on choosing the “best” alternative 
(Hollingshead, 1996). In doing so, team members are likely to select information too 
narrowly. Hollingshead (1996) suggests that rank ordering alternatives would force team 
members to more thoroughly evaluate all the available alternatives. As Roberto (2000) 
proposes, managers achieve higher levels of efficiency and consensus about strategic 
decision-making when they establish well-defined alternative evaluation criteria: the rank 
ordering could correspond to such a criterion. 
In the present study, ‘alternative evaluation’ is defined as thorough an examination of 
the alternatives as possible, and an analysis of the costs and benefits of each alternative, thus 
preventing team members to ignore relevant information, to limit their discussion to only a 
few alternatives, and to take the risk of deciding too hastily. 
 
1.3.4. Team Cohesion 
Group cohesion20 is an important component of group decision-making. It has been 
defined and operationalized in many different ways (Bettenhausen, 1991; Hogg, 1996; Levine 
& Moreland, 1990; Mudrack, 1989 for a review). Kurt Lewin (1951/1975) defined group 
cohesion as the members’ positive evaluation of the group and their motivation to continue to 
belong to it, which in turn would motivate group members to carry out the group’s tasks. The 
most frequently cited definition is Festinger’s (1950), who described group cohesiveness as 
“the resultant forces, which are acting on the members to remain in the group” (p. 274). Janis 
(1982) defined it as a “high degree of amiability and esprit de corps among the members” 
which is a manifestation of “the high degree to which members value their membership in the 
group and want to continue to be affiliated.” (p. 245). 
                                                   
20 Both the terms ‘cohesion’ and ‘cohesiveness’ are used in the group literature. The label ‘team cohesion’ will 
be applied in the present study. 
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The criticism has been made that subsequent research has focused only on the 
interpersonal attraction side of group cohesion (Hogg, 1996; Mudrack, 1989). Recent studies 
have demonstrated that group cohesion can be a multifaceted construct, including both a task 
and an interpersonal component (Mullen, Anthony, Salas, & Driskell, 1994; Zaccaro & Lowe, 
1988; Zaccaro, 1991). Contemporary integrative definitions – that is, those that do not 
separate the task and the interpersonal side of cohesion – propose that team members need to 
share the willingness to work together, which was originally included in the Lewin’s 
definition, and to reach some common objectives. There seems to be a convergence toward 
the following definition of team cohesion: the commitment to group members to achieve 
common objectives, to accomplish a task together, with positive feelings about team members 
(Evans & Dion, 1991; Turner et al., 1992; Wech, Mossholder, Steel, & Bennett, 1998). To 
obtain this type of team cohesion, Mullen and Cooper (1994) have found in their meta-
analytic integration of the relation between group cohesiveness and performance, that real 
teams, which are composed of members who have built a history of relationships, will 
develop stronger cohesion than ad hoc teams that have been created in the laboratory. The 
emphasis on the goal orientation makes the construct also better applicable to teams operating 
in organizations (Mudrack, 1989). 
An alternative facet of commitment is described as “decision acceptance” (Priem and 
Price, 1991; Schweiger et al., 1986, 1989) in the strategic decision-making literature, 
concerned with real world decisions. Decision acceptance is important to group decision-
making because team members more readily implement decisions if they have participated to 
the decision process, have been listened to, and accepted the final decision (Beach, 1997; 
Peterson, 1997; Shaw, 1981; Zander, 1994), thus enhancing the potential success of the 
implementation. The process of taking decisions in groups should ideally serve to win 
acceptance and commitment from decision-makers who have to live with the results of their 
decisions after implementing them and have to continue to take decisions together effectively 
in the future (Amason, 1996; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986; Schweiger, Sandberg, & 
Rechner, 1989; Schweiger & Sandberg, 1991; Scudder et al., 1994; Sniezek, 1992). This 
notion was introduced by Maier (1963) in his formula: 
ED = f(Q,A) 
where ED stands for effective decision, Q for quality, and A for acceptance. 
Decision acceptance is also obtained by affective acceptance among team members 
(Amason, 1996). It has been considered as an affective measure of group output, such as 
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confidence in the group decision (Peterson, 1997), as enhancing a friendlier climate, and 
group liking after decision-making (Priem and Price, 1991). The word ‘satisfaction’ is often 
used about decision acceptance, term that relates to a general favorable state of being, applied 
to life or work (Kahneman, 1999). In turn, team cohesion has been considered as the affective 
component of teams. For example, cohesion has been referred to as a transient affective state 
(Leana, 1985), as the chief affective component of group functioning (Harrison, Price and 
Bell, 1998), as affective bonds (Mudrack, 1989), as interpersonal liking and friendship 
(Cartwright, 1968; Zaccaro, 1991). However, neither decision acceptance nor cohesion can be 
equated to an emotion _ as defined in section 1.1. (Zaccaro, personal communication, August 
1998). 
One characteristic of team cohesion is that it can be studied as (a) a determinant of 
team performance (and decision-making can be considered as a team performance feature), 
(b) a process occurring while the task is performed, or (c) a result of performance. Cartwright 
(1968), in his review on group cohesiveness, outlined the fact that team cohesion has been 
investigated as either a dependent variable or an independent variable. In the first case, the 
objective is to identify the conditions that bring different levels of cohesiveness. In the second 
case, the objective is to study the effects of different levels of cohesiveness on the team and its 
members. For example, Mullen et al. (1994), in their meta-analysis, reported results with 
group cohesiveness as a determinant of decision-making, and group cohesiveness was found 
to have an effect on the quality of group decision-making. They also considered group 
cohesiveness as an outcome, as they examined certain antecedents of groupthink, and how 
these antecedents would influences the relationship between group cohesiveness and 
performance. Gully, Devine, and Whitney (1995), in an ensuing meta-analysis, considered 
cohesion as one of the most important component of group process. Harrison et al. (1998) 
investigated team cohesion as a result or an outcome of decision-making. In the present study, 
it was chosen to consider team cohesion as a component of the group process, i.e. a 
component of group decision-making. 
Finally, although earlier studies have considered team cohesion only at the individual 
level, it is appropriate to study it at the aggregated team level, especially when attempting to 
relate it with a group performance measure (see Gully et al., 1995, for a review). Yet it is still 
individuals working in groups evaluate the degree of cohesion reached by their group, thus it 
is necessary to verify that an appropriate degree of consensus has been reached within the 
groups regarding the concept measured (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994). Thus, it is 
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important to adequately choose the level of analysis, as explained in Chapter 3 (see p. 67). 
Gully et al. (1995) address this issue by drawing attention to the fact that some researchers 
have been measuring team cohesion at the individual level and formulating their findings and 
conclusions at the group level, thus bearing the risk of “misspecification, or fallacy of the 
wrong level.” (p. 501), unless one purposely studies cohesiveness across level. Wech et al. 
(1998) examined how cohesiveness affects individual’s performance and organizational 
commitment. A possible alternative would be to measure team cohesion at the individual 
level, remain at the individual level for data analysis, and consider the results as the individual 
contribution to team cohesion. 
In this study, ‘team cohesion’ is defined as the commitment made by all team 
members to the team’s decisions and to the team itself. Team cohesion implies that team 
members have positive behaviors and feelings towards each other, and that team members’ 
goals are to enhance present and future performance of the team. 
 
1.3.5. Summary 
Levine and Moreland (1990) state that decision-making is an important aspect of 
group performance in general. The particular focus in this study is primarily strategic 
decision-making in a quasi-naturalistic environment, which is characterized by ill-structured 
problems, uncertainty, dynamism, shifting of competing goals, time stress, high stakes, 
multiple player, and organization goals and/or norms. In summary, a strategic decision is 
defined as being ambiguous and complex. 
Four main decision-making processes can be identified: (a) the pooling of team 
members’ expertise, knowledge, and skills, that should in theory nurture the decision-making 
discussion; (b) the generation of alternatives, which represents the most creativity-oriented 
process; (c) the evaluation of alternatives, which represents the analytical dimension of 
decision-making, and (d) the cohesiveness of the team, which contributes to the acceptance 
and commitment to the decision by all team members. 
The concept of sharing information encompasses the team members’ willingness to 
share their particular knowledge, abilities, skills, and expertise with others, and the sharing of 
any information gathered during the decision-making task that could help the team make a 
better decision, as opposed to a decision that is influenced by the team members’ early 
preferences. Alternative generation is the ability of team members to generate as wide a range 
of alternatives and as great a number of alternatives as they can, in order to avoid being 
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psychologically entrapped in too narrow a decision and to ensure no meaningful element has 
been overlooked which would have potential negative consequences for the quality of the 
decision. Alternative evaluation is as thorough an examination of the alternatives as possible, 
and an analysis of the costs and benefits of each alternative, thus preventing team members to 
ignore relevant information, to limit their discussions to only a few alternatives, and to take 
the risk of deciding too hastily. Team cohesion is the commitment made by all team members 
to the team’s decisions and to the team itself, implying positive feelings toward team 
members; team member’s goals are to enhance present and future performance of the team. 
Emotion and individual decision-making are reviewed next, before the different 
researches addressing emotion and group decision-making are described. 
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1.4. Emotion and Decision-Making 
Historically, emotions have had a negative reputation when it comes to their influence 
on people’s behaviors, and namely on decision-making (Forgas, 2000). Decision-making is 
supposed to be a rational activity (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). In contrast, emotions have 
been associated with irrationality, disruption, or interruption (Ketelaar & Clore, 1998; 
Scherer, 1984b; Simon, 1987). Traditionally called “passions,” emotions were perceived as a 
negative force for human behavior by disrupting and interfering “with the serene process of 
rational thought” (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988, p. 302). Three research domains can be held 
responsible for gradually changing the negative perceptions of the role of emotion in decision-
making. First, decision-making theorists have demonstrated people’s “bounded rationality” 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1976), and the limitations 
encountered by humans to exhaustively process all of the information available. Second, 
research on emotion has demonstrated the complex interrelations between emotion and 
cognition (see Dalgeish & Power, 1999; Forgas, 2000). Third, research on the relationships 
between affective processes and decision-making processes have demonstrated that these 
relationships can be beneficial or detrimental depending on the intensity and the quality of the 
affect considered (e.g., Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Emphasis in this study will be placed 
on the third research stream, considering that positive and negative affect, positive and 
negative mood, and emotions are representing different intensities and qualities of affect. 
Their respective influence on decision-making at the individual level will first be reviewed, 
and then their influence on group decision-making will be reviewed next. 
 
1.4.1. Emotion and Individual Decision-Making 
Considerable research has demonstrated the variety of influences of affect on decision-
making at the individual level, which has mostly focused on mild affect or mood rather than 
emotion21, but has also used these terms interchangeably (for reviews, see Forgas, 1995; Isen, 
1993; Isen, 1987; Isen & Baron, 1991; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Schwarz, Bless, & 
Bohner, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Research on affect and decision-making distinguishes 
between two main categories of emotions: expected or anticipated emotions and immediate 
emotions (see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Schwarz, 2000, for reviews). Expected or 
anticipated emotions consist of predictions about the emotional consequences of decision 
outcomes (e.g. Baron, 1992; Janis and Mann, 1977; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997; 
                                                   
21 See section 1.1.1. for definitions. 
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Zeelenberg, Dijk, Manstead, & Pligt, 2000). Immediate emotions consist of emotions that are 
experienced at the time of decision-making, which will be the focus of this section. The main 
findings regarding the relationship between respectively positive affect/mood, and negative 
affect/mood, and decision-making will first be reviewed bearing in mind that the separation is 
sometimes slightly artificial, given the remark made above that authors have used the terms 
affect, affective, mood, and emotion interchangeably. A few examples of effects of emotion 
and decision-making will be reviewed next. 
 
1.4.1.1. Positive Affect/mood 
Isen and her colleagues have focused their research efforts on mild positive affect, 
defined as common positive feeling of happiness, well-being, good fortune, or enjoyment, 
induced by everyday events such as when one finds a coin in a public telephone, or when 
being offered refreshments, cookies, or candies (Isen & Baron, 1991). Mild positive affect 
enhances cognitive flexibility in categorizing and interconnecting information in unusual 
ways (Higgins, Qualls, & Couger, 1992; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & 
Sujan, 1990); improves performance in tasks involving creativity thinking and innovation 
(Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987); facilitates creative problem-solving by increasing the 
effort put into problems (Higgins et al., 1992); results in better performance in a complex 
decision-making task (Isen & Means, 1983) by enhancing a broader search for information 
and a more thorough consideration of alternatives (Isen, 1993; Isen & Baron, 1991); and 
encourages cooperative behavior (Isen, 1987; Isen, 1999). Convergent results have been 
obtained by researchers in organizational psychology: people with a high positive affective 
disposition (in the sense of personality trait) performed better in their decision-making task (a 
business simulation), searched information more broadly, requested more information when 
necessary, considered it more thoroughly, and had a better ability to recognize situational 
contingencies (Staw & Barsade, 1993). Staw and Barsade’s (1993) results are congruent with 
Isen and her colleagues’ findings; therefore dispositional affect (i.e., personality trait) and 
induced affect (e.g., either in daily life or in the laboratory) seem to have similar effects on 
decision-making and its related processes. 
Two potential disadvantages can be attributed to positive affect. First, under certain 
circumstances, individuals in whom positive affect has been induced may not help a third 
party, especially if helping would jeopardize their positive feeling; it may be interpreted as 
protection of affective state and of independence (Isen & Baron, 1991). Second, under certain 
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circumstances, positive affect may lead to quick and suboptimal decision-making because of 
the use of heuristics22 and hunches, resulting in “biased, incomplete, and incorrect solutions” 
(Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982, p. 252). Isen recognizes the fact that positive affect 
may impair performance under certain conditions, yet she concludes that positive affect does 
not reduce cognitive capacity (Isen, 1987; Isen & Baron, 1991). In addition, if the task is 
considered important and interesting, and requires effort and care, positive affect-induced 
individuals will be more thorough in their decision-making (Isen, 1993). 
A certain research tradition considers mood to be a source of information. Adhering to 
this tradition, Schwarz and Bless (1991) posit that positive mood increases the use of simple 
heuristics in information processing, with little attention to details, but increased creativity 
(the “happy and mindless” hypothesis). Based on the affect-as-information theory (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983), a positive affective state may signal a benign environment, in which case a more 
demanding processing strategy should not be necessary. Schwarz (2000) describes the 
heuristic processing strategy yielded by positive mood as a top-down processing, with high 
reliance on pre-existing knowledge structures and usual routines (see also Bless, 2000). In a 
recent study, Bless et al. (1996) have brought refinement to the “happy and mindless” 
hypothesis: they found that even if positive mood increases the reliance on general knowledge 
structures (e.g., scripts or stereotypes), it does not reduce processing capabilities, which 
supports Isen’s (1987; Isen & Baron, 1991) conclusion about positive affect. Forgas (1989) 
also found that positive mood resulted in faster decision-making, and greater self-confidence 
of individuals about their decision, but only in the case where the decision outcome was not 
personally relevant to them. In case of personally relevant decisions, individuals in a positive 
mood would probably be more systematic in their decision-making process (Elsbach & Barr, 
1999). 
There are potential disadvantages to positive mood. The use of heuristics or the lack of 
attention to details can become a disadvantage if one is to overlook important information, 
especially if the task at hand requires thorough analysis (Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Forgas 
(1989) reported that happy subjects ignored additional information to the one they already 
retained. In addition, individuals in a happy mood tend to overestimate the likelihood of 
positive, and to underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes (Loewenstein & Lerner, 
2003; Schwarz, 2000). 
                                                   
22 “a simple, inexact, but practical rule”, Isen (1987), p. 227. 
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1.4.1.2. Negative Affect/mood 
Schwarz and Bless (1991) posit that negative mood enhances considerable attention to 
details, a careful, step-by-step analysis of information, and a high degree of consistency (“sad 
and smart”). Schwarz (2000) describes this systematic processing strategy as bottom-up 
processing, with little reliance on pre-existing knowledge structures. The close attention paid 
to details could be due to the fact that negative mood signals the current situation to be 
problematic, hence the elicitation of an analytical processing strategy (Bless et al., 1996; 
Schwarz, 2000). Sinclair (1988) found depressed subjects to process information more in a 
more controlled manner, which lead to a greater accuracy in judgments. Forgas (1989) found 
that negative mood resulted in motivated and selected decision strategies towards rewarding 
outcomes. Individuals in sad moods focused on the interpersonal aspects of the decision, and 
searched more intensely for interpersonal information regarding potential collaborators. In a 
subsequent study, Forgas (1991) also found that sad participants remembered negative 
features of potential partners more than happy participants did. Elsbach and Barr’s (1999) 
findings suggest that individuals in a negative mood are more likely to use a structured 
decision protocol completely and correctly, which may be appropriate in the context of a 
complex decision-making task. 
The downside of negative mood resides in inefficient and wasteful decision strategies, 
where sad subjects consider more irrelevant information (Forgas, 1989). In sad moods, 
individuals have the tendency to underestimate the likelihood of positive, and to overestimate 
the likelihood of negative outcomes (Schwarz, 2000). In addition, Schwarz and Bless (1991) 
state that sad mood impairs creativity-related tasks. 
Some studies have addressed the relationship between negative affect and decision-
making. For example, Stone & Ziebart (1995) showed that in a preferential choice task, a 
higher level of negative affect is associated with a lower choice accuracy, which may be due 
to impaired processing capacity, especially when a large amount of information processing is 
required by a complex decision task (Lewinsohn & Mano, 1993). Stone and Ziebart found that 
participants with a higher level of negative affect (measured with 5 labels: angry, frustrated, 
irritated, overwhelmed, and threatened, based on Watson and Tellegen’s (Watson & Tellegen, 
1985) scale processed less of the available information, ignored more attributes, and hurried 
the decision, which impaired its quality. Higgins et al. (1992) report negative affect to be 
associated with constrictive thinking, decreased creativity, and use of less information in a 
more routinized way. 
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In contrast, Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki (1987), in comparing effects of positive affect 
and negative affect on creativity, did not find negative affect to result in impaired creativity, at 
least in the conditions of their study (they acknowledged the fact that different results could 
have been obtained if differentiated negative affects would have considered, such as fear, 
sadness, or anger). 
 
1.4.1.3. Emotion 
The few emerging studies addressing the influence of emotion and decision-making 
rely on appraisal theories of emotions (see section 1.1.). In doing so, researchers propose 
differentiated effects of discrete emotions, as opposed to the research that has focused on 
undifferentiated positive or negative moods (Ellsworth, 1991, Ketelaar & Clore, 1998). 
Whereas it has been reported that emotion influences action and mood influences information 
processing and decision-making (Davidson, 1994; Forgas, 2000), Ketelaar and Clore (1998) 
propose that emotional appraisals produce particular feeling states that will influence 
subsequent information processing. They argue that the emotional information provided is 
functional, as it helps individuals to solve particular problems. For example, anger is triggered 
by the encounter with someone who treated one unfairly, and provides information to the 
individual that someone is to blame. Consequently, emotion will motivate actions, such as 
punishment in this case. Ketelaar and Clore suggest another example of emotion as 
information provider is guilt: in a prisoner’s dilemma game, if the temptation of cheating 
arises, guilt becomes activated when present rewards of cheating are compared to long-term 
consequences, thus providing useful information on how to behave. 
A few other studies have been able to demonstrate the influence of discrete emotions 
on information processing or decision-making. Ellsworth (1991) reports preliminary data 
suggesting differences in the way people make judgments: sad subjects estimate the likelihood 
of events to be more caused by circumstances, whereas angry subjects estimate the likelihood 
of events to be more caused by other people. Lerner and Keltner (2000) have demonstrated 
that fear and anger affect judgments about risk in a very different manner: individuals feeling 
fear tend to make pessimistic judgments about future events, whereas individuals feeling 
anger tend to be more optimistic. Raghunathan & Pham (1999) compared the different effect 
of sadness and anxiety on decision-making processes (in a gambling and in a job selection 
task). Sad individuals tended to prefer high-risk/high reward options, especially when the 
individual is personally affected by the outcome. In contrast, anxious individuals tended to 
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prefer low-risk/low-reward options, also when personally affected. Baron, Inman, Kao, & 
Logan’s (1992) findings on fear and information processing run counter to Schwarz and 
Bless’s (1991) model of negative mood being associated with increased systematic 
information processing (see section 1.4.1.2.). They argue that it is due to the fact they induced 
an intense negative emotion, i.e. fear, as opposed to inducing a milder negative affect. Thus, 
high-fear participants evaluated a message more on its superficial attributes than on its key 
arguments, confirming thereby the hypothesis that more intense emotional states increase 
superficial processing as opposed to careful processing. 
 
1.4.1.4. Summary 
Positive affect enhances creativity and efficient decision-making. However, it may 
lead to selfishness and suboptimal decision-making based on heuristics. Positive mood is also 
found to enhance creativity and fast decision-making, based on heuristics and routine 
information processing, activated when the situation is safe. Similarly to findings on positive 
affect, the heuristics used in a positive mood state can result in suboptimal decision-making, 
especially if details that may be important for the decision are overlooked. Positive affect and 
positive mood seem to yield the same effects on decision-making and its related processes. 
Negative affect has been found to impair processing capacity and thinking in complex 
decision tasks, whereas negative mood is supposed to enhance detail, careful, systematic 
information processing, including a comprehensive and critical evaluation of alternatives 
Jones & George (1998), which is considered to improve decision quality (see section 1.3.3.). 
Thus, negative affect and negative mood seem to yield different effects on decision-making 
and its related processes. 
Jones and George (1998) propose a beneficial accumulation of both the effects of 
positive and negative affect/mood on decision-making. They hypothesize that, since managers 
experience different affective states over time, alternatively positive and negative ones, while 
dealing with an issue, they may consider this issue under different angles. For example, when 
in a positive affective state, managers may view the problem too optimistically; thus, 
reviewing it when in a more negative affective state may provide them with a more balanced 
perspective, as they would review the issue more carefully. When in a negative affective state, 
managers may view the problem too pessimistically; thus, reviewing it when in a more 
positive affective state may provide them with a broader perspective and more confidence in 
the future. In summary, these different alternating affective states would lead managers to 
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“approach decision-making in more flexible way, generate multiple alternatives, and gain a 
broadened perspective on potential threats and opportunities” (p.20-21). 
Although a clear pattern of findings about the influence of discrete emotions on 
decision-making processes does not emerge, it appears that from one discrete emotion to the 
other, one can expect specific influence on decision-making, which departs from the research 
studying effects of positive affect/mood and/or negative affect/mood (i.e. having a more 
general influence). In the present study, it will be attempted to identify the effects of different 
classes of emotions on decision-making processes. 
The literature covering emotion and group decision-making will now be reviewed. 
 
1.4.2. Emotion and group decision-making 
Eisenhardt (1989) states “emotion is critical for understanding strategic decision-
making” (p. 573) performed by top management teams. Yet, the general deficiency of 
research on affect / mood / emotion and group decision-making has been noted (Davis, 1982; 
Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). For example, Davis observed that little emphasis had been 
placed: (a) on the role of emotion in group decision-making research; and (b) on the link 
between emotional reactions of a group member and interactions with others in the group, 
although these interactions form the ground of social cognition research. Hinz et al., 
addressing the issue of information processing in groups, recognize that social-emotional 
relations are a key aspect of group performance, yet has been long ignored. Hinz et al. suggest 
research on the functions and influences of emotion and affect in task-performing groups 
should be pursued. Affect/mood/emotion has been addressed in group decision-making in 
alternative ways, as will be reviewed now. 
Research in strategic decision-making distinguishes between affective conflict and 
cognitive conflict. Affective conflict, also called socio-emotional conflict, is defined as a 
dysfunctional type of conflict, based on personal incompatibilities, disagreements, or 
criticisms (Amason, 1996; Priem & Price, 1991). According to Amason (1996), affective 
conflict leads to cynicism, avoidance, or countereffort that could jeopardize decision quality. 
One of the items selected to measure affective conflict is “How much anger (emphasis added) 
was there among the group over this decision?” The results of Amason’s study show that 
affective conflict is detrimental to decision quality. According to Priem and Price (1991), 
social-emotional conflict may arise when team members are not able to communicate 
accurately the reasons for taking a decision or another; and it may be triggered by cognitive 
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conflict, which is supposed to foster the quality of decisions. Cognitive conflict is defined as 
functional (Amason, 1996), task-oriented, and enabling the emergence of all contradictory 
viewpoints about the goals to achieve, and the decisions to be taken (Amason, 1996; Priem 
and Price, 1991). Priem and Price were not able to demonstrate that social-emotional conflict 
has a detrimental effect on decision quality. They suggest future research to investigate this 
matter. Schweiger et al. (1986; 1989) do not make the distinction between affective and 
cognitive conflict but similarly to Priem and Price, note that in a situation where cognitive 
conflict is encouraged, team members’ feelings can be damaged (e.g. feeling rejected or 
diminished, or treated unfairly), and feelings of depression or anger (emphasis added) can 
impair working relations. 
Researchers investigating decision-making in teams and conflict suggest this 
dichotomy between cognitive and affective conflict as well. Sessa (1996) defines task-
oriented conflict as the type of conflict concerned with the substance of the task (i.e. ideas or 
procedures concerning the task); and people-oriented conflict as the type of conflict directed 
toward people within the team (i.e. questioning the competence of others, arguing, and dealing 
with personality differences). Devine (1999) defines cognitive conflict as strategic, enhancing 
the examination of multiple plans to achieve the team’s goals, and affective conflict as 
interpersonal, preventing the accomplishment of the team’s goals through arguments or 
withdrawal. Devine found that unique information sharing was related negatively to 
performance (i.e., profit, in the context of a simulated strategic decision-making task) when 
affective conflict was high. 
Janis (1989) built a theoretical framework of group decision-making that he illustrates 
with case study observations, mainly the comparative case studies of decision-making by US 
government leaders. Within this theoretical framework, he distinguishes between cognitive 
decision rules and emotive decision rules. Cognitive decision rules correspond to the simple 
decision rules used by decision-makers who want to quickly find a solution that seems 
satisfactory. These cognitive rules help decision-makers cope with time pressure, limitations 
in knowledge, social pressures, and emotional stress; factors that inhibit high-quality decision-
making. Emotive decision rules correspond to decisions taken under high stress, and based on 
emotions such as fear, anger, shame, guilt, or elation (the only positive emotion in the model). 
Where Janis’s model differs from the previous models presented is that cognitive rules are not 
fully equivalent to functional decision-making and emotive rules are not fully equivalent to 
dysfunctional decision-making. Cognitive rules can be functional in certain circumstances; for 
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example, when decisions are less important; but can be dysfunctional when decisions are of 
vital importance. Emotive rules can be functional in certain circumstances; for example, when 
emotions such as shame and guilt send signals to decision-makers that they should reconsider 
their decisions; but can be dysfunctional, for example, when intense anger leads to blind 
retaliation or high arousal of elation leads to a rapid closure in information search and 
incomplete deliberations. 
The above-mentioned studies continue to rely on the traditional dichotomy between 
cognitive processes associated with rationality and affective processes associated with 
irrationality, or at least, impairment of rationality, although results regarding the negative 
impact of affective conflict on decision quality are mixed. However, it is also acknowledged 
that, on the one hand, a certain degree of positive affective relationships are necessary for 
team members to feel satisfied with their team and motivated to continue to work with each 
other (Amason, 1996; Priem and Price, 1991; Schweiger et al., 1986; 1989), and that, on the 
other hand, a moderate level of emotions can contribute to effective decision-making (Janis, 
1989; Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994). 
Communication research suggests that the quality of the climate within groups affects 
decision-making. For example, Mayer (1998) found that a negative climate supported by 
negative socio-emotional behaviors (such as disagreement, sarcasms, attacks, expressed 
dislike towards group members) are perceived to decrease the quality of the decision, whereas 
a positive climate supported by positive socio-emotional ones (such as agreement, respect, 
support) are perceived to improve the decision: information exchanges are increased, and 
cooperation is higher. Research on group decision-making also points out the advantageous 
aspect of a positive climate, where team members can feel free to express themselves without 
fear of criticism by other team members (Moreland & Levine, 1992; Shaw, 1981). 
Research on diversity in decision-making teams (e.g., Jackson et al., 1995) relies on 
Isen’s (see section 1.4.1.1. for details) findings on positive affect, and posits that given that 
positive affect triggers helping behavior, it can be supposed that team members will be more 
motivated to work together on a decision task. In contrast, Jackson et al. posit that anxiety 
would inhibit team members to participate in the decision activity. 
Emotion has been studied also in the general group and group decision-making 
literature. The main findings are: (a) group cohesiveness is positively related to emotional 
control and emotional stability of group members, and negatively related to anxiety and 
defensiveness (Shaw, 1981); (b) anxiety created by stress narrows the attention of decision-
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makers, slows them down, but does not impair the quality of decisions taken if enough time is 
allowed (Zander, 1994); and (c) high level of emotion (namely anger and anxiety) is a 
condition for judgment to be impaired (Furnham, 1997). Zander (1994) describes a study 
suggesting that the highest quality decisions are taken in groups where members agree to 
delay affective demonstrations until the decision task is over, and that groups in which 
members express their feelings freely generate less alternatives and devote less effort to the 
task. Zander does not report the nature of emotions felt and/or expressed. 
As far as research on collective emotion is concerned, the studies that have addressed 
this concept did not consider its influence on group decision-making processes such as 
described in section 1.3, but found relationships with different group performance indicators. 
The following findings are related to the studies previously described in section 1.2. In this 
previous section, definitions and operationalizations of collective emotion were described. 
Hereafter, the focus will be on the influence of collective emotion on other different team 
processes. For example, Barsade (2001) found that positive emotional contagion is positively 
related to level of cooperativeness and collectivistic behavior in the group, and is negatively 
related to conflict. Bartel and Saavedra (1998) found that pleasant moods (such as being 
happy, delighted, pleased) and activated pleasant moods (such as being excited, enthusiastic, 
elated) enhance the quality and the efficiency of group performance, whereas unpleasant 
moods (such as being sad, gloomy, unhappy) and activated unpleasant (such as being fearful, 
annoyed, anxious) enhance the quantity and goal attainment aspects of group performance. 
George (1990) has found positive affective tone to be negatively related to absenteeism, and 
negative affective tone to be negatively related to prosocial behavior. 
 
1.4.2.1. Summary 
In the group decision-making literature, emotion is (a) included in a broader concept 
called “affective conflict”, (b) divided in positive vs. negative dimensions, or (c) described 
mostly in theoretical terms (anger, shame, guilt, anxiety, and elation are the most frequently 
mentioned emotions). 
It appears that anger may play a negative role in decision-making teams, and may have 
the potential to deteriorate relationships between team members. This is confirmed by 
research addressing the role of anger in negotiations23: partners with a high anger level do not 
                                                   
23 Negotiation can be compared to decision-making, as there are some common features, such as generating 
alternatives for example (e.g., Jackson et al., 1995), but to reach a suitable outcome for both parties, one could 
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want to work again with each other in the future (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997) or 
reject alternatives offered, especially if the deal is considered unfair or humiliating (Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1996). In addition, anger seems to be embedded in the concept of affective 
conflict. Although the way researchers have operationalized affective conflict addresses 
several of the possible antecedents of anger, this seems to confirm the detrimental role of 
anger in decision-making. 
Anxiety appears to deteriorate working relations, to inhibit team members’ 
participation in the decision activities, to narrow decision-makers’ attention, and to slow the 
decision-making process. Shame or guilt appear to provide information to decision-makers 
that their decisions might need to be revised, for example if they would turn out to be too 
unethical, or too risky. Elation appears to lead to hasty decision-making, where alternatives or 
information might be overlooked. 
Empirical research considering both the effects of emotion as defined in section 1.1. 
(i.e. a dynamic process, object or event related, limited in its duration, with specific action 
tendencies and behavioral consequences), and of collective emotions, on group decision-
making is still sparse. The present study proposes to empirically address the influence of a 
greater variety of emotions, at the individual and at the collective level, on team decision-
making processes. In the following section, the research objective of the study and detailed 
hypotheses are presented. 
                                                                                                                                                               
speculate that evaluating alternatives, sharing information, and committing to the deal are parts of the negotiation 
process as well. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Research Objective 
Team decision-making consists of two core processes (alternative generation and 
alternative evaluation), and of two supporting factors (sharing information and team 
cohesion). These four elements involve a large amount of interactions among team members. 
At times these interactions may evoke emotion. Emotion, in contrast to affect or mood, is 
object and/or event-related, and plays a social role as it reflects the ongoing exchanges and 
mutual influences individuals experience in a social context. Thus, emotion has the potential 
to influence or to be influenced by any of the processes underlying team decision-making, 
such as generating new alternatives, evaluating these alternatives and making final choices, 
sharing information or experiences with team members, or committing to team decisions 
while enjoying to work with other team members. 
The mutual influence of emotion and decision-making processes in a team context 
being acknowledged, the objective of this research is to determine the extent to which four 
classes of emotions (achievement emotions, approach emotions, resignation emotions, and 
antagonistic emotions) influence four decision-making processes (alternative generation, 
alternative evaluation, sharing information, and team cohesion) (a) at the individual level, (b) 
at the aggregated team level (i.e., emotions reported by individual team members aggregated 
at the team level), and (c) at the group consensus level (emotion reported as the result of a 
group discussion about the team members’ perception of what the prevalent emotion(s) has 
been during the decision task). Although the primary interest of this study is to focus on team 
processes, it seems reasonable to first test the hypotheses at the individual level. Emotions and 
decision-making processes were measured at that level, and some meaningful interactions 
may be revealed at the psychological level. 
The detailed hypotheses for each class of emotions in regard with each of the decision-
making processes are outlined next. 
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2.1. Hypotheses 
2.2.1. Achievement Emotions and Team Decision-Making Processes 
Achievement emotions include pride, elation, joy, and satisfaction. As outlined in 
section 1.1. (see pp. 7 and 9), these four emotions are suggested to be representative of 
achievement emotions, but not to be an exhaustive list. Achievement emotions are expected to 
induce openness, free activation, exuberance, expansiveness, but also patience and tolerance 
towards others. Research on group decision-making indicates that a positive atmosphere 
encourages team members to share information or ideas. One can assume that achievement 
emotions would contribute to the formation of such an atmosphere. Sharing information, one 
of the four decision-making processes examined in this research, reflects the team members’ 
willingness to share their knowledge, expertise, and skills with others, as well as any 
information that would prevent the team to make a decision influenced by the team members’ 
preferences of any particular alternative. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H1a: Achievement emotions will be positively related to sharing information. 
 
Achievement emotions enhance flexible thinking, creativity, and openness. Research 
on affect and decision-making has demonstrated that positive affect or mood, which is 
operationalized in studies with verbal labels such as “happy” or “elated”, enhance cognitive 
flexibility, creative thinking, innovation, and broader information search. Alternative 
generation, one of the four decision-making processes examined in this research, reflects the 
ability of team members to generate a wide range as well as a wide number of alternatives in 
order to make sure that the team has not overlooked any important avenue, and which requires 
a certain form of creativity. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H1b: Achievement emotions will be positively related to alternative generation. 
 
Achievement emotions may lead to boastful actions with low concentration and a 
slowing down of productive thinking. Research on positive mood has demonstrated that it is 
associated with the use of simpler decision rules, with little attention paid to details, and a 
tendency to overlook important information or to underestimate the likelihood of negative 
outcomes. Alternative evaluation, one of the four decision-making processes examined in this 
research, implies the thorough examination of all available alternatives, and an analysis of 
costs and benefits of each alternative, that would prevent the team to ignore some crucial 
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input for the decision. This decision-making process requires time and effort. Thus, I 
hypothesize that: 
H1c: Achievement emotions will be negatively related to alternative evaluation. 
 
Achievement emotions enhance individual and group identity and mark the celebration 
of success, especially when a task or a goal has been competently accomplished. Achievement 
emotions give team members the desire to be together, to celebrate together, and to fully 
participate to the team’s activities. Research in strategic decision-making suggests that 
positive affective relationships among team members enable them to work together 
effectively. Team cohesion, one of the four decision-making processes examined in this 
research, represents the commitment by all team members to the team’s decisions and to the 
team itself, implying positive feelings toward team members in respect to enhancing present 
and future performance of the team. Thus I hypothesize that: 
H1d: Achievement emotions will be positively related to team cohesion. 
 
2.2.2. Approach Emotions and Team Decision-Making Processes 
Approach emotions include relief, hope, interest, and surprise. These four emotions 
are suggested to be representative of approach emotions24 . Approach emotions are expected 
to motivate individuals toward the acquisition of new information and new competencies. 
Team members are involved and attending team activities, but are also relaxed. An open and 
relaxed atmosphere should be favorable to the exchange of information among team members. 
Sharing information reflects the team members’ willingness to share their knowledge, 
expertise, and skills with others, as well as any information that would prevent the team to 
make a decision influenced by the team members’ preferences of any particular alternative. 
Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H2a: Approach emotions will be positively related to sharing information. 
 
Approach emotions are associated with creative activities, accompanied with 
intellectual curiosity and energy; exploring behaviors are stimulated. Alternative generation 
reflects the ability of team members to generate a wide range as well as a wide number of 
                                                   
24 See comment at the beginning of section 2.2.1., p. 60. 
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alternatives in order to make sure that the team has not overlooked any important avenue, and 
which requires a certain form of creativity. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H2b: Approach emotions will be positively related to alternative generation. 
 
Approach emotions induce vigilance, mobilization, and persistence even in tedious 
tasks. Team members may be ready to expand effort if necessary. Research in affect and 
decision-making has demonstrated that if individuals are interested and motivated, and if they 
consider the task personally relevant to them or to their team, they will engage in thorough, 
systematic, and effortful analysis of the situation. Alternative evaluation implies the thorough 
examination of all available alternatives and an analysis of costs and benefits of each 
alternative. This decision-making process requires effort. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H2c: Approach emotions will be positively related to alternative evaluation. 
 
Approach emotions sustain group activity as they reinforce links between people. 
Team members feeling approach emotions are mobilized to move forward, and are not only 
committed to the task, but also to work together. Team cohesion represents the commitment 
by all team members to the team’s decisions and to the team itself, implying positive feelings 
toward team members in respect to enhancing present and future performance of the team. 
Thus I hypothesize that: 
H2d: Approach emotions will be positively related to team cohesion. 
 
2.2.3. Resignation Emotions and Team Decision-Making Processes 
Resignation emotions include sadness, fear, shame and guilt. These four emotions are 
suggested to be representative of resignation emotions25. Resignation emotions are associated 
with behaviors such as withdrawal, hiding, avoidance, and apathy. Resignation emotions mark 
a phase of internal focus and re-gathering before engaging in new activities. Research on the 
influence of negative mood (i.e., sad mood) shows that individuals have the tendency to 
consider irrelevant information. Research in group decision-making has show that resignation 
emotions have the potential to prevent team members from expressing themselves freely, 
especially if the threat is felt to be exercised by other team members. In such a climate, it is 
unclear whether team members are willing to expose new and/or relevant information. 
                                                   
25 See comment at the beginning of section 2.2.1., p. 60. 
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Sharing information reflects the team members’ willingness to share their knowledge, 
expertise, and skills with others, as well as any information that would prevent the team to 
make a decision influenced by the team members’ preferences of any particular alternative. 
Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H3a: Resignation emotions will be negatively related to sharing information. 
 
Resignation emotions are associated with the narrowing of thoughts, with tunnel 
vision, ruminations over the same thoughts, lack of confidence, and little innovation. Research 
on emotion and decision-making suggests that individuals feeling fear are more pessimistic 
about future events; research on mood and decision-making suggests that sad individuals 
overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes. It appears that under the influence of 
resignation emotions, team members will have difficulty to propose a wide range of 
innovative alternatives. Alternative generation reflects the ability of team members to 
generate a wide range as well as a wide number of alternatives in order to make sure that the 
team has not overlooked any important avenue, and which requires a certain form of 
creativity. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H3b: Resignation emotions will be negatively related to alternative generation. 
 
Resignation emotions promote the possibility to review team objectives realistically, 
and to think carefully about risks. Research on mood and group decision-making suggests that 
negative mood (i.e., sad mood) leads team members to proceed to a thorough analysis of the 
situation. Research on affect or mood and decision-making concurs as it consistently 
demonstrates that negative mood (i.e., sad mood) enhances considerable attention to details 
and a careful, step-by-step analysis of alternatives. Research on group decision-making 
indicates that a reasonable level of shame or guilt encourages decision-makers to revise their 
decisions. Alternative evaluation implies the thorough examination of all available 
alternatives and an analysis of costs and benefits of each alternative. This decision-making 
process requires time and effort. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H3c: Resignation emotions will be positively related to alternative evaluation. 
 
Resignation emotions enhance group conformity, the reinforcement of social bonds, 
the request for others’ support, and encourage reconciliation and empathy, concomitantly with 
a reduced aggressiveness. Research on mood and group decision-making has demonstrated 
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that individuals in a sad mood show a higher level of cooperation, especially if the group is 
seriously threatened. Team cohesion represents the commitment by all team members to the 
team’s decisions and to the team itself, implying positive feelings toward team members in 
respect to enhancing present and future performance of the team. Thus I hypothesize that: 
H3d: Resignation emotions will be positively related to team cohesion. 
 
2.2.4. Antagonistic Emotions and Team Decision-Making Processes 
Antagonistic emotions include envy, disgust, contempt, and anger. These four 
emotions are suggested to be representative of antagonistic emotions26. Antagonistic emotions 
are characterized by some form of aggressiveness, active or passive, and rejection. The 
climate based on antagonistic emotions does not encourage team members to share their 
knowledge or information relevant to the decision: certain team members may exert pressure 
on remaining team members. Sharing information reflects the team members’ willingness to 
share their knowledge, expertise, and skills with others, as well as any information that would 
prevent the team to make a decision influenced by the team members’ preferences of any 
particular alternative. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H4a: Antagonistic emotions will be negatively related to sharing information. 
 
Antagonistic emotions are triggered when team members feel they have been treated 
unfairly, or harm as been done to them, or their goals have been threatened. Thus, antagonistic 
emotions encourage mobilization and ideas of retaliation. Team members remain very focused 
on the object of revenge and have a strong desire to reinstate their threatened goals. Given that 
the attention is centered on a narrow range of targets, it is unlikely that team members will 
generate alternatives outside of the scope of their revenge. Alternative generation reflects the 
ability of team members to generate a wide range as well as a wide number of alternatives in 
order to make sure that the team has not overlooked any important avenue, and which requires 
a certain form of creativity. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H4b: Antagonistic emotions will be negatively related to alternative generation. 
 
Antagonistic emotions are held responsible for defective decision-making, as 
demonstrated by research on group decision-making. When motivated by retaliation or 
                                                   
26 See comment at the beginning of section 2.2.1., p. 60. 
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aggression, team members may not take the time to weigh the consequences of their 
decisions. Alternative evaluation implies the thorough examination of all available 
alternatives and an analysis of costs and benefits of each alternative. This decision-making 
process requires time and effort. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H4c: Antagonistic emotions will be negatively related to alternative evaluation. 
 
Research on strategic decision-making suggests that affective conflict is characterized 
by disputes, personal attacks, verbal aggressiveness, which are typically antagonistic-related 
behaviors. In addition, the operationalization of affective conflict reflects the fact that anger is 
the underlying emotion behind affective conflict. The danger of a vicious circle based on 
anger may occur: team members argue over an issue, may start to verbally attack each other, 
thus triggering anger, which in turn motivates team members to retaliate. In such a climate, 
the likelihood of wanting to continue to work together is rather low, as shown by the research 
on anger and negotiations and by research on the role of affective conflict and strategic 
decision-making. Team cohesion represents the commitment by all team members to the 
team’s decisions and to the team itself, implying positive feelings toward team members in 
respect to enhancing present and future performance of the team. Thus I hypothesize that: 
H4d: Antagonistic emotions will be negatively related to team cohesion. 
 
2.2.5. Summary 
In summary, these 16 hypotheses will be tested at the individual level (i.e., emotions 
reported by individual team members), at the group consensus level (emotion reported as the 
result of a group discussion about the team members’ perception of what the prevalent 
emotion(s) has been during the decision task), and at the aggregated level (i.e., emotions 
reported by individual team members aggregated at the team level) – see Figure 1 for a 
summary view. 
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Figure 1. Summary view of hypotheses. 
 
The following section will describe the method used to test these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
3.1. Participants 
The participants were 106 managers, 96 males (90.6%) and 10 females (9.4%) taking 
part in executive development seminars. The participants attended the seminars in batches of 
successively 27, 23, 32 and 24 persons in each class. Two of the classes came from the same 
multinational organization, i.e. the participants came from 3 different organizations in total. 
The participants were selected by their top management to attend the seminars. The average 
age was 33.85 (SD = 5.37) for the total sample, ranging from 25 to 51 years. The participants 
had an average experience as managers of 10 years; they can be considered as expert decision-
makers (Zsambok, 1997). The common language was English. As the headquarters of the 
companies were located in Germany and in The Netherlands, the percentage of participants 
coming from these two countries were separated: 16% of the participants came from 
Germany, and 40,6% came from the Netherlands. Then 29,2% of the participants came from 
Europe (EU and non EU, including former Eastern Europe countries), 5,7% from Asia, 3,8% 
from North America, 2,8% from Africa, and 1,9% from South America. 
Each class was then divided in 5 teams, with 4 to 7 participants per team (M = 5.3); 
the total number of teams was 20. Heterogeneous teams were formed before the seminar 
started, and the teams remained together for the duration of the simulation (presented below in 
section 3.3.). The objective was to obtain the widest mix of nationalities, of functions and of 
business units, to ensure a balance of backgrounds, and at the same time to avoid having 
either too many participants of the same function or too many specialists in any of the 
particular functions (Fandt, Richardson, & Conner, 1990). Heterogeneous teams have been 
shown to be more effective and to make higher-quality decisions when dealing with non-
routine, complex problems (Amason, 1996; Sniezek, 1992). In addition, there were no 
designated leaders. Team members operated as a self-managed team, acting as a board of 
directors of the company they have to manage during the business simulation, which was a 
main learning component of the seminar, and during which the decision-making processes 
were studied. 
3.2. Measures 
Self-report measures were used for both the independent and the dependent variables. 
Verbal reports of emotion represent a common methodology, although its limits have been 
acknowledged (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2001), as they are based on subjects’ memories and 
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conscious subjective feeling (Scherer, 2000). However, in natural or quasi-natural settings, as 
is the case in the present study, this method appears to be the most appropriate one. As far as 
decision-making variables are concerned, self-report measures are used in research on group 
decision-making or strategic decision-making (e.g., Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). Amason (1996) 
for example argues that in the case of teams operating in an uncertain and complex 
environment, it is difficult to evaluate the quality of a decision objectively as criteria can vary 
from context to context. Thus, the group’s own evaluation may the best way of assessing the 
decision-making processes retrospectively (Amason, 1996; Sniezek, 1992). Furthermore, the 
present study adopts a position similar to Dean and Sharfman’s (1996): 
“… it is clearly necessary that we frame our model at the decision level of analysis, rather than at 
the overall firm-performance level. Doing so avoids the problem of ambiguity of causal ordering – the 
question of whether success is the cause or the effect of the decision process – that would accompany the 
choice of firm performance as focus (…) Firm performance is a function of a diverse array of factors, 
which may mask the effect of decision processes.” (p. 371), 
thus focuses on decision-making process rather than on decision outcomes (i.e. firm 
performance). 
 
3.2.1. Classes of Emotion 
The four classes of emotions (achievement emotions, approach emotions, resignation 
emotions, and antagonistic emotions) were measured with the Emotion Wheel (see Appendix 
A). This paper-and-pencil instrument includes 16 emotions in total (four emotions per class of 
emotion), and each emotion can be rated on four levels of intensity, on a scale from 1 (lowest 
intensity, close to the origin) to 4 (strongest intensity, at the perimeter): there are in total 64 
emotions represented. The emotions are organized along two appraisal criteria selected from 
Scherer’s (1984a) Stimulus Evaluation Checks (SECs), Pleasantness/Unpleasantness, and 
Low Control/High Control, in a circular form, each emotion with its four levels of intensity 
forming a radiant. 
The Emotion Wheel was designed to represent quality and intensity, organized along 
two dimensions, with its advantage as a practical data collection instrument (see Appendix B 
for a description of its validation). Emotion labels are positioned along a radiant because 
intensity was taken into consideration for each of the single emotions composing the 
quadrants of the Emotion Wheel (each class of emotions occupying a quadrant on the Wheel), 
which departs from Russell’s circumplex where intensity was not taken into consideration. 
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Russell (1980, p. 1170), however, did suggest that a wheel would be an appropriate 
representation of relative intensity. 
 
3.2.2. Decision-Making Processes 
All decision-making variables were measured on a 10-point Likert-type scale (0-9) 
two times, once after the second decision period (called Time 127), and once after the sixth 
decision period (called Time 228). Anchors were specified for each item. Mean scores were 
then calculated, in order to obtain global scores for each scale used in subsequent analyses. 
3.2.2.1. Sharing Information 
A specific scale was designed for this study. All references below are mentioned in 
section 1.3.1. The first item, “To what extent did team members contribute their relevant 
expertise/experience/insights?” (0 = very few did, 9 = everyone did) is based on Devine 
(1999), Gigone & Hastie (1993), Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale (1996), Hollingshead 
(1996), Kim (1997), Larson et al. (1994), Schulz-Hardt et al. (2000), Stasser & Titus (1985), 
Stasser & Titus (1987), Williams et al., (1997), and Wittenbaum et al. (1999). The second 
item, “To what extent do you think team members withhold their relevant knowledge?” (0 = 
not at all, 9 = a lot) is based on Leana’s (1985) concept of self-censorship, which, if it occurs, 
is detrimental to decision-making. The third item, “To what extent did team members ignore 
important information that was brought in?” (0 = not much, 9 = a lot) and the fourth item, 
“How many team members seem to hear only the things supporting their present opinion?” (0 
= not at all, 9 = a lot) are based on Gigone and Hastie (1993), Stasser and Titus (1985, 1987), 
supported by recent findings (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000). The three latter items, negatively 
worded, were reverse-coded. The four items were averaged to create a scale measuring 
sharing information. The internal-consistency coefficient for the scale, Cronbach’s alpha, 
reached .42 at Time 1 and .57 at Time 2. Thus, it was decided to eliminate this scale in 
subsequent analyses, in other words Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d cannot be tested. 
3.2.2.2. Alternative Generation 
Alternative generation has not usually been measured with a self-report scale but 
rather in the context of tasks where the researchers could actually count the number of 
                                                   
27 Then, the team had worked together in a naturalistic decision-making environment for two times three to four 
hours. 
28 Then, the team had worked together in a naturalistic decision-making environment for four times three to four 
hours. 
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alternatives generated (e.g. Scudder et al., 1994). Thus, a specific scale was designed for this 
study. All references below are mentioned in section 1.3.2. The first item, “How many 
alternatives do you think your team generated, compared to what one would expect?” (0 = less 
than expected, 9 = more than expected) is based on Osborn (1957/1974), March and Simon 
(1958), and Eisenhardt (1989). The second item, “To what extent did team members restrict 
themselves to a limited set of alternatives?” (0 = not at all, 9 = a lot) is based on the concepts 
of production blocking (Diehl & Strobe, 1997), social loafing (Latané et al., 1979), or free 
riding (Kerr & Brunn, 1983). This item was reverse-coded. The third item, “To what extent do 
you think your team generated non-obvious alternatives?” (0 = not at all, 9 = a lot) and the 
fourth item, “To what extent did your team try to come up with innovative solutions?” (0 = 
not at all, 9= a lot) are based on Hackman & Morris (1983), Paulus (2000), Paulus and Yang 
(2000), and Eisenhardt (1989). The internal-consistency coefficient for the scale, Cronbach’s 
alpha, reached of .66 at Time 1 and .62 at Time 2. In consequence, the four items were 
averaged to produce a scale score. 
3.2.2.3. Alternative Evaluation 
Based on Janis’s (1989) recommendation to conceptualize a decision criterion such as 
alternative evaluation in such a way that one could give a low, medium or high rating, a scale 
was developed. All references below are mentioned in section 1.3.3. The first item, “To what 
extent do you think your team may have thoroughly reviewed all alternatives before making 
the decision?” (0 = not reviewed, 9 = thoroughly reviewed) is based on Johnston et al. (1997), 
Turner et al. (1992), and Schweiger et al. (1986). The second item, “To what extent did you 
look at the cost and benefits of the alternatives you finally considered?” (0 = did not look, 9 = 
looked extensively) is based on Hollingshead (1996), Janis (1982, 1989), Janis and Mann 
(1977), and Mayer (1998). The third item, “To what extent do you think your team jumped 
too quickly to a conclusion?” (0 = not at all, 9 = very much so) is based on Aldag and Fuller 
(1993) and Scudder et al. (1994). This item was reverse-coded. The fourth item, “How 
effective was your team at focusing its attention on crucial information and ignoring irrelevant 
information?” (0 = not effective, 9 = very effective) is an item developed by Dean and 
Sharfman (1996). The four items were averaged to create a measure of alternative evaluation. 
The internal-consistency coefficient for the scale, Cronbach’s alpha, reached .58 at Time 1 
and .60 at Time 2. The third item had the lowest correlation with other items (r = .25 at Time 
1 and r = .16 at Time 2), thus it was decided to eliminate it. In consequence, the three 
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remaining items were averaged to produce a scale score. Cronbach’s alpha was recalculated 
and reached .60 at Time 1 and .69 at Time 2. 
3.2.2.4. Team Cohesion 
The four items composing this scale were borrowed from existing scales. The first 
item, “To what extent would you want to be a member of this team again?” (0 = never again, 
9 = any time, for any project) was adapted from Leana (1985), Seashore (1954, reproduced in 
Cartwright and Zander, 1968), Terborg, Castore, & DeNinno (1976), Turner et al. (1992), and 
Wech et al. (1998). The second item, “How satisfied are you with the way decisions were 
reached in your team?” (0 = not satisfied, 9 = very satisfied) was adapted from Amason 
(1996), and Schweiger et al. (1986). The third item, “Did you enjoy working with the group 
on the decisions?” (0 = not at all, 9 = very much) was adapted from Amason (1996), Leana 
(1985), Priem and Price (1991), Schweiger et al. (1986), and Zaccaro (1991). The fourth item, 
“To what extent do you feel committed to your team’s decisions?” was adapted from Priem 
and Price (1991) and Schweiger et al. (1986). The internal-consistency coefficient for the 
scale, Cronbach’s alpha, reached .80 at Time 1 and .86 at Time 2. In consequence, the four 
items were averaged to produce a scale score. 
 
3.3. Procedure 
Before the simulation started, participants were instructed about the nature of the 
simulation. They received (a) a set of newsletters that instruct them about the market 
conditions and the technical aspects of the decision-making task, and (b) a booklet briefly 
outlining the study, including dictionary (“Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current 
English”) definitions for the 16 emotions of interest in this study– see Appendix C. They were 
told that reporting emotions over an extended period of time would be part of the learning 
process. 
The participants operated in a quasi-naturalistic decision-making environment, defined 
by Johnston, Driskell, & Salas (1997) as follows: “… decisions are made under time pressure, 
data are ambiguous or conflicting, the consequences of error or poor performance are costly, 
and decision makers are familiar with the task.” (p. 615) The business simulation used in the 
present study was designed to help participants see the integration of different functions and 
competencies necessary to run a multinational organization. It is a complex, large-scale 
simulation that requires complex decision-making strategies to deal with multiple inputs, 
 72 
unpredictable events, and competing groups (Thornton-III & Cleveland, 1990). Simulations 
have been identified as being efficient and pivotal in the development of managers, because 
they provide a viable and cost-effective means to develop managers in realistic, but non-
threatening situations. Furthermore, “simulations elicit overt behaviors of participants related 
to complex skills such as communication, decision making, and interpersonal interaction” 
(Thornton III & Cleveland, 1990, p. 191). The task is not only designed to practice decision-
making and business analysis, but also to help participants learn about team processes and 
team behaviors. 
Technically, each team was equipped with a PC running the simulation program called 
Topsim-EURO (developed by Unicon GmbH, Meersburg, Germany). It is designed to 
integrate decision-making across functions (marketing, sales, R&D, production, logistics, 
finance). The underlying computer program contains more than 7000 sigmoid equations. 
These curves combined with each individual team’s decisions permit almost an infinite array 
of alternative outcomes. Thus, each team was challenged to generate as many alternatives as 
possible and perform “what-ifs” during each decision period. 
Participants managed a company during 8 fictitious years. During the first 3 “years”, 
they operated locally, within the country assigned to each of the teams. During the 5 next 
“years”, they operated internationally: they could expand up to five other countries. The level 
of complexity increased from “year” to “year”, depending on how global each team chooses 
to compete; that is, make complex decisions. Each fictitious year lasted between 3 and 3 ½ 
hours, and was called a decision period. During each period P, participants made strategic 
(long-term effects and organizational goals), tactical (medium-term effects), and operational 
decisions (short-term effects and routine decisions) (Furnham, 1997). These decisions were 
recorded on a 3.5 computer diskette, handed to the instructor, who then centralized all the data 
on a separate computer. Before the start of the next decision period, teams received a report 
that is the equivalent of real organizations’ annual reports, containing all relevant financial 
figures. The exercise was very relevant to the participants, as they had to present the totality 
of their outcome (i.e. both business and human aspects) to a member of the real board of their 
respective company. The evaluation made by the member of the board may be perceived 
critical in their career advancement; thus, their motivation to perform well was as high as it 
could be in these circumstances. 
In each decision room, an A3 copy of the Emotion Wheel was posted, including the 64 
labels corresponding to each circle/intensity level, as a reference document indicating the 
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definition of each emotion. For each decision period, each team received an A4 Emotion 
Wheel to record their team emotion; the individual scoring sheet included 3 small Emotion 
Wheels, reduced so they can fit on a recto-verso A4 sheet, one for each time of measurement 
(Appendix D). At the beginning of each decision period, participants selected 2 emotions 
reported on the Emotion Wheel “B”. At the mid-point of the decision period, they selected 2 
emotions on the Emotion Wheel “M”. At the end of the decision period, they selected 2 
emotions on the Emotion Wheel “E”. The sheet included a few lines for additional comments. 
The criterion for selecting the two emotions was their degree of importance for the participant. 
At the end of each decision period, before the teams were ready to hand their final sets 
of business decisions to the instructor, participants all together discussed and selected the 2 
emotions they thought prevailed in the team during the whole decision period. The scores 
were obtained through open discussion among the team members (see Gibson, 1999), and one 
team member was recording the scores on a separate A4 Emotional Wheel. These ratings 
represented the group consensus score of emotion. Yammarino and Markham (1992) have 
recommended that a good measure of group affect might be to ask respondents to describe the 
group’s affect. Wierba and Mackie-Lewis (1994) have raised the question regarding the 
possibility of establishing a relationship between members’ emotions and the group’s 
emotions. It remains to be demonstrated whether a group emotion is the equivalent of the 
aggregation of the individual emotions, or if a group emotion is one that members can 
recognize they would not need to feel or did not feel individually until discussion. The 
procedure of collecting business decisions, individual and group consensus emotions was 
repeated eight times (see p. 84 for a summary graph of the design). 
The 16-item questionnaire designed to measure decision-making processes (Appendix 
E) was distributed to participants the first time between the second and the third decision 
periods, right before the financial results of the second period were provided. The same 
questionnaire was administered a second time between the sixth and the seventh decision 
periods, right before the financial results of the sixth period were provided. 
On the last day of the seminar, participants were debriefed on the study. Emotional 
maps per team for selected time periods and an emotional map of all teams for all time periods 
were drawn. An example is shown below (Fig. 2). More examples are provided in Appendix 
F. 
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Figure 2. Example of an emotional map from one team during the first period of the 
simulation. 
 
Their answers to the decision-making questionnaire were represented by histograms 
comparing the results of the questionnaire administered after Period 2 and the one 
administered after Period 6. An example is shown in Figure 3. More examples are provided in 
Appendix G. 
Figure 3. Example of a summary of decision-making data provided to participants. 
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3.4. Overview of Analyses 
3.4.1. Correlations 
One-tailed bivariate correlations29 were performed, as the purpose of this study is to 
determine the extent to which the four classes of emotions may influence on decision-making 
processes. This study is correlational. Given the fact that this study is exploratory and non-
experimental, results with a p level < .10 are reported as well. 
Procedures for aggregation of data to the team level will be presented below. 
Regression analyses performed to assess the relative weight of each class of emotions 
in predicting responses about decision-making processes are reported in Appendix H. 
 
3.4.2. Data Preparation 
Individual scores for each class of emotions, based on the intensity level for each 
selected emotion, were created and aggregated over time in 3 categories: (a) Periods 1 to 6, 
which will be labeled ‘Overall’; (b) Periods 1 and 2, which will be labeled ‘Starting Phase’; 
and (c) Periods 3 to 6, which will be labeled ‘Developing Phase’. Each participant had a 
score for achievement emotions (composed of scores for pride, elation, joy, and satisfaction), 
approach emotions (composed of scores for relief, hope, interest, and surprise), resignation 
emotions (composed of scores for sadness, fear, shame, and guilt), and antagonistic emotions 
(composed of scores for envy, disgust, contempt, and anger). For each period (Period 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, and 6), each emotion score at the beginning, the middle, and the end of the decision 
period were averaged to form a Period score, then Periods 1 and 2 scores were averaged 
together to form Starting Phase scores, and Periods 3, 4, 5, and 6 were averaged to form 
Developing Phase scores. The data for Periods 7 and 8 was not taken into consideration in the 
analyses, as the second questionnaire measuring the dependent variables was administered 
after Period 6. 
Participants selected only two emotions as explained in section 3.3. Zeros were 
entered whenever any emotion was not selected, so that the non-responses were not 
considered as missing values. Counting the non-selected emotions as missing values would be 
appropriate if the objective was to measure emotional blends such as (Scherer & Ceschi, 
1997) did identify emotional blends in a naturalistic context. Thus, the solution to enter zeros 
                                                   
29 The direction of the predictions is given in the hypotheses. 
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was considered to be best one for the purpose of this study. Let us take an example with 
achievement emotions, composed of pride, elation, joy, and satisfaction. If someone reported 
a score of 3 on pride and a score of 4 on joy at a given period, the average score for 
achievement emotions was M = 1.75, i.e. the average of the reported intensity for pride (score 
of 3) and joy (score of 4) plus scores of zero for respectively elation and satisfaction (the two 
non-chosen emotions). 
 
3.4.3. Specific Treatment of Emotion Data 
According to Stone, Shiffman, & De Vries (1999), there are three kinds of memory 
processes occurring when subjects try to remember events or emotions that occurred over a 
certain period of time: they may compute a kind of average; they may remember only the 
peak experience; or they may remember only the last experience. In order to address these 
characteristics of self-reports (see also Kahneman, 1999 on Peak-End evaluations), and in 
order to enrich the data analyses, three types of emotion scores were computed: 
- The mean of all emotion scores reported over all decision periods (i.e. 
variables called Mean Overall, Mean Starting Phase, Mean Developing Phase); 
- The maximum intensity of emotion scores reported over all decision 
periods of time concerned (i.e. variables called Max Overall, Max Starting Phase, 
Max Developing Phase); 
- The last emotion score reported just before the questionnaire measuring 
decision-making processes (i.e. variables called Last of Starting Phase, Last of 
Developing Phase). 
 
3.4.4. Levels of Analysis 
Analyses were executed at three levels: 1) individual level; 2) aggregated team level; 
and 3) group consensus level. Multi-level or cross-level research has contributed to the 
methodology addressing group issues (e.g., Chan, 1998; Ilgen, Major, Hollenbeck, & Sego, 
1995; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984, James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993; Kenny & Voie, 1985). 
Researchers considering group or organizational phenomena were concerned that the 
statistical techniques used at the individual level were not adapted to group level analyses. 
These obstacles have been partially overcome during the past decade (Simpson & Wood, 
1992). In the present study, Kenny and La Voie’s (1985) Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
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(ICC) will be calculated, as well as James, Demaree, and Wolf’s (1984) Interrater Reliability 
Coefficient (IRR). The detailed procedure is presented next. 
3.4.4.1. Aggregation to the Team Level of Analysis 
To ensure the feasibility of aggregation to the team-level, two measures of within-
group agreement were used (e.g., Bartel & Saavedra, 1998; Edmondson, 1996). The first 
measure is the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) (Kenny and La Voie, 1985), and the 
second measure is the interrater reliability (IRR) (James, Demaree, and Wolf, 1984). For the 
analyses at the individual level, variables were standardized because of response sets. 
However, ICCs and IRRs were applied to the non-standardized variables, as the 
standardization reduces the variance: ICCs could not reach significance, and IRRs would be 
artificially inflated. A different principle was applied to Maximum scores and a separate sub-
section will be devoted to these variables later on. 
Intraclass correlation coefficients. The formula is the following: 
MSBxy – MSWxy 
n’ 
 
where MSBxy is the mean square between groups and MSWxy is the mean square within 
groups; n’ correspond to the number of persons in each group, when groups are of unequal 
size. 
The formula to obtain n’ is: 
k 
n’ = N2 – Σ nj2 
j = 1 
             ______________ 
             N(k – 1) 
 
          k 
where N = Σ nj (k = number of groups). 
                               j = 1 
The ICC consists of a one-way ANOVA with the variables of interest as dependent 
variables and the team as the independent variable. If the F-test is significant, it means there is 
significantly less within-group variance than between-group variance, thus indicating that 
respondents agree about certain variables more within their team that they do between their 
teams (Edmondson, 1996; Kenny & Voie, 1985; Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997; Tesluk, Mathieu, 
Zaccaro, & Marks, 1997). In this case, aggregation of the variables at the group-level is 
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justified. Aggregation procedures will now be described for Mean and Last scores. 
ICCs for Mean and Last scores. 
A. Achievement and approach emotions 
ICCs were calculated respectively for achievement and for approach emotions. Table 6 
presents ICCs for these two classes of emotions, with the distinction of: 1) mean intensities 
for each class of emotions across all periods (i.e. Overall), and for the Starting and 
Developing Phases; and 2) Last emotion scores reported before the questionnaire measuring 
decision-making variables, at the end of the Starting Phase and of the Developing Phase 
respectively. Classes of achievement and approach emotions yielded significant ICC values, 
ranging from .12 to .46 (p<.01 to .001). 
 
B. Resignation and antagonistic emotions 
Table 6 presents ICCs for negative classes of emotions, with the distinction of mean 
intensities for each class of emotions across all periods (i.e. Overall), and for the Developing 
Phases. ICCs were not calculated for scores in the Starting Phase, neither for both Last scores 
(in the Starting and Developing Phases), as there were not enough respondents reporting 
negative emotions per team, rendering the calculation of an intra-group coefficient irrelevant. 
The ICC for Mean Overall scores of resignation emotions was statistically not significant. The 
ICC reached statistical significance for Mean Scores in the Developing Phase (.10) at a p<. 25 
level, which is a liberal criterion for significance suggested by Kenny and La Voie (1985). 
ICCs for antagonistic emotions reached statistical significance respectively in the case of 
Mean Overall Scores (.14) and of Means Scores in the Developing Phase (.15), at a p<.05 
level. 
ICCs for decision-making variables. ICCs of decision-making variables are reported in 
Table 7: they are all positive and statistically significant (with p levels ranging from .10 to 
.001, and .25 in the case of alternative generation in the Developing Phase). 
Interrater reliability coefficients. The second measure of within-agreement, the 
interrater reliability coefficient (IRR) (James, Demaree, and Wolf, 1984) compares actual 
variance to a measure of “expected variance” to assess within-group agreement, to ensure that 
interrater agreement of team members on any variable of the survey is high. 
The formula is the following: 
Rwg (1) = 1 – (Sxj2 / σ EU2) 
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“Where Rwg (1) is the within-group interrater reliability for a group of K judges on a single 
Xj, Sxj2 is the observed variance on Xj, and σ EU2 is the variance on Xj that would be 
expected if all judgments were due exclusively to random measurement error.” (p. 87) 
To calculate σ EU2, the following formula is used: 
σ EU2 = (A2 – 1)/12, 
where “EU refers to an expected error (E) variance based on a uniform (U) distribution, and A 
corresponds to the numbers of alternatives in the response scale for Xj, which is presumed to 
vary from 1 to A” (p. 87). James et al. include in this formula the assumption of discrete 
scales with seven plus or minus two categories (e.g. scales of 1 to 5, or 1 to 7 or 1 to 9). If one 
has too large a number of categories, one runs the risks of inflating IRRs, however if one uses 
only a few alternatives (such as a scale of 1 to 3), IRRs would be artificially low estimates of 
within-group agreement (James et al., 1984). As far as the measurement of emotion is 
concerned in the present study, the scale in the Emotion Wheel ranges from 1 to 4. However, 
as explained page 75, zeros had been entered whenever respondents did not select an emotion. 
Thus, zero was also included as a category to apply the formula described above, so that A = 5 
(James, personal communication, September 2002)30. 
IRRs range from 1, indicating perfect agreement, to 0, indicating random answers by 
the judges or disagreement. James, Demaree, & Wolf (1993) indicate that if IRR is equal to 
.86, it is a high level of agreement, .47 represents a reasonably low level of agreement, 
whereas when an IRR close to zero, it would appear that responses are random. George (1990) 
suggests that values above .70 are a necessary level to allow aggregation, Bartel & Saavedra 
(1998) used median IRRs ranging between .51 (indicating a moderate level of agreement) to 
.76 (indicating a substantial level of agreement). 
IRRs for Mean and Last Scores 
A. Achievement and approach emotions 
IRRs were calculated for each of the 20 teams and for all variables relative to 
positive classes of emotions (achievement and approach). Table 6 presents IRRs along the 
same organization as the ICCs. Median IRRs for achievement emotions were ranging 
from .95 to .98. Median IRRs for approach emotions were ranging from .96 to .98. These 
                                                   
30 When measuring emotion, one is regularly confronted with the role the zero should play. One could argue that 
zero is not a point on the continuum of a scale but that there is a binary choice to be made: either one scores zero, 
ergo emotion is absent, or emotion is present, and one scores the emotion on a scale of variable intensity. For the 
purpose of this study, I will remain with the choice of including the zero as one point of the scale. 
 80 
numbers appear to be higher than expected. One possible explanation is the fact that there 
were numerous layers of averages performed (e.g. scores for pride were average across 
periods, as well as scores for elation, joy, and satisfaction; then scores for these four 
emotions were scored per period, then again for several periods). The variance is 
automatically reduced, thus yielding strong IRRs. 
 
B. Resignation and antagonistic emotions 
IRRs were calculated only for the teams where the number of respondents was 
equal or superior to half the total size of the team: for example a team with a total of 6 
members had to have 3 members at least or more reporting a resignation or an antagonistic 
emotion to be taken in consideration. In Table 6, new sample sizes are indicated with the 
number of valid teams. IRRs for negative emotions (resignation and antagonistic) 
represent a perfect agreement, i.e. 1.00. One technical reason for this result is that means 
were often very close to zero, due to the number of zero responses given by respondents 
across different periods of time, thus variance was very small. But whenever these 
emotions were reported, they were reported within a range of scores that indicates a strong 
agreement among the respondents. IRRs are reported only for Mean Overall scores and 
Means scores in the Developing Phase. There were not enough teams with Last scores in 
resignation or antagonistic emotions for the IRR coefficient to be calculated. 
 81 
Table 6 
Intraclass Coefficients and Interrater Reliability Coefficients for Classes of Emotions 
 
  ICC Median IRR 
     
Achievement emotions     
Mean Overall  .30*** .98  
Mean Starting Phase  .33*** .98  
Mean Developing Phase  .25*** .97  
Last of Starting Phase  .31*** .97  
Last of Developing Phase  .22** .95  
     
Approach emotions     
Mean Overall  .46*** .98  
Mean Starting Phase  .35*** .97  
Mean Developing Phase  .44*** .98  
Last of Starting Phase  .12** .96  
Last of Developing Phase  .24** .96  
     
Resignation emotions     
Mean Overall  n.s. 1.00 n = 15 teams 
Mean Developing Phase  .10++ 1.00 n = 11 teams 
     
Antagonistic emotions     
Mean Overall  .14* 1.00 n = 10 teams 
Mean Developing Phase  .15* 1.00 n = 8 teams 
ns = non significant; ++ p<.25 (liberal criterion for significance, recommended by Kenny and 
La Voie (1985); + p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
 
IRRs for decision-making variables. The IRRs are reported in Table 7 for the three 
decision-making variables, for the Starting Phase and the Developing Phase respectively, 
ranging from .82 to .89, thus indicating a high level of agreement within the teams. 
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Table 7 
Intraclass Coefficients and Interrater Reliability Coefficients for Decision-Making 
 
 ICC Median IRR 
   
Alternative generation Starting Phase .22** .87 
Alternation evaluation Starting Phase .20** .84 
Team cohesion Starting Phase .24** .89 
Alternative generation Developing Phase .09++ .86 
Alternative evaluation Developing Phase   .30*** .86 
Team cohesion Developing Phase .14+ .82 
Notes. N = 20 teams 
++ p < .25 (liberal criterion for significance, recommended by Kenny and La Voie (1985); + p 
< .10; ** p< .01; p*** p < .001. 
General remarks on aggregation. George (1990) suggests that theoretical justification 
should be provided before aggregation is performed. In section 1.2 (p. 20), theoretical 
underpinnings of collective emotion were outlined. There is some growing evidence that after 
a certain time of interaction, team members tend to share some common emotions (e.g. Bartel 
& Saavedra, 2000; De Rivera, 1992; Paez et al., 1995; Totterdell et al. 1998). In addition, 
decision-making variables, i.e. alternative generation, alternative evaluation, and team 
cohesion, were operationalized as a group-level construct, by anchoring the questions around 
the term “team” (see Chan, 1998; Tesluk et al., 1997). Thus, aggregation of the variables is at 
least theoretically justified. IRRs indicate a strong level of agreement inside each team, 
regardless of the fact that there is not enough between group variance. George (1990) argues 
for using only IRRs, as groups operating in the same setting or context (or groups coming 
from the same organization for example) would have a tendency to respond similarly to a 
survey. Edmonson (1996) agrees with this argument, but also indicates that a tendency to 
respond similarly exists as well and may inflate estimates of agreement, thus she recommends 
the use of both ICCs and IRRs to show which variables have greater between-group 
differences while having similar within-group agreement levels. James argues that IRRs are 
better indicated of agreement, as ICCs would underestimate interrater reliabilities in case of 
restricted variance (James, personal communication, September 2002). 
In conclusion, all Mean scores across several periods (Overall, Starting, and 
Developing Phase) and Last scores (means for one given period in time) could be aggregated 
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to the team level. Both George and James’ recommendation can be applied to the Mean scores 
of resignation emotions in the Developing Phase that has a non-significant ICC but a perfect 
level of intragroup agreement (IRR of 1.00). 
Maximum scores. The objective of selecting maximum scores of emotion was to find 
whether these maximum scores, corresponding to what Kahneman (1999) calls the Peak 
experience, have a determinant influence on decision-making processes, compared to the 
mean experience or the last experience. However, it seems that maximum scores could not be 
statistically treated like the mean scores. On the one hand, if one aggregates these scores at the 
team level by averaging them including zeros, one obtains an artificially inflated variance, 
given the distance between 0 and for example the end of the scale, i.e., 4. On the other hand, if 
one aggregates these scores without zeros, one obtains very little variance: for example, in the 
case of positive emotions, most of the maximum scores range between 3 and 4. It seemed that 
aggregation procedure were not relevant for the maximum scores, as the idea was not to see if 
team members agree on the maximum but to capture the maximum intensity by team. It was 
thus decided to sum the maximum scores regardless of how many team members checked any 
given emotion in any given class. In other words, what was obtained was a sum of all 
intensities felt for each of the respective time periods for every team. 
 
3.4.5. Temporal Patterns 
The Experience Sampling Methodology (ESM) was used in the present study. With 
this method, “individuals are asked to report on what is happening at the moment in their 
typical environment.” (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, p. 26). Usually a brief questionnaire is 
completed several times a day for several days. This was applied in this study by asking the 
participants to report their emotions 3 times during a 3- to 4-hour period. Multiple measures at 
the moment where emotions are felt are necessary to better grasp dynamic processes 
characterizing emotions (Fisher, 2000; Scherer, 2000). The questionnaire measuring the 
dependent variables was administered twice, based on the assumption that different group 
dynamics may occur at the beginning versus the end of the decision task (i.e. during Starting 
Phase versus Developing Phase). Figure 4 illustrates the design. 
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Figure 4. Illustration of design and labels attributed to the variables.  
Results will be presented next. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Both independent and dependent variables were checked for normality of distribution. 
All variables had skewness and kurtosis values comprised between +2 and –2, thus the 
assumption of normality is not rejected (SPSS Base 8.0, Applications guide, 199831). 
Histograms were used additionally to verify normality (see Appendices I to M). A small 
number of outliers was found but not eliminated from the data set. These outliers were caused 
by biased response tendencies on the part of these participants. To correct for these 
tendencies, intra-individual z-scores were computed (see Appendix N for the detailed 
procedure), which were used to analyze data at the individual level, but not at the team level 
(see section 3.4.4., p. 77 for further details). 
Table 8 shows the percentage of classes of emotion felt, and Figures 5 and 6 illustrate 
these data graphically. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of classes of 
emotions are reported in Appendix O. 
Table 8 
Percentage of classes of emotions felt 
 
 Starting 
Phase 
 Developing 
Phase 
Achievement 93.4  98.1 
Approach 97.2  98.1 
Resignation 29.2  51.9 
Antagonistic 22.6  39.6 
Figure 5. Percentage of classes of emotion 
felt in the Starting Phase
Achievement
Approach
Resignation
Antagonistic
Figure 6. Percentage of classes of 
emotion felt in the Developing Phase
Achievement
Approach
Resignation
Antagonistic
 
Table 9 shows the distribution of means for non-standardized decision-making 
variables, in the Starting Phase and in the Developing Phase, for the whole sample (see Figure 
                                                   
31 In subsequent analyses, both SPSS 8.0 and SPSS 10.0 will be used. 
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7 for a graphic representation). Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for 
standardized variables are reported in Appendix P. 
Table 9 
Mean Comparison for Decision-Making Variables Between the Starting Phase and the Developing 
Phase 
 Starting 
Phase 
 Developing 
Phase 
Alternative generation 4.71  4.84 
Alternative evaluation 5.22  5.37 
Team cohesion 6.30  6.22 
 
Figure 7. Mean comparison of decision-making variables between the Starting Phase and the 
Developing phase 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
alternative
generation
alternative
evaluation
team cohesion
Starting Phase
Developing Phase
 
In Appendix Q, means per team for both emotion and decision-making non-
standardized scores are reported. 
The results relative to relationships between each class of emotions and decision-
making processes will be described next in four main sections. Within each sub-section, 
results will be reported in the following order32: first, means for the overall time (at the 
individual or the aggregated team level), which could be viewed as more ‘conventional’ (or at 
least close to what has been done in previous studies); second, means for the overall time at 
the group consensus level; and third, both intensity and time will be considered (which is an 
exploratory way of analyzing the data). Thus maximum intensities for the overall time, 
followed by means, last mean scores, and maximum intensities in the Starting Phase, and 
                                                   
32 It is understood that when there are no results for any of the sub-categories, the category is skipped. 
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means, last mean scores, and maximum intensities in the Developing Phase will be reported 
successively at the individual, the aggregated team, and the group consensus levels. The same 
structure will be adopted for all four classes of emotion. Overall results tables (with all four 
classes of emotion variables and three decision-making variables) are available in Appendix Q 
showing all correlations performed between classes of emotions and decision-making 
variables. 
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4.2. Achievement Emotions and Decision-Making Processes 
4.2.1. Achievement Emotions and Alternative Generation 
Achievement emotions were predicted to be positively related to alternative 
generation. As shown in Table 10, achievement emotions were negatively related to 
alternative generation. 
Table 10 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Achievement Emotions with 
Alternative Generation across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - - 
Group consensus -.32+ - -.36+ 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team - - 
Group consensus - - 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - -.32+ 
Group consensus -.35+ - -.39* 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20. 
* = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
Results with a p level < .10 revealed a consistent pattern at different levels of analysis 
and at different periods of time, consistently going in the opposite direction of predictions. For 
the Overall time period, Means (r = -.32, p < .084) and Maximum intensities (r = -.35, p < 
.066) at the group consensus level were negatively related to alternative generation. This 
negative relationship was reiterated in the Developing Phase for: 1) Means at the group 
consensus level (r = -.36, p < .057); and 2) Maximum intensities at the aggregated team level 
(r = -.32, p < .084) and at the group consensus level (r = -.39, p < .05). 
It could be that although achievement emotions are supposed to be positively related, 
i.e. conducive to the generation of new alternatives, they might lead to complacency at the 
group level, especially at higher levels of intensity. Team members may be very enthusiastic 
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about their team and its achievements; nevertheless this enthusiasm might have a limiting 
effect, such as a decrease in productive thinking (Izard, 1991) or such as lack of effort to find 
new alternatives (Scherer and Tran, 2001). 
 
4.2.2. Achievement Emotions and Alternative Evaluation 
Achievement emotions were predicted to be negatively related to alternative 
evaluation. There is a contrast between results for the Overall time and the Developing Phase 
which were as predicted, and for the Starting Phase which were opposite to predictions, as can 
be seen in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Achievement Emotions with Alternative 
Evaluation across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - .34+ - 
Group consensus - - - 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team .36+ - 
Group consensus - - 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team -.51* - -.47* 
Group consensus -.34+ .49* - 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20. 
* = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
For the Overall time period, Maximum intensities of achievement emotions at the 
aggregated team level (r = -.51, p <.05), and at the group consensus level (r = -.34, p < .066) 
were negatively related to alternative evaluation. This negative relationship was reiterated in 
the Developing Phase, for Maximum intensities at the aggregated team level (r = -.47, p <.05). 
In contrast, relationships between achievement emotions and alternative evaluation were 
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positive in the Starting Phase: 1) for Means (r = .34, p < .072)33 and Last scores (r = .36, p = 
0.57) at the aggregated team level; and 2) for Maximum intensities at the group consensus 
level (r = .49, p < .05). Results with a p level between .05 and .10 are reported because they 
are consistently positive in the Starting Phase across dependent variables, thus indicating a 
pattern. 
In behavioral decision research, confidence is defined as the belief in the quality of 
one’s judgment or choice; group confidence describes the confidence of a group in its 
judgment or choice (Sniezek, 1992). The two emotions that are the most conducive to 
confidence are ‘joy’ and ‘satisfaction’ (see section 1.1.2, p. 9). Both were frequently selected 
during the Starting Phase (an average of 41% for joy, and of 61.3% for satisfaction in the 
Starting Phase). Achievement emotions may have fuelled this feeling of confidence team 
members had in their evaluating abilities. 
 
4.2.3. Achievement Emotions and Team Cohesion 
Achievement emotions were predicted to be positively related to team cohesion. As 
shown in Table 12, results were found for Maximum intensities only. 
Maximum intensities of achievement emotions were negatively related to team 
cohesion for the Overall time period (r = -.50, p < .05), and in the Developing Phase (r = -.47, 
p < .05.). In contrast, relationships between achievement emotions and team cohesion were 
positive in the Starting Phase (r = .35, p< .068) at the group consensus level. These results 
suggest that maximum intensities of achievement emotions, including emotions such as pride 
and joy, may not enhance team cohesion, even though achievement emotions are considered 
to strengthen bonds between people by sharing successes (Fridja, 1986; Kemper, 1991; 
Scherer and Tran, 2001). 
                                                   
33 This particular relationship becomes statistically significant when entering achievement emotions together 
with the three other classes of emotion in a regression model (see Appendix H) 
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Table 12 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Achievement Emotions with 
Team Cohesion across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - - 
Group consensus - - - 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team - - 
Group consensus - - 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team -.50* - -.47* 
Group consensus - .35+ - 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20. 
* = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
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4.2.4 Summary 
Table 13 summarizes results relative to achievement emotions and decision-making 
processes. No results were found at the individual level. Four statistically significant results 
(yielded by Maximum intensities) out of six were opposite to predictions, equally distributed 
between the aggregated team level and the group consensus level at different periods in time; 
thus, there was not a particular difference to be noted between these two levels of analysis. In 
regard to the relationship with alternative generation, all results were opposite to predictions. 
In regard to the relationship with alternative evaluation, the results were the only ones 
supporting the prediction: Maximum intensities were negatively related to alternative 
evaluation. In regard to the relationship with team cohesion, the relationship was again 
negative with Maximum intensities with the exception of the Starting phase, where the 
relationship was marginally positive. 
Table 13 
Summary of Findings for Achievement Emotions in Relation to Decision-Making Processes 
  Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
  Mean Max Mean Last Max Mean Last Max 
I         
A        o+ 
Alternative 
Generation 
(+) C o+ o+    o+  O* 
I         
A  Y* o+ o+    Y* 
Alternative 
Evaluation 
(-) C  y+   O*    
I         
A  O*      O* 
Team 
Cohesion 
(+) C     y+    
Note. I = Individual level; A = Aggregated team level; C = Group consensus level; Y = 
Hypothesis confirmed; O = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .05 (*) or p < .01 (**); y+ = 
Result in the direction of hypothesis with p < .10 (+); o+ = Result opposite to hypothesis with p 
< .10 (+). 
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4.3. Approach Emotions and Decision-Making Processes 
4.3.1. Approach Emotions and Alternative Generation 
Approach emotions were predicted to be positively related to alternative generation. 
As shown in Table 14, approach emotions were positively related to alternative generation, 
mainly in the Developing Phase. 
Table 14 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Approach Emotions with 
Alternative Generation across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team .37+ - .44* 
Group consensus .32+ - .42* 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team - .49* 
Group consensus - - 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - -.39* - 
Group consensus - - .36+ 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20. 
* = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
For the Overall time period, approach emotions were positively related to alternative 
generation, both for Means at the aggregated team level (r = .37, p < .052), and at the group 
consensus level (r = .32, p < .086). This positive relationship is replicated in the Developing 
Phase: 1) for Means (r = .44, p < .05) and Last scores (r = .49, p < .05) at the aggregated team 
level; 2) for Means at the group consensus level (r = .42, p < .05); and 3) for Maximum 
intensities at the group consensus level (r = .36, p < .06). It means that the results found 
during the Overall period, even though with a p level <.10, were consistent with the findings 
in the Developing Phase (with p<.05). In contrast, approach emotions related negatively to 
alternative generation in the Starting Phase for Maximum intensities at the aggregated team 
level (r = -.39, p < .05). It is unclear whether this result is due to Maximum intensities (as the 
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pattern throughout all results is that Maximum intensities relate negatively to decision-making 
processes), or to the timing (i.e. Starting Phase). 
The positive relationship between approach emotions and alternative generation in the 
Developing Phase could be explained by group development research. Teams may have 
reached what Gersick (1988) has described as the “punctuated equilibrium”: near the halfway 
mark, groups incorporate previous learning; change the rhythm and the approach with which 
they worked; thus, make significant progress in their tasks (Gersick & Davis-Sacks, 1990). 
Teams in the present study might have seen these activities supported by approach emotions. 
 
4.3.2. Approach Emotions and Alternative Evaluation 
Approach emotions were predicted to be positively related to alternative evaluation. 
There was a contrast between results found for Mean scores in the Developing Phase, which 
were as predicted, and results for Maximum intensities, which were opposite to predictions 
(see Table 15). 
Table 15 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Approach Emotions with 
Alternative Evaluation across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - - 
Group consensus - - .43* 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team - .39* 
Group consensus - - 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team -.52* -.39* -.44* 
Group consensus - - - 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20. 
* = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
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In the Developing Phase, both Means at the group consensus level and Last scores at 
the aggregated team level were positively related to alternative evaluation (respectively r = 
.43, p < .05 and r = .39, p < .05), as expected. The tentative explanations provided in the 
previous section are valid here as well: after the halftime between the beginning of the task 
and the estimated time left to complete the task, groups find new ways of improving their 
processes (Gersick and Davis-Sacks, 1990). 
In contrast, there was a consistent negative relationship between approach emotions 
and alternative evaluation for Maximum intensities across all time periods, at the aggregated 
team level: 1) for the Overall time period (r = -.52, p < .05); 2) in the Starting Phase (r = -.39, 
p < .05); and 3) in the Developing Phase (r = -.44, p < .05) – see Table #. 
 
4.3.3. Approach Emotions and Team Cohesion 
Approach emotions were predicted to be positively related to team cohesion. Results 
opposite to predictions were found for Maximum intensities, as shown in Table 16. 
Table 16 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Approach Emotions with Team 
Cohesion across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - .33+ 
Group consensus - - - 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team - - 
Group consensus - - 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team -.53** -.53** -.41* 
Group consensus - - - 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20. 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
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Maximum intensities related negatively to alternative evaluation: 1) for the Overall 
time period (r = -.53, p<.01); 2) in the Starting Phase (r = -.53, p < .01); and 3) in the 
Developing Phase (r = -.41, p < .05). Not only are the effect sizes moderate to large (Cohen, 
1987), but the p level is very small. There was a weak positive relationship between Means 
and team cohesion in the Developing Phase (r = .33, p < .076). 
 
4.3.4. Summary 
Table 17 summarizes results relative to approach emotions and decision-making 
processes. No results were found at the individual level. Means and Last scores were 
positively related with alternative generation and alternative evaluation in the predicted 
direction at both the aggregated team and the group consensus level. Maximum intensities at 
either the aggregated team or the group consensus level were systematically negatively related 
to all three decision-making processes. Thus, the level of analysis was not the discriminating 
factor but the type of emotion scores was (Mean/Last versus Maximum). 
The opposite results seem to indicate that approach (i.e. positive) emotions, when too 
intense, can have negative relationships with all three decision-making processes. The 
negative features of approach emotions are, for example, to elaborate unrealistic goals or 
plans, to disperse energy and scatter attention, or to take inappropriate actions (Scherer & 
Tran, 2001). 
Table 17 
Summary of Findings for Approach Emotions in Relation to Decision-Making Processes 
  Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
  Mean Max Mean Last Max Mean Last Max 
I         
A y+    O* Y* Y*  
Alternative 
Generation 
(+) C y+     Y*  y+ 
I         
A  O*   O*  Y* O* 
Alternative 
Evaluation 
(+) C      Y*   
I         
A  O*   O* y+  O* 
Team 
Cohesion 
(+) C         
Note. I = Individual level; A = Aggregated team level; C = Group consensus level; Y = 
Hypothesis confirmed; O = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .05 (*) or p < .01 (**); y = 
Result in the direction of hypothesis with p < .10 (+). 
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4.4. Resignation Emotions and Decision-Making Processes 
In the case of Mean scores in the Starting Phase and of Last scores in the Starting and 
Developing Phases, resignation emotions could not be taken in consideration due to 
insufficient data points. 
 
4.4.1. Resignation Emotions and Alternative Generation 
Resignation emotions were hypothesized to be negatively related to alternative 
generation. Resignation emotions were found to be positively related to alternative generation 
at different moments of the decision-making task, as shown in Table 18. 
Table 18 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Resignation Emotions with 
Alternative Generation for the Different Time Periods and for the Three Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team .47* n.a. .50+ 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual .20* - 
Aggregated Team n.a. n.a. 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - - 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20. 
* = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
For the Overall period of time, resignation emotions were positively related to 
alternative generation for Means at the aggregated team level (r = .47, p < .05), result which is 
moderately apparent during the Developing Phase (r = .50, p <.06). 
In the Starting Phase, Last scores of resignation emotions were positively related to 
alternative generation (r = .20, p<.05), at the individual level. This result adds a new element 
regarding what is known about the influence of resignation emotions: previous research on 
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sad moods usually posits that sad moods have a positive influence on analytical capabilities34 
(e.g. Schwarz and Bless, 1991; Schwarz, 2000) at the individual level, except for Isen et al.’s 
(1987) observation that negative affect has not been proven to impair creativity. 
The relationship between resignation emotions and alternative generation seems not to 
have been tested at the team level in previous research, thus a comparison is difficult. In the 
present study, this relationship remained consistently positive at the team level. 
 
4.4.2. Resignation Emotions and Alternative Evaluation 
Resignation emotions were predicted to be positively related to alternative evaluation. 
This hypothesis could not be supported (see Table 19). 
Table 19 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Resignation Emotions with 
Alternative Evaluation across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - n.a. - 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team n.a. n.a. 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - - 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note. n.a. = not applicable. 
 
                                                   
34 Which corresponds to ‘alternative evaluation’ in my study. 
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4.4.3. Resignation Emotions and Team Cohesion 
Resignation emotions were predicted to be positively related to team cohesion. As 
shown in Table 20, resignation emotions were positively and selectively related to team 
cohesion. 
Table 20 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Resignation Emotions with 
Team Cohesion across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team .48* n.a. .72** 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - 
Aggregated Team n.a. n.a. 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - - 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20; n.a. 
= not applicable. 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05  
Resignation emotions were positively related to team cohesion for: 1) Means during 
the Overall time period (r = .48, p < .05); and 2) Means in the Developing Phase (r = .72, p < 
.01).  
These results fit with theoretical predictions and/or previous findings from the emotion 
literature: resignation emotions strengthen bonds between members of a group, they lead to 
protective behavior and reinforce social cohesion, encourage prosocial behavior, enhance 
conformity, compliance, and empathy (Paez et al., 1995; Lazarus, 1991a; Izard, 1991; 
Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Niedenthal et al., 1994). 
 
 100
4.4.4. Summary 
Table 21 summarizes results relative to resignation emotions and decision-making 
processes. Hypotheses could not be tested at the group consensus level. In regard to the 
relationship with alternative generation, results opposite to prediction were found both at the 
individual and at the aggregated team levels. In regard to the relationship with alternative 
evaluation, no results were found. In regard to the relationship with team cohesion, results 
congruent with predictions were found at the aggregated tam level. 
Table 21 
Summary of Findings for Resignation Emotions in Relation to Decision-Making Processes 
  Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
  Mean Max Mean Last Max Mean Last Max 
I    O*     
A O*     o+   
Alternative 
Generation 
(-) C         
I         
A         
Alternative 
Evaluation 
(+) C         
I         
A Y*     Y**   
Team 
Cohesion 
(+) C         
Note. I = Individual level; A = Aggregated team level; C = Group consensus level; Y = 
Hypothesis confirmed; O = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .05 (*) or p < .01 (**); y = 
Result in the direction of hypothesis with p < .10 (+); o = Result opposite to hypothesis with p 
< .10 (+). 
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4.5. Antagonistic Emotions and Decision-Making Processes 
In the case of Mean scores in the Starting Phase and of Last scores in the Starting and 
Developing Phases, antagonistic emotions could not be taken in consideration due to 
insufficient data points. 
 
4.5.1. Antagonistic Emotions and Alternative Generation 
Antagonistic emotions were predicted to relate negatively to alternative generation. As 
shown in Table 22, antagonistic emotions were negatively related to alternative generation at 
the aggregated team level but were positively related at the individual level. 
Table 22 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Antagonistic Emotions with 
Alternative Generation across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - n.a. - 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - .17* 
Aggregated Team n.a. n.a. 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual .22* - - 
Aggregated Team - - -.42* 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20; n.a. 
= not applicable. 
* = p < .05 
Antagonistic emotions were positively related to alternative generation at the 
individual level for: 1) Overall Maximum intensities (r = .22, p < .05); and 2) Last scores in 
the Developing Phase (r = .17, p < .05). In contrast, Maximum intensities at the aggregated 
team level related negatively to alternative generation (r = -.42, p < .05). 
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There is no evidence in the literature that would lead to the conclusion that anger is 
beneficial to alternative generation. It might be that those team members who felt anger had 
the impression to contribute with more alternatives to “show” their ideas to others. In contrast, 
the effect of accumulated antagonistic emotions from all team members is negative on 
alternative generation. 
 
4.5.2. Antagonistic Emotions and Alternative Evaluation 
Antagonistic emotions were predicted to be negatively related to alternative 
evaluation. Antagonistic emotions were negatively related to alternative evaluation, as 
predicted, except for individual mean scores in the Developing Phase (see Table 23). 
Table 23 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Antagonistic Emotions with 
Alternative Evaluation across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - .23** 
Aggregated Team -.47+ - - 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual -.24** .26** 
Aggregated Team n.a. n.a. 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - -.23** - 
Aggregated Team -.55** -.36+ -.61** 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20; n.a. 
= not applicable. 
** = p < .01; + = p < .10. 
A consistent pattern in the results emerged at different levels of analysis and at 
different periods of time. For the Overall time period, Means (r = -.47, p < .086), and 
Maximum intensities (r = -.55, p < .01) at the aggregated team level were negatively related to 
alternative evaluation. This result was reiterated: 1) in the Starting Phase, for Last scores (r = -
.24, p < .01) and Maximum intensities (r = -.23, p < .01) at the individual level; for Maximum 
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intensities at the aggregated team level (r = -.36, p < .059); 2) in the Developing Phase, for 
Means (r = .23, p < .01) and Last scores (r = .26, p < .01) at the individual level; for 
Maximum intensities at the aggregated team level (r = -.61, p < .01). 
Similarly to alternative generation, there is no evidence in the literature that would 
lead to the conclusion that anger is beneficial to alternative evaluation. It might be that those 
team members who felt anger during the second half of the simulation (i.e. the Developing 
Phase) thought they were better analyzing the alternatives available to their team. 
 
4.5.3. Antagonistic Emotions and Team Cohesion 
Antagonistic emotions were predicted to relate negatively to team cohesion. As 
shown in Table 24, antagonistic emotions were negatively related to team cohesion. 
Table 24 
Correlations of Mean, Maximum, and Last Emotion Scores of Antagonistic Emotions with 
Team Cohesion across Time Periods and across Levels of Analysis 
 Mean 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team - - - 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Last 
Level of analysis Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual -.20* - 
Aggregated Team n.a. n.a. 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. 
 Maximum 
Level of analysis Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
Individual - - - 
Aggregated Team -.56** -.35+ -.64** 
Group consensus n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note. Individual level, N = 106; aggregated team level, N = 20; consensus level, N = 20; n.a. 
= not applicable. ** = p < .01; * = p < .05; + = p < .10 
The relationships between antagonistic emotions and team cohesion were found 
negative: 1) for Maximum intensities at the aggregated team level (r = -.56, p < .01), for the 
Overall time period; 2) in the Starting Phase, for Last scores at the individual level (r = .20, p 
< .05), and for Maximum intensities at the aggregated team level (r = -.35, p < .67); and 3) in 
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the Developing Phase, for Maximum intensities at the aggregated team level (r = -.64, p < 
.01). 
4.5.4. Summary 
Table 25 summarizes results relative to antagonistic emotions and decision-making 
processes. Contrary to the three other classes of emotions, several results were found at the 
individual level for antagonistic emotions. Hypotheses could not be tested at the group 
consensus level. In regard to the relationship with alternative generation, results opposite to 
predictions were found at the individual level. In contrast, results confirming predictions were 
found at the aggregated team level. In regard to alternative evaluation, results strongly 
confirmed predictions at the individual level (for Last means scores and Maximum intensities) 
in the Starting Phase, but were strongly opposite to the prediction in the Developing Phase. At 
the aggregated team level, all results were supporting predictions. In regard to the relationship 
with team cohesion, all results confirmed predictions, whether at the individual level or at the 
aggregated team level. 
Table 25 
Summary of Findings for Antagonistic Emotions in Relation to Decision-Making Processes 
  Overall Starting Phase Developing Phase 
  Mean Max Mean Last Max Mean Last Max 
I  O*     O*  
A        Y* 
Alternative 
Generation 
(-) C         
I    Y** Y** O** O**  
A y+ Y**   y+   Y** 
Alternative 
Evaluation 
(-) C         
I    Y*     
A  Y**   y+   Y** 
Team 
Cohesion 
(-) C         
Note. I = Individual level; A = Aggregated team level; C = Group consensus level; Y = 
Hypothesis confirmed; O = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .05 (*) or p < .01 (**); y = 
Result in the direction of hypothesis with p < .10 (+). 
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4.6. Overall Summary 
Figure 8 summarizes the findings for all four classes of emotions and decision-making 
processes, showing the number of times hypotheses were confirmed, and the number of times 
results were in opposition to predictions, taking into consideration results at a p level of 
minimum .05. 
 
Figure 8. Summary of findings. 
Note. Results reported on this chart are at a p level <.05; Y = hypothesis confirmed; O = result 
opposite to hypothesis; I = Individual level; A = Aggregated team level; C = Group consensus 
level; 1x = one time; 2x = two times; 3x = three times. 
 
Regarding positive emotions, no results were found at the individual level. Then: 
· Regarding achievement emotions, four results were opposite to predictions, two 
supported predictions, at the team aggregated level and/or at the group consensus level 
and all associated with maximum intensities; 
· Regarding approach emotions, seven results were opposite to predictions (all 
associated with maximum intensities), five supported predictions, at the team 
aggregated level and/or at the group consensus level. 
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Regarding negative emotions, a combination of results were found at the individual 
level and at the aggregated level (analyses at the group consensus level could not be 
performed due to insufficient data points): 
· Regarding resignation emotions, two results were opposite to predictions (one at the 
individual level, one at the aggregated team level), two supported predictions (both at 
the aggregated team level); 
· Regarding antagonistic emotions, eight results supported predictions at both the 
individual and at the aggregated team level; four were opposite to predictions, mainly 
at the individual level. In contrast to all over three classes of emotions, relationships 
between antagonistic emotions and decision-making processes were the most 
congruent with hypotheses formulated. 
These results will be reviewed and critiqued in the discussion section below, and 
tentative explanations as well as suggestions for future research will be provided. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study aimed to empirically demonstrate that certain classes of emotions 
associated with specific behavioral tendencies influence certain group decision-making 
processes, such as alternative generation, alternative evaluation, and team cohesion; and this 
in teams in a quasi-naturalistic environment. Three levels of analysis were considered: 
individual, team, and group consensus. The main findings will be discussed next, followed by 
contributions of this study, and directions for future research. Limitations will be described, 
and finally practical applications will be suggested. 
 
5.1. Main Findings 
5.1.1. Achievement Emotions 
It was hypothesized that achievement emotions (mainly composed of pride, elation, 
joy, and satisfaction) would be positively related to alternative generation and to team 
cohesion, but negatively related to alternative evaluation. 
The results of this study indicate that achievement emotions are not positively 
associated with alternative generation. These results were found mainly for maximum 
intensities at the group consensus level, during the second part of the simulation. They were 
supported by a consistent pattern of weaker results with both means and maximum intensities, 
during the overall duration of the simulation. Previous research on achievement emotions has 
stated that they could lead to complacency, overconfidence, low effort to explore new 
alternatives (Scherer and Tran, 2001), or decreased productive thinking (Izard, 1991), but the 
intensity required or the conditions in which these pitfalls would occur have not been 
specified. Previous research on positive affect and decision-making has stated that in certain 
circumstances, positive mood could lead to overlook important information (Schwarz & 
Bless, 1991), and to greater self-confidence (Forgas, 1989). Evidence on group emotion 
relating to alternative generation is scarce. The results of this study seem to confirm previous 
findings with at least three elements: 1) the participants in the present study may have been 
too self-confident, which might also be an inherent characteristic of managers who are 
selected by their organization as high-potentials; 2) the second part of the simulation 
corresponds to a rapid growth in the industry, which may lead participants to overlook 
information and become complacent due to an apparent easiness to get market shares 
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(although towards the end, the industry consolidates, and market shares shrink); 3) the vote on 
the group consensus emotion takes place at the end of a three to four-hour decision period, 
participants are usually very enthusiastic about the fact that the task is over; thus they tend to 
report their group emotion with a high intensity level (if not the highest). The present study 
has been able to identify the type of emotion, the intensity, the time, and the level of analysis 
at which this relationship is negative. 
The results of this study indicate that achievement emotions are negatively associated 
with alternative evaluation. These results were found for maximum intensities at the 
aggregated team level, during the overall duration, as well as during the second part of the 
simulation. These findings come in support of Janis’ (1989) idea that high arousal of elation 
leads to incomplete alternative evaluation. In contrast, maximum intensities of achievement 
emotions are positively associated with alternative evaluation during the beginning of the 
simulation at the group consensus level, result that is opposite to predictions. The Yerkes-
Dodson Law (1908) that links performance on tasks to arousal with an inverted U function 
could provide an explanation. At the beginning of the simulation, there is momentum 
building, during which a high level of intensity of achievement emotions relates positively to 
alternative evaluation. As time evolves, the combination of an increased complexity of the 
task accompanied by high arousal (i.e. maximum intensities for the group consensus emotion) 
leads to a negative relationship between achievement emotions and alternative evaluation 
during the later part of the simulation. The present study has begun to provide a more refined 
analysis of the relationship between achievement emotions (versus traditionally positive affect 
or positive mood) and a decision-making process. 
The results of this study indicate that achievement emotions are not positively 
associated with team cohesion. These results were found for maximum intensities at the group 
consensus level, and are in opposition with previous research that found positive affect to be 
positively associated with cooperative behavior at the individual level (e.g. Isen, 1999), and at 
the group level (e.g. Barsade, 2001; George, 1990). The reason for this discrepancy is 
probably the level of intensity. Even though achievement emotions are typically associated 
with cohesion, too much of them can be an inhibiting factor (see paragraph above regarding 
the U-shaped curve hypothesis). 
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In summary, although achievement emotions are very important for the well-being of 
an individual, and for his/her self-esteem, they can have a negative influence at the collective 
level, particularly at high levels of intensity. 
 
5.1.2. Approach emotions 
It was hypothesized that approach emotions (mainly composed of relief, hope, interest, 
and surprise) would be positively related to alternative generation, alternative evaluation, and 
team cohesion. 
The results of this study indicate that approach emotions are positively associated with 
alternative generation. These results were found during the second part of the simulation, both 
for means at the aggregated level and means at the group consensus level. This positive 
relationship is also found for means measured at the last period before the end of the 
simulation, at the aggregated team level. Previous research on positive affect or positive mood 
at the individual level has not discriminated among achievement “affect/mood” and approach 
“affect/mood”; thus, it is possible to draw some explanatory elements from this literature, and 
extend them to the team level. Research on positive affect has shown that it enhances 
cognitive flexibility, interconnecting information in unusual ways, creative thinking, and 
innovation (Higgins et al., 1992; Isen and colleagues). Thus, assuming some of these findings 
apply to emotion, a moderate level of approach emotions should enhance alternative 
generation. Given the void of research on both approach emotions and on their relationship to 
group decision-making processes, the present findings are exploratory. It can be conjectured 
that interest, one of the approach emotions, plays a key role in knowledge acquisition and 
competence development (Izard, 1991). As team members progress in the decision-task, they 
are possibly more and more involved in the task, and motivated to generate new alternatives 
that help them improve and obtain competitive advantages over the other teams. Hope, 
another approach emotions, also helps to sustain activities, and to maintain morale, even in 
difficult circumstances. With its core relational theme “fear the worst but yearn for better”, 
hope is an important emotion in an organizational context where fear of disapproval, of not 
performing, or of losing one’s job are current events (Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001). In the 
present study, both hope and interest probably fuelled team members’ motivation to generate 
new alternatives, especially if team members operate under the belief that there is room for 
improvement (Lazarus and Cohen-Charash, 2001). 
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In contrast, maximum intensities of approach emotions are negatively associated with 
alternative generation during the first part of the simulation, at the aggregated team level. At 
the beginning of the simulation, the strategy of the teams is still in formation, and even though 
this time offers a perfect opportunity to have broad alternative generation, the teams often 
limited themselves in their options, trying to apply familiar models or even the existing 
strategy of their real organization35. This can be illustrated by the relative low level of the 
average ratings of alternative generation for the first part of the simulation. Thus, it appears 
logical that a high level of approach emotions will relate negatively to a low level of 
alternative generation. 
The results of this study indicate that approach emotions are positively associated with 
alternative evaluation. These results were found for means at the group consensus level, 
during the second part of the simulation, and for means measured at the last period before the 
end of the simulation, at the aggregated team level. Previous research on positive affect at the 
individual level has shown that it enhances thorough consideration of alternatives (Isen & 
Baron, 1991). In addition, both Isen (1993) and Elsbach and Barr (1999) have suggested that 
in case of personally relevant decisions, individuals in a positive affect or mood are more 
systematic in their decision-making process. Thus, given the fact that interest sustains 
engagement, group activity, and persistence (Izard, 1991), it is plausible to conclude that a 
moderate level of approach emotions relates positively to alternative evaluation. 
The results of this study indicate that maximum intensities of approach emotions are 
consistently negatively associated with both alternative evaluation and team cohesion at the 
aggregated team level, during each phase of the simulation (overall, first part, and second 
part). Scherer and Tran (2001) have hypothesized that approach emotions can lead to 
dispersed attention or in the contrary to excessive focus, and to unrealistic goals. Thus, high 
intensity levels of approach emotions may lead the team members to divert their attention 
towards too many different alternatives, and it may even lead to conflicts among team 
members, which have a negative impact on team cohesion. 
In summary, collective approach emotions appear to be an enhancing factor, in the 
context of which team members are willing to compete as successfully as possible with both 
the capability to generate new alternatives and to go through the painstaking analysis and 
review of alternatives. Yet, the same phenomenon is observed in the case of approach 
                                                   
35 I was able to observe this phenomenon on site. 
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emotions as it was for achievement emotions: there is the probability of an inverted U 
function taking place. 
5.1.3. Resignation Emotions 
It was hypothesized that resignation emotions (mainly composed of fear, sadness, 
shame, and guilt) would be negatively related to alternative generation, and positively related 
to alternative evaluation and team cohesion. 
The results in this study indicate that resignation emotions are not negatively 
associated with alternative generation. These results were found for means at the aggregated 
team level, during the overall duration of the simulation, and for means measured at the last 
period in the first part of the simulation, at the individual level. Previous research at the 
individual level has posited that sad mood impairs creativity-related tasks, that negative affect 
is associated with constrictive thinking and decreased creativity (Higgins et al., 1992; 
Schwarz and Bless, 1991) and that high levels of fear increase superficial information 
processing (Baron et al. 1992). It appears that fear is the dominant representative emotion of 
its class (i.e. resignation) at that particular point in time36. Fear enhances adaptation, as it 
helps individuals to be more perceptive about the environment and the useful signals it 
provides (Paez et al., 1995), and to be more careful about risks (Izard, 1991). A mild degree of 
fear may actually be beneficial to the generation of alternatives, as the team has to find new 
solutions and new ideas to improve their performance. The type of fear probably prevalent in 
this situation may be fear to appear less competent compared to peers in competitive 
circumstances. 
Two other resignation emotions, shame and guilt, have behavioral consequences that 
support these findings. Shame leads to improvement and encourages avoidance of 
incompetence (Izard, 1991); and guilt contributes to constructive endeavors (Kemper, 1991). 
These characteristics seem compatible with the activity of generating more new alternatives, 
in order to better cope with the increasing complexity of the decision-making task. 
At the individual level, resignation emotions were positively related to alternative 
generation at the end of the first part of the simulation. At the aggregated team level, 
resignation emotions were positively related to alternative generation throughout the entire 
                                                   
36 Sadness was selected in Period 1 by one respondent (.9%) and by two respondents in Period 2 (1.8%). Fear 
was selected by 16% of the respondent in Period 1, and by 10.4% in Period 2. Shame was selected by 4.7% of 
the respondents and guilt by 2.7% of them. 
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simulation; thus, a reasonable level of resignation emotions may have helped team members 
to collectively generate a wider range of alternatives. This constitutes evidence that different 
levels of analysis and different times are necessary to better understand the role of emotion in 
group decision-making. 
The results in the present study indicate that resignation emotions are positively 
associated with team cohesion. These results were found at the aggregated team level, for both 
the overall duration and the second part of the simulation, and are in congruence with 
previous research on resignation emotions in relation to emotional climate (see Paez et al., 
1995), which has shown that both climates of sadness and fear reinforce cohesion. In addition, 
research on shame has argued that it encourages prosocial behavior and reinforces cohesion 
by enhancing conformity and social responsibility (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991a); research on 
guilt has shown that it reinforces social bonds, interpersonal obligation, and empathy 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Niedenthal et al., 1994). During the simulation, despite their 
probable self-confidence, participants nevertheless felt resignation emotions to a minor extent: 
they probably felt fear to appear incompetent, to loose from one period to another (market 
shares, the competition…), sadness to miss the targets, or to have misunderstanding with other 
team members, shame and guilt of not being up to par; yet enough for resignation emotions to 
have positive relationships with their alternative generation and their team cohesion. 
In summary, collective resignation emotions influence alternative generation and team 
cohesion positively and consistently over time. Contrary to the results found with 
achievement, approach, and antagonistic emotions, no high levels of intensity of resignation 
emotions were reported. Thus, these findings corroborate the fact that a moderate level of 
emotions can contribute to effective decision-making (Janis, 1989). 
 
5.1.4. Antagonistic Emotions 
It was hypothesized that antagonistic emotions (composed mainly of envy, disgust, 
contempt, and anger) would be negatively related to alternative generation, alternative 
evaluation, and team cohesion. 
The results of this study indicate that antagonistic emotions are not negatively 
associated with alternative generation at the individual level, but they are at the aggregated 
team level. First, at the individual level, positive relationships were found for maximum 
intensities during the overall duration of the simulation, and for means measured at the last 
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period of the second part of the simulation. A partial explanation for these results may be that 
some participants felt encouraged to “rock the boat” in the context of the simulation 
(characterized as ‘non-threatening’) and to share ideas boastfully even if discussions became 
conflict-oriented. Lerner and Keltner (2000) have found that individuals feeling anger tend to 
be more optimistic in regard to risk-taking. Second, at the aggregated team level, negative 
relationships were found for maximum intensities during the second part of the simulation, 
result that is congruent with predictions and with the previous results relative to maximum 
intensities. 
The results of this study indicate that antagonistic emotions are negatively associated 
with alternative evaluation at the individual level during the first part of the simulation, but 
they are positively associated during the second part of the simulation. First, negative 
relationships were found for means reported at the end of the first part, and for maximum 
intensities. These findings are congruent with previous research in group decision-making. 
Janis (1989) postulated that anger prevents team members from evaluating alternatives. 
Amason (1996) argued that anger inhibits the process of considering all contradictory 
viewpoints and of making decisions. 
Second, positive relationships were found for means of the second part, and for means 
reported at the end of the second part. This positive relationship has not been addressed very 
often by previous research. It may be due to increased task interdependence, represented by 
the interconnections among the work of individual members (Bartel and Saavedra, 2000; 
Gersick, 1988). In parallel, when team cohesion improves, there is more freedom for team 
members to express and feel their emotions, including negative ones, without being criticized 
and without these emotions having negative impact on the team spirit. The increase of task 
interdependence, creating a sense of affiliation and fosters norms of collaboration (Gersick, 
1988), together with team cohesion, may have buffered the negative influence of anger on 
team decision-making. Furthermore, Lazarus and Cohen-Charash (2001) have suggested that 
in organizational contexts, anger often replaces fear and sadness. Thus, it could be 
hypothesized, although very prudently, that anger in that particular context takes on some of 
the attributes of fear and sadness, which are to carefully review alternatives. 
In contrast, at the aggregated team level, antagonistic emotions are negatively 
associated with alternative evaluation, for maximum intensities during the overall duration 
and the second part of the simulation. It can be hypothesized, as it is the case for the other 
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classes of emotions that a moderate level of antagonistic emotions contributes to a positive 
relationship with decision-making processes, whereas intense levels of antagonistic emotions 
contribute to a negative relationship. 
The results of this study indicate that antagonistic emotions are negatively associated 
with team cohesion. These results were found both at the individual and at the aggregated 
team level, during each phase of the simulation (overall, first part, and second part). They are 
congruent with previous research addressing anger in a negotiation context. Allred et al. 
(1997) found that high levels of anger are detrimental to future working relationships. In the 
context of the simulation, it can occur either when participants have anger-in, that is they are 
not satisfied with themselves (their performance for example), or anger-out (hostility towards 
other team members or toward competing teams). 
In summary, individual antagonistic emotions influence alternative generation and 
alternative evaluation positively when team members have worked a long time enough 
together. Adversely, when team members are starting to work together, antagonistic emotions 
influence alternative evaluation and team cohesion negatively. An intense level of collective 
antagonistic emotions is detrimental to all decision-making processes. 
 
5.1.5. Collective Emotion 
The present study found that positive collective emotions (both achievement and 
approach emotions) converged rapidly, as soon as the teams started to work together as shown 
by the convergence measures used. Future research will have to refine the definition and the 
measurements of convergence. However, the working definition of collective emotion in this 
research was that shared emotions are embedded in interrelated behaviors associated with the 
accomplishment of a task over time, and this study may have found empirical confirmation of 
this working definition. If one considers Paez et al.’s (1995) definition of emotional climate, 
one assumes emotions are accompanied by the predominance of certain action tendencies that 
permeate social interactions, and these action tendencies translate into behaviors shared by a 
given group. Thus, the fact that convergence was also found on decision-making processes 
within the 20 teams may be an indicator that emotional convergence is sustained by 
behavioral similarities. This convergence of positive emotions contrasts with Bartel and 
Saavedra’s (2000) findings: they found convergence of both positive and negative moods in 
working groups. 
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In the present study, the convergence may be due to certain norms that groups develop 
very early on in the process of working together (Moorhead, Neck, & West, 1998). The 
participants had already been together between 2 and 5 days before starting the simulation. 
Early studies on climate emphasize the importance of a positive climate for good group 
performance. Vraa (1974) suggest that an optimal climate enables team members a certain 
freedom of expressing their emotions without fear of rejection. Contemporary research echoes 
this view: Shaw (1981), Moreland and Levine (1992), or Jones, Stevens, and Fischer (2000) 
suggest that it is necessary for team members to act independently and express themselves 
without fear of negative feedback. Luft (1970) described how important a good climate is for 
good collaboration where feelings of insecurity leading to anger and defensiveness can be 
eliminated. In the present study, it can be argued that the elimination of anger is not an issue. 
The fact that the predominance of positive collective emotions instills a positive climate 
probably plays the role of buffer and enables individuals to report their anger (i.e., they feel 
free to do so). Anger was then positively related to decision-making processes during the 
second part of the simulation, precisely when team members have had time to establish this 
positive climate. This may be an illustration of what Heath and Jourden (1997) have described 
as the buffer effect, played by positive affect to prevent negative performance evaluations by 
team members after a disappointing event. 
 
5.2. Theoretical and Methodological Contributions 
5.2.1. Emotion and Group Decision-Making 
Several authors have commented about the deficiency of research on affect/mood/ 
emotion and group decision-making (e.g. Davis, 1982, Hinsz et al., 1997), although there has 
been interest for the role of emotions in decision-making at the individual level over the last 
decade (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). In a recent review, Kelly and Barsade (2001) describe 
the fact there is “virtually no empirical research examining the influence of intense emotions 
in work teams. This is most likely due to the methodological difficulties of being allowed into 
organizations to study such emotions.” (p. 103) This study contributes to the development of 
this research area. The scale used was graded from 1 to 4, which might not reflect a large 
enough band of intensities; yet the size of the circle drawn on the Emotion Wheel plus the 
label attached to it suggests an intensity of 4 is strong. Thus, intense emotions have been 
measured in an organizational context. 
 116
Dunegan, Duchon, and Barton (1992) suggest two points that support what was 
accomplished in this study. First, they argue that affective states that directly emanate from 
the decision task would be more proximal indicators of decision behaviors. Loewenstein and 
Lerner (2003) share this view, as they argue that immediate emotions influence decision-
making by modifying the decision maker’s perception of probabilities, decision-relevant cues, 
or decision outcomes. In this study, emotions were measured during the decision-making 
process: the results appear to be consistent with Loewenstein and Lerner. Second, Dunegan et 
al. argue that a certain level of affective arousal may be necessary before it begins to influence 
decision-making. They suggest that research should find criterion measures that would require 
different intensities of emotion before any relationship can emerge. This idea, as well as 
Loewenstein and Lerner’s (2003) proposition that both quality and intensity of emotions have 
to be considered when studying effects on decision-making, was implemented in this study 
and different results were yielded depending on the type of class of emotions (i.e. quality) and 
on the type emotion scores used (Mean, Maximum, or Last score, i.e. intensity). 
 
5.2.2. Types of Emotion Scores 
In order to provide a more refined series of self-report measures on emotion, three 
different types of scores were created, based on the assumption that there are three kinds of 
memory processes occurring when subjects try to remember events or emotions that occurred 
over a certain period of time: 1) an average of emotions experienced over a given period of 
time; 2) peak experiences; or 3) end experiences (see Stone, Shiffman, & De Vries (1999). 
These assumptions were tested in the present study. Measurements made at the end of 
decision periods yielded the least number of statistically significant results (8), whereas 
maximum intensities yielded the most results (27). Average reports yielded an average 
number of results (15). It appears that the intensity of the experience may be more relevant to 
people than the latest experience. Hedonic psychology already addresses these issues 
(Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999); future studies applied to organizational settings 
should explore these assumptions further. 
 
5.2.3. Curvilinear Relationships 
Each of the classes of emotions has positive and negative behavioral consequences, as 
it was described in Chapter 1. In addition, findings in the present study show rather 
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systematically that intense levels of emotion, positive or negative, appeared detrimental to 
group decision-making processes. Thus, it can be assumed that this study has begun to find 
curvilinear relationships between emotion and decision-making processes. Future studies 
should further examine these inverted U-shaped functions, as suggested by Frijda (1986), and 
consider influencing factors such as the context, the length of time team members spend 
working together, the type of task, etc. 
 
5.2.4. Specificity of Emotions 
In the research domain of strategic decision-making in teams, studies have not yet 
addressed the role of specific emotions. In parallel, Barsade and Gibson (1998), when 
addressing the issue of collective emotion, have suggested that studying group emotion based 
on specific emotions (e.g. anger, fear, sadness, joy) could improve our knowledge on group 
emotions and their effects on behaviors. The present research has contributed to advances of 
knowledge in this direction. In strategic decision-making literature, the dichotomy between 
cognitive conflict and affective conflict (e.g. Amason, 1996) relies on the fact that anger leads 
to interpersonal conflict (or affective conflict), which in turn is detrimental to decision-
making. The present study shows that anger (or related emotions, such as antagonistic 
emotions) can be both helping and hindering decision-making processes, depending on the 
type of decision-making process (alternative generation, alternative evaluation, or team 
cohesion), on the timing (beginning or end of a task/project), and on the emotion intensity 
(means vs. maximum intensities). 
 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
The first limitation of this study is that it cannot be ascertained that participants 
reported emotions, as they were defined in Chapter 1. This is the challenge of using self-report 
measures to measure emotion or any other affective construct, as mentioned earlier. Whether 
researchers measure affect, mood, or emotion, many terms are similar: terms such ‘happy’, 
‘sad’, ‘elated’, ‘fearful’, ‘angry’ are used to measure all three constructs. Even when 
researchers attempt to manipulate the inducement of sadness as a mood for example, even if 
they apply manipulation checks, they may have not measured emotion37. Future investigation 
should tackle the issues: of 1) more rigorous definitions; and 2) more rigorous measurements. 
                                                   
37 See section 1.4. 
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The second limitation is that participants were constrained to report two emotions. 
Theoretically, I argued that at any given point in time, it is not possible to feel more than two 
emotions given the investment made by the organism to produce an emotion. However, 
Scherer and Ceschi (1997) suggest that emotion blends may be the kinds of emotional 
response subjects have in naturalistic situations. Scherer and Ceschi acknowledge that timing 
could be a critical issue and that more sophisticated ways of measuring emotions at very 
precise moments in time will have to be devised. A combination of laboratory experiments 
where it is possible to use technological instruments to detect micro-mechanisms and of field 
studies will have to be conducted to further explore this issue. In the latter case, the Emotion 
Wheel could be used as an instrument to measure blends by allowing participants to report as 
many emotions as they wish by class of emotions and by asking them to rank order their 
choices. 
The third limitation is that there were a limited amount of data points for resignation 
emotions and antagonistic emotions. In a quasi-field study with no experimental 
manipulation, it is very difficult to create the conditions in which participants will feel 
resignation and/or antagonistic emotions as often as achievement and approach emotions. 
Even in an experimental setting, Barsade (2002) could not find that negative moods lead to a 
stronger emotional contagion than positive moods. Although negative emotions serve an 
adaptive purpose, organizational norms would rather regulate or suppress them and give 
preference to neutral or positive emotions (see Ashforth & Humphrey (1995) and Barsade & 
Gibson (1998), for reviews on normative control of emotion). Negative emotions, when they 
reach a high intensity, have usually negative consequences, at the individual level (e.g. fight, 
disease, mental disorder, stress) or at the collective level (e.g. riots, demonstrations, wars, 
etc.). Future research bear the responsibility of finding either experimental designs to trigger 
anger while remaining in the boundaries of ethical rules on the use of human subjects or to 
access field settings where antagonistic emotions are already present for contextual reasons 
(such as organizations going through turbulent situations, or union workers demonstrating in 
the streets). For example, Tjosvold (2002) used critical incident interviews of employees and 
managers to investigate how anger is managed in the context of teamwork. His results suggest 
that open-minded discussion of the anger-inducing incident actually fosters productivity and 
reinforces relationships among team members. 
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The fourth limitation is that both emotions and decision-making variables were self-
report measures. Thus, all the above-mentioned conclusions have to be seen as the influence 
of participants’ emotion on their perception of decision-making processes occurring in their 
teams. Weingart (1997) recommends that observation of group processes is a more 
informative data collection method than self-report measures. Larsen and Fredrickson (1999) 
point out that the advantage of external observers is that they are unobtrusive in naturalistic 
environments. Huy (1999) also suggests that external observations constitute a reasonable 
solution to provide additional objectivity in the assessments of emotions in teams or 
organizations. 
Finally, research on team diversity and organizational literature (e.g. Milliken & 
Martin, 1996) might bring a new perspective on collective emotion. Barsade and Gibson 
(1998) in reviewing various forms of collective emotion, refer to the affective composition of 
team. This approach can be split in two sub-categories: 1) group emotion can be considered 
from a homogeneity perspective, i.e. as the sum of its parts, and individual emotions are either 
summed or averaged; 2) group emotion can be considered from a heterogeneity perspective, 
i.e. as the amount of variance in emotions between team members. This latter approach 
implies that homogeneity is not the only answer. Gibson and Barsade have suggested 
integrating the perspective on maximum or minimum emotional rating into the minority 
influence literature (see Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone (1994) for a 
review on minority influence). They question the influence team members having the 
maximum and minimum rating on the affective dimension of interest may have on other team 
members. In the present study maximum ratings were extracted and put in relation to 
decision-making processes. Due to the fact that team members voted on their group consensus 
emotion, it is likely that both minority influence and vote by majority strategies were played 
out. However, these processes were neither captured, nor analyzed. Future research needs to 
explore this question. 
 
5.4. Practical Applications 
The Emotion Wheel revealed itself as a useful instrument for field studies, to be used 
with managers in a quasi-naturalistic environment. In addition, to obtain almost 100% 
response rates from these managers during 8 to 10 days everyday was a positive 
accomplishment, and a possible indicator of their involvement in their task. The method of 
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either filling a diary or the Emotion Wheel should address Kelly and Barsade’s (2001) 
concern that “even if researchers are allowed to study the emotions, measuring them is 
difficult, given their generally brief nature.” (p. 103-104) 
Two practical applications for the use of the Emotion Wheel as a data-gathering tool in 
the present study can be envisaged. First, the Emotion Wheel could be conceived as medium 
to help develop managers’ emotional intelligence. Second, the Emotion Wheel could 
contribute to the further understanding of the influence of emotion on teams’ output (e.g., 
actual decisions, productivity, performance). 
Emotional intelligence represents a growing field of research. It is only logical that 
this concept is further investigated in the area of organizational behavior in order to find out 
what the implications of emotional intelligence could be on work processes and outcomes, 
whether at the individual level or at the group level (Kelly & Barsade, 2001). For example, 
Huy (1999) proposes to consider both levels in a theoretical model where emotional 
intelligence at the individual level should facilitate adaptation and change; and at the 
organizational level where what he termed emotional capability should be helpful to realize 
radical change. One of the first theoretical papers on group emotion intelligence (Wolff & 
Druskat, 1999) defines it as “the ability of a group to generate a shared set of norms that shape 
how members interpret and respond to their own emotions and to the ones exhibited by other 
members and individuals outside of the group.” (p. 3) In a second paper designed for a more 
practical-oriented managerial audience they suggest to create a structure that let the group 
express its emotions and all group members should be able to share perspectives before 
making decisions. That is where the Emotion Wheel may play a role in real project teams or 
may play a role in any meeting taking place in organizations. It could be observed during the 
simulation that participants often used the Emotion Wheel as a medium to discuss their 
emotions freely with their colleagues and it became part of the norms of the teams to do so. 
Thus, discussing emotions yields self-awareness and awareness at the group level when, for 
example, participants discuss their group consensus emotion. In addition, by mapping 
emotions on the Emotion Wheel on a regular basis, everyone can see the evolution of the 
emotional climate and team members can proactively manage it. Since one of the pillars of 
emotional intelligence is awareness of own emotions and awareness of others’ emotions, the 
Emotion Wheel provides support in this direction and could be seen as a tool to help managers 
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develop their emotional intelligence, individually and as a team, which in turn would help 
them in change processes as suggested by Nguyen Huy’s paper. 
The second practical application is one that is very much expected by practitioners. 
What is the influence of emotion on productivity, performance, or actual decisions? Until 
now, studies focusing on emotions are still scarce. Forgas & George (2001), in a recent 
review, report studies demonstrating that affect and mood are key components of 
organizational behavior (including motivation, employee flexibility, helpfulness, absenteeism, 
negotiation behaviors, and decision-making), and not solely a source of disruption. However, 
they reiterate the idea that high-intensity emotions have complex and varied effects that are 
not as easy to predict as low-intensity moods. The question remains whether this is the right 
question: why are emotions automatically qualified as “high-intensity”? In the present 
research, relationships between emotions at different intensities and perceived decision-
making processes were studied. Future research should further investigate the relationships 
between emotions (not affect nor mood) and decisions’ outcomes. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
The present study has demonstrated the feasibility to measure emotions in teams 
repeatedly in a quasi-naturalistic environment thus providing ecological validity to a research 
question often studied in laboratory settings. At the outset of this research, it was argued that 
the objective was to study the influence of emotions on team decision-making processes, yet 
acknowledging that no causal link could be inferred due to the correlational nature of the 
study. Nevertheless, relationships were identified, some congruent with previous literature; 
for example, that antagonistic emotions are detrimental to decision-making processes. But 
some shed a new light on this area of research; for example, that achievement emotions are 
not detrimental to analytical tasks (i.e. alternative evaluation) or that antagonistic emotions are 
not necessarily impeding decision-making. Emotion was measured at multiple levels and 
different response patterns were identified; thus, a contribution has also been brought to the 
study of individual-level emotion versus group emotion. The challenge remains in the future 
to study the influence of emotions on actual decision outcomes as it is probably one of the 
most frequently asked questions when it comes to real-life implications of this study. 
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RESUME FRANÇAIS 
1. Cadre théorique 
L’objectif de cette recherche est de déterminer la mesure dans laquelle les 
émotions influencent les processus de prise de décision dans les équipes de cadres. 
D’une part, quatre différentes classes d’émotions (émotions d’accomplissement, 
émotions d’approche, émotions de résignation, et émotions antagonistes); d’autre part, 
quatre processus de prise de décision (le partage de l’information, la génération 
d’alternatives, l’évaluation d’alternatives, et la cohésion de l’équipe) ont été pris en 
considération. Cette recherche est appliquée et exploratoire. Bien que les processus 
individuels soient importants et traités dans ce travail, il s’agira surtout de découvrir 
comment les émotions combinées en processus collectifs dynamiques peuvent avoir un 
impact sur les processus de prise de décision des cadres. 
Récemment, un certain nombre de chercheurs ont investigué comment les 
affects, les humeurs ou les émotions ressentis au sein d’équipes se combinent en un 
processus collectif qui influence comment les équipes vont fonctionner. De Rivera 
(1992) définit le climat émotionnel comme étant constituté des relations émotionnelles 
entre les membres d’une nation. Paez, Asun, et Gonzales (1995) postulent qu’un climat 
émotionnel est basé sur des émotions, des croyances et des représentations sociales 
partagées, représentant un phénomène collectif qui n’est pas juste une aggrégation 
d’émotions individuelles. Barsade (2002) a étudié la contagion émotionnelle dans les 
équipes de travail, utilisant la définition de la contagion émotionnelle de Hatfield 
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994), à savoir un processus d’imitation inconscient et 
automatique des comportements non-verbaux d’autrui. Bartel et Saavedra (1998, 2000) 
définissent les humeurs collectives comme des humeurs partagées par les membres 
d’une équipe. George (1990) définit la tonalité affective d’un groupe comme des 
réactions affectives consistentes de la part des membres du groupe. Totterdell, Kellett, 
Teuchmann, et Briner (1998) définissent les liens entre les humeurs des membres d’une 
équipe de travail comme des influences interpersonnelles d’humeurs similaires. 
Dans le cadre de ces concepts multiples et variés, certaines de ces études ont 
révélé une influence de l’affect collectif sur des processus ou produits de groupe. Par 
exemple, la contagion émotionnelle positive est positivement liée au niveau de 
 123
comportement coopératif dans les groupes et à une perception d’une meilleure 
performance dans l’accomplissement de la tâche; elle est négativement liée au conflit 
dans le groupe (Barsade, 2001). Les humeurs plaisantes favorisent la qualité et 
l’efficience de la performance du groupe, tandis que les humeurs déplaisantes 
entraînent par exemple une motivation du groupe à attteindre ses buts et à fournir la 
quantité prévue de produits ou de services (Bartel et Saavedra, 1998). La tonalité 
affective positive est négativement corrélée à l’absentéisme et la tonalité affective 
négative est négativement corrélée au comportement pro-social (George, 1990). 
Cependant, la plupart des études étudient l’influence de l’affect collectif sur divers 
processus ou produits de groupe, mais pas l’impact de l’émotion collective sur les 
processus de prise de décision en équipe. 
D’autres études parmi la littérature sur les groupes et la prise de décision en 
groupe ont tenu compte de l’aspect affectif du travail en équipe. Bien que l’affect 
collectif ne soit pas explictement traité, un processus d’influence affective pourrait 
cependant émerger et mener les membres d’une équipe à bien s’entendre ou à ne pas 
bien s’entendre, à être satisfait ou dissatisfait de l’équipe. Dans ces études, l’affect est 
étudié en relation avec les processus et les produits groupaux. Heath et Jourden (1997) 
ont trouvé que les activités de groupe favorise l’affect positif (ce qu’ils ont appelé 
«l’effet d’enthusiasme») mais plus important encore est le rôle de tampon que cet affect 
positif joue: il atténue le fait que l’affect négatif généré par la déception post-
performance puisse se traduire en évaluations négatives de la performance. D’autres 
dimensions affectives incluent: a) la satisfaction avec le leader et la confiance en la 
décision du groupe (Peterson, 1997); b) l’acceptation affective des autres membres de 
l’équipe, qui est considérée comme essentielle à la qualité de la décision dans les 
équipes dirigeantes (Amason, 1996); c) l’«affect groupal», défini comme la sympathie, 
le plaisir et la mesure dans laquelle les membres du groupe s’apprécient (Priem et 
Price, 1991), que les décisionnaires pensent être plus élevé lorsqu’ils prennent leur 
décisions basées sur le consensus, en comparaison à des conditions de prise de décision 
plus conflictuelles; et d) le conflit affectif ou socio-émotionnel, défini comme un type 
de conflit dysfonctionnel, basé sur des incompatibilités personnelles, des désagréments 
et des critiques incluant une dimension de colère, qui semble être néfaste à la qualité de 
la décision (Amason, 1996; Devine, 1999, Priem et Price, 1991). Ces études examinent 
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les processus de prise de décision en équipe influencé par une forme quelconque 
d’affect mais pas par l’émotion collective. 
Les études traitant explicitement ou implicitement du problème de l’affect 
collectif influençant les processus ou performances groupaux, tels que les 
comportements coopératifs, l’absentéisme, le conflit ou l’acceptation des décisions, par 
exemple, ont essentiellement choisi l’humeur ou l’affect comme concepts affectifs, 
mais pas l’émotion. Les études se focalisant sur l’humeur la définissent comme un état 
affectif diffus, n’ayant souvent pas d’objet particulier (par ex. Bartel et Saavedra, 
2000). Les études se focalisant sur l’affect le définissent comme un trait de personnalité 
(par ex. George, 1990), et le mesurent avec des dimensions telles que l’Affect Positif et 
l’Affect Négatif (voir Watson, Clark, et Tellengen, 1988). Cependant, les résultats 
obtenus avec l’humeur ou l’affect ne sont pas nécessairement généralisables à 
l’émotion.  
Les théoriciens de l’émotion ont suggéré le besoin de recherches traitant de 
l’influence de l’émotion sur la prise de décision (par ex. Ellsworth, 1991; Ketelaar et 
Clore, 1998). Au niveau individuel, par exemple, Lerner et Keltner (2000) ont 
démontré que des individus ressentant de la peur émettent des jugements plus 
pessimistes sur des événements futurs, tandis que des individus ressentant de la colère 
émettent des jugements plus optimistes. Au niveau du groupe, la recherche sur la prise 
de décision groupale prend l’émotion en considération. L’émotion est reconnue comme 
faisant partie de la prise de décision, par exemple la confiance ou l’anxiété (Eisenhardt, 
1989), ou la colère (par ex. Amason, 1996; Janis, 1989; Priem & Price, 1991). L’effet 
néfaste d’émotions telles que l’élation, l’anxiété, la honte, la culpabilité et la colère 
ressenties de manière intense ou du stress aigu ont été abordé par Janis (1989). 
Cependant, bien que le terme émotion soit employé, il n’est souvent pas bien défini. 
En résumé, il existe encore à l’heure actuelle peu de travaux empiriques sur 
l’émotion collective et sa relation aux processus de prise de décision en équipes. 
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2. Objectif de la recherche et définitions 
2.1. Objectif 
L’objectif de cette recherche sera le suivant: déterminer dans quelle mesure 
certaines classes d’émotions ont une influence sur les processus de prise de décision 
dans les équipes de management. Les bases théoriques reposent donc sur trois volets: 
l’émotion, telle que définie plus haut (individuelle et collective), la prise de décision en 
équipes et l’émotion en relation avec la prise de décision. 
2.2. Définitions opérationnelles 
Emotion. L’émotion est définie dans ce travail comme étant de nature 
épisodique, d’une durée relativement courte, et générée par un objet ou un événement 
spécifique (Lazarus, 1991; Frijda, 1994; Scherer, 1984). L’émotion comporte plusieurs 
composantes: la cognition, la physiologie, l’expression motrice, les tendances à 
l’action, et le sentiment subjectif (Scherer, 2000). Le fait que la cause soit exacte et le 
contenu cognitif a des implications sur les comportenements, qui seront à leur tour 
spécifiques (Forgas, 1991). Par ailleurs, Frijda (1986) a défini les tendances à l’action 
comme des états de préparation «dans le but d’exécuter un certain type d’action.» (p. 
70). Les tendances à l’action sont un élément pertinent de l’émotion, surtout lorsqu’il 
s’agit de comprendre les comportement potentiels ou réalisés dans le contexte d’une 
tâche de prise de décision en équipe. 
Classes d’émotions. Scherer (1994) suggère le terme d’émotions «modales» 
pour décrire des familles d’émotions partageant des schémas d’évaluation cognitive 
similaires et récurrents. Dans ce travail, quatre classes d’émotions pouvant être 
considérées comme représentant des émotions modales sont proposées. 
Les émotions d’accomplissement sont représentées par exemple par la fierté, 
l’exhaltation, la joie et la satisfaction. Elles sont ressenties au cours de situations telles 
que les personnes ont accompli quelque chose personnellement ou professionnellement, 
et ont un désir de célébrer avec d’autres. Les émotions d’approche sont représentées par 
exemple par le soulagement, l’espoir, l’intérêt et la surprise. Elle sont ressenties lorsque 
l’on est attentif, alerte, en phase d’exploration, désireux d’apprendre, et se réjouissant 
du futur. Les émotions de résignation sont représentées par exemple par la tristesse, la 
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peur, la honte et la culpabilité. Elles sont ressenties au cours de situations telle qu’une 
perte personnelle (par exemple le décès d’un proche) ou une perte professionnelle (par 
exemple la perte de son emploi ou la restructuration de l’entreprise entraînant la perte 
de collègues). Les émotions antagonistes sont représentées par exemple par l’envie (ou 
jalousie), le dégoût, le mépris ou la colère. Elles sont ressenties lorsque l’on estime que 
soi ou les siens sont attaqués, moralement ou physiquement, et que la cause de cette 
attaque semble injuste. 
La prise de décision managériale et ses composantes. Le cadre théorique 
concernant la prise de décision sur lequel repose ce travail est la prise de décision 
naturalistique (Zsambok, 1997), qui décrit comment les cadres prennent leurs décisions 
de manière concrète et comment ils les mettent en œuvre. Il s’agit ici donc de 
connaissances pratiques et d’expérience des décisions dans un monde réel où tout va 
très vite et où règne beaucoup d’incertitudes. La décision managériale est liée à des 
problèmes complexes et ambigus, mobilisant d’importantes ressources de la part de 
l’entreprise (Mintzberg, 1975) et qui affecte les résultats de cette dernière (Furnham, 
1997). 
Les quatre composantes de la prise de décision sont: le partage de l’information, 
la génération d’alternatives, l’évaluation d’alternative, et la cohésion de l’équipe. 
Le concept du partage de l’information inclut la volonté des membres d’une 
équipe de partager leurs connaissances, leurs capacités, leurs compétences et leur 
expertise avec les autres, de même que le partage de toute information récoltée pendant 
la prise de décision qui pourrait aider l’équipe à prendre une meilleure décision, au lieu 
d’une décision qui serait influencée par les préférences pré-décisionnelles des membres 
de l’équipe (voir Devine, 1999; Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, 
& Neale, 1996; Hollingshead, 1996; Kim, 1997; Larson et al., 1994; Schulz-Hardt et 
al., 2000; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Williams et al., 1997; Wittenbaum et al., 1999). 
La génération d’alternatives est la capacité pour les membres d’une équipe de 
générer un large spectre d’alternatives ainsi que le plus grand nombre d’alternatives 
possible, de manière à éviter qu’ils se trouvent psychologiquement enfermés dans une 
décision trop étriquée, et à ce qu’aucun élément pertinent ne soit omis, ce qui pourrait 
aussi avoir des conséquences négatives sur la qualité de la décision (voir Bettenhausen, 
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1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hackman & Morris, 1983; Janis, 1982, 1989; Paulus, 2000; 
Paulus & Yang, 2000; Scudder, Herschel, & Crossland, 1994). 
L’évaluation d’alternatives est une activité au cours de laquelle on procède à un 
examen de chaque alternative aussi systématique que possible et à une analyse des 
coûts et des bénéfices de chaque alternative. Les membres d’une équipe peuvent ainsi 
éviter d’ignorer une information pertinente, de limiter leurs discussions à peu 
d’alternatives et à courir le risque de décider trop hâtivement (voir Aldag & Fuller, 
1993; Hirokawa & Poole, 1996; Hollingshead, 1996; Janis & Mann, 1977; Janis, 1982, 
1989; Johnston, Driskell, & Salas, 1997; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 1986, 1989; 
Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992). 
La cohésion d’équipe représente l’adhésion par tous les membres d’une équipe 
à ses décisions, à l’équipe elle-même, impliquant des sentiments positifs entre les co-
équipiers. Les objectifs de l’équipe deviennent alors de permettre la performance 
présente et future de l’équipe (Amason, 1996; Leana, 1985; Mullen, Anthony, Salas, & 
Driskell, 1994; Priem and Price, 1991; Seashore, 1954, reproduit par Cartwright & 
Zander (1968); Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 1986, 1989; Terborg, Castore, & 
DeNinno, 1976; Turner et al. 1992; Wech, Mossholder, Steel, & Bennett, 1998; 
Zaccaro, 1991; Zaccaro & Lowe, 1988). 
3. Hypothèses 
Quatre hypothèses ont été sélectionnées parmi les 16 élaborées dans la thèse. 
Les émotions d’accomplissement peuvent mener à des actes de vantardise, 
accompagnées d’une moins bonne concentration et d’un ralentissement de la pensée 
constructive. Les recherches antérieures ont démontré que l’humeur positive est 
associée avec une prise de décision intuitive, avec peu d’attention portée aux détails, et 
une tendance à passer outre certaines informations importantes ou encore de sous-
estimer la probabilité d’une issue négative. Par ailleurs, l'évaluation d’alternatives 
implique un examen systématique de toutes les alternatives, ainsi qu’une analyse des 
coûts et des benefices, ce qui requiert du temps et des efforts. C’est pourquoi, 
l’hypothèse suivante est formulée: 
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H1c: Les émotions d’accomplissement seraient négativement liées à l’évaluation 
d’alternatives. 
Les émotions d’approche soutiennent l’activité de groupe et renforce les liens 
entre les personnes. Les membres d’une équipe qui ressentent ce type d’émotions sont 
mobilisées dans un but d’avancer ensemble, non seulement ils sont dévoués à la tâche 
mais aussi à travailler ensemble. La cohésion de l’équipe represente l’engagement vis-
à-vis des autres membres de l’équipe et des decisions qu’ils prennent ensemble. C’est 
pourquoi, l’hypothèse suivante est formulée: 
H2d: Les émotions d’approche seraient positivement liées à la cohésion de l’équipe. 
Les émotions de résignation sont associés à un rétrécissement des pensées, à 
une vision de type «tunnel», à des ruminations, à un manque de confiance, et à peu 
d’innovation. Les recherches antérieures sur émotion et prise de décision suggèrent que 
les individus ressentant de la peur sont plus pessimistes quant aux événements futurs; 
les recherches sur l’humeur et la prise de décision suggèrent que les individus tristes 
sur-estiment la probabilité d’événements négatifs. Il semble donc que les individus sous 
l’emprise d’émotions de resignation auront de la difficulté à proposer un grand spectre 
de nouvelles alternatives. Or, la génération d’alternatives est la capacité pour les 
membres d’une équipe de générer un large spectre d’alternatives ainsi que le plus grand 
nombre d’alternatives possible. C’est pourquoi, l’hypothèse suivante est formulée: 
H3b: Les émotions de résignation seraient négativement liées à la génération 
d’alternatives. 
Les émotions antagonistes sont responsables d’une prise de décision 
défectueuse, comme le montre les recherches sur la prise de décision en groupes. 
Quand les membres de l’équipe sont motivés par la vengeance ou l’agression, ils ne 
prennent sans doute pas le temps de peser les pours et les contres de leurs décisions, 
alors que l’évaluation des alternatives requiert justement du temps et des efforts. C’est 
pourquoi, l’hypothèse suivante est formulée: 
H4c: Les émotions antagonistes seraient négativement liées à l’évaluation 
d’alternatives. 
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4. Méthode 
106 participants répartis en 20 équipes gèrent une entreprise pendant 8 années 
fictives. Chaque années fictive (appelée Période) dure en réalité 3 à 4 heures. Les 
équipes sont composées de 4 à 7 personnes, qui opèrent comme équipe dirigeante de 
leur entreprise respective. Les participants engagent d’intenses discussions en groupe 
pour prendre leurs décisions et atteindre leurs objectifs. 
On a considéré trois niveaux d’analyse: 
· Individuel (émotion et prise de décision); 
· Equipe (scores moyens individuels agrégés, émotion et prise de décision); 
· Consensus de groupe (émotions seulement, scores obtenus par une discussion 
entre les membres de l’équipe). 
Les scores individuels et agrégés ont été créé pour chaque classe d’emotions, 
sur la base de l’intensité de chaque emotion sélectionnée, couvrant 3 catégories 
temporelles: (a) Les périodes 1 to 6, appelées ‘Totalité’; (b) Les périodes 1 and 2, 
appelées ‘Phase de Démarrage’; et (c) les périodes 3 to 6, intitulées les ‘Phase de 
Développement’. 
Trois types de scores d’émotion ont été calculés pour tenir compte des 
problèmes de reconstitution d’événements passés (voir Kahneman, 1999): 
· Un score émotionnel moyen 
· Un score émotionnel maximum 
· Un score émotionnel final, reporté juste avant le questionnaire mesurant les 
processus de prise de décision. 
 
5. Résultats 
L’hypothèse H1C ne s’est pas vérifiée au niveau du consensus de groupe dans 
la phase de démarrage: les intensités maximales des émotions d’accomplissement sont 
liées positivement à l’évaluation d’alternatives. La confiance en la qualité de la 
décision est basée sur des émotions comme la joie et la satisfaction. Il se peut donc que 
les émotions d’accomplissement aient entretenu le sentiment de confiance que les 
membres de l’équipe ont eu dans leur capacité d’évaluer les alternatives, au cours de la 
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phase de démarrage. Ces résultats diffèrent de ce qui a été traditionnellement trouvé sur 
l’affect ou l’humeur positifs et la prise de décision. 
L’hypothèse H2d ne s’est pas vérifiée au niveau de l’équipe et pour toutes les 
périodes de la simulation: les intensités maximales des emotions d’approche sont liées 
négativement à la cohesion de l’équipe. Scherer and Tran (2001) ont postulé que les 
emotions d’approche peuvent engendrer une attention dispersée, ou au contraire une 
focalisation excessive, et des objectifs irréalistes. Il se peut donc que d’intenses 
émotions d’approche aient entraîné les membres de l’équipe à envisager trop 
d’alternatives différentes, ce qui peut être propice aux conflits et donc à une 
détérioration de la cohésion de l’équipe. 
L’hypothèse H3b ne s’est pas vérifiée: les émotions de résignation sont 
positivement liées à la génération d’alternatives, aussi bien au niveau individuel (phase 
de démarrage) qu’au niveau de l’équipe (toute la durée de la simulation). Ces résultats 
diffèrent des résultats sur l’influence de l’humeur triste sur la prise de décision (par ex. 
Forgas, 1989; Schwarz, 2000). La peur, pour autant qu’elle ne soit pas trop intense (ce 
qui est le cas ici), améliore les capacités d’adaptation des individus et les rends plus 
perceptifs aux signaux donnés par l’environnement (voir Paez et al., 1995). Un faible 
degré de peur peut donc être bénéfique à la génération d’alternatives et pousser les 
membres de l’équipe à trouver de nouvelles idées pour améliorer leur performance. Par 
aillleurs, la honte et la culpabilité ont aussi pour conséquence un désir de l’améliorer 
pour éviter l’incompétence. Ceci est aussi compatible avec la génération de nouvelles 
alternatives, dans le contexte de la simulation qui devient de plus en plus complexe au 
fil du temps. 
L’hypothèse H4c s’est vérifiée de manière consistente pendant toute la 
simulation au niveau de l’équipe: les intensités maximales sont négativement liées à 
l’évaluation des alternatives. Par contre, au niveau individuel, un schéma différent a 
émergé: la relation est négative dans la phase de démarrage (avec les scores finaux) 
mais positive dans la phase de développement (avec les moyennes). Les relations 
négatives au niveau de l’équipe sont congruentes avec les recherches sur la prise de 
décision en groupe: Janis (1989) postule que la colère empêche les membres de 
l’équipe d’évaluer les alternatives. Amason (1996) argumente que la colère inhibe le 
processus qui consiste à prendre tous les points de vue contradictoires en considération 
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et à prendre les décisions. Les relations positives au niveau individuel sont peut-être 
dues au fait que les membres de l’équipe se sont sentis libres d’exprimer leurs emotions 
negatives sans être critiqués et sans pour autant que l’esprit d’équipe en souffre. Ce 
phénomène peut être expliqué par une interdependence axée sur la tâche, augmentant 
au fur et à mesure que les individus travaillent ensemble (Bartel and Saavedra, 2000; 
Gersick, 1988). Par ailleurs, Lazarus and Cohen-Charash (2001) ont suggéré que dans 
un contexte organisationnel, la colère remplace souvent la peur et la tristesse. Il se peut 
donc que la colère dans ce contexte particulier entraîne une évaluation des alternatives 
méticuleuse, comme ce serait le cas avec la peur ou la tristesse. Ceci n’est qu’une 
hypothèse à considérer avec prudence. 
6. Limites, contributions et futures recherches 
6.1. Limites 
La limite inhérente au rapport verbal est reconnue. Il serait judicieux de le 
compléter par des enregistrements vidéo ou des interviews a posteriori. 
Les participants ont rapporté 2 émotions par mesure, ce qui pourrait apparaître 
comme une limitation. Il faudrait collecter les données de telle manière que plusieurs 
émotions puissent être rapportées et analyser les mélanges d’émotions. 
C’est une étude quasi-naturalistique. Une ou des étude(s) devraient être 
effectuer avec un contrôle expérimental, comme par exemple l’induction de certaines 
émotions (comme par ex. Barsade, 2002). L’intention de départ était de mesurer le 
climat émotionnel: l’aspect statistique demeure difficile. Cependant, dans la présente 
recherche, un climat émotionnel positif a pu être identifié. Il est important de continuer 
à la fois la conceptualisation et l’opérationnalisation du climat émotionnel. 
 
6.2. Contributions et futures recherches 
De manière générale, trois classes d’émotion (accomplissement, approche, et 
antagonistes) sont négativement liées à la prise de décision quand il s’agit d’intensités 
maximales. Les émotions de résignation forment une exception, car aucune intensité 
maximale n’a été obtenue pour cette classe d’émotions. Plus spécifiquement, les 
émotions d’accomplissement intenses sont négativement liées à la prise de décision, 
sauf dans la phase de démarrage. Ces résultats démontrent que la joie et la fierté par 
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exemple ne suffisent pas à rendre les gens plus productifs, en tout cas pas lorsque ces 
émotions sont ressenties de manière intense. On pourrait supposer que cela contribue au 
bon moral des équipes, mais sans pour cela les rendre plus efficientes dans leur prise de 
décision. Les émotions d’approche sont généralement positivement liées à la prise de 
décision, lorsqu’on prend en compte soit les moyennes, soit les scores finals. Ainsi, la 
présence bénéfique des émotions d’approche s’est révélée conformément aux attentes, 
mais pour autant que l’intensité ne soit pas trop forte, auquel cas les relations avec les 
processus de prise de décision se sont avérées négatives. Les émotions de résignation 
ont une relation positive avec la génération d’alternatives, contrairement à ce qui a été 
précédemment trouvé concernant les humeurs tristes (ce qui est une des contributions 
de cette recherche) et avec la cohésion de l’équipe (ce qui est congruent avec des 
phénomènes identifiés au niveau du climat émotionnel - ref. Paez et al., 1995). Les 
émotions antagonistes ont en général une relation négative avec la prise de décision, 
sauf aussi cas précis: au niveau individuel pendant la phase de développement. Ces 
relations négatives sont conformes aux attentes formulées. 
 
Nous pouvons ainsi mieux comprendre les conditions dans lesquelles nos 
hypothèses peuvent être confirmées ou infirmées, grâce aux différents niveaux et 
différents types de scores. La contribution majeure de ce travail est que des relations 
curvilinéaires entre l’émotion et les processus de prise de décision ont put être 
identifiées. Ainsi, la réputation des émotions comme ayant une influence néfaste sur les 
comportements en général et la prise de décision en particulier (voir Forgas, 2000) est 
sans doute justifiée si l’on considère des émotions intenses. Cependant, la présente 
recherche a aussi pu montré que cette influence des émotions est modulée en fonction 
du type d’émotion et en fonction de l’intensité (voir Loewenstein et Lerner, 2003). Ces 
relations curvilinéaires doivent être davantage investiguées dans de futures recherches. 
Pour ce faire, il serait par exemple utile d’étendre l’échelle de mesure des émotions, par 
exemple à 9 points, au lieu des 4 existants (y compris la possibilité d’indiquer un score 
de zéro). Des mesures objectives devraient être également utilisées en complément de 
l’Emotion Wheel, par exemple des enregistrements vidéo des interactions entre les 
membres des équipes. 
 
 133
7. Implications 
7.1. Implications Théoriques 
L’émotion en relation avec la prise de décision, en contraste avec les recherches 
précédentes qui se focalisaient sur l’affect et l’humeur. 
L’accent a été mis sur les propriétés communes des émotions qui composent 
chaque classe, concept qui s’avère pertinent pour étudier la convergence émotionnelle. 
 
7.2. Implications Pratiques 
Le fait de pouvoir démontrer aux managers qu’ils peuvent rapporter leurs 
émotions et que c’est tout à fait légitime contribue au développement de leurs 
compétences émotionnelles. 
Une meilleure prise de conscience de l’influence des émotions sur les processus 
de prise de décision contribue à l’amélioration de la performance des équipes. 
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Appendix A: The Emotion Wheel
Elation
Pride
Joy
Satisfaction
Hope
Interest
Relief
Surprise
Anger
Disgust
Contempt
Envy
Fear
Sadness
Guilt
Shame
High Control
PleasantUnpleasant
Low Control
puzzled
astonished
surprised
stupefied
attentive
interested
fascinated
enthralled
expectant
hopeful
optimistic
confident
feeling
unburdened relieved feeling
at ease feeling
comfortable
delightedcontent
satisfied
pleased
cheerful
happy
joyful
overjoyed
in high
spirits
elated
exhilarated
exalted
flushed
with pride
full of
rage
proud
self-
satisfied
gratified
angry
irritated
aggravated
disdainful
feeling
dislike
feeling
distrust
scornful
contemptuous
feeling
repulsion
revolted
feeling
disgust
feeling
distaste
jealous
envious
grudging
feeling
guilty
deserving
reproach
feeling
blameworthy
feeling
at fault
feeling
disreputable
shameful
feeling
disgrace
embarrassed
despaired
dejected
sad
in low
spirits
nervous
apprehensive
fearful
panicked
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Appendix B: Validation of the Emotion Wheel38 
 
The objective of this appendix is to report of the use of the Emotional Wheel as an 
equivalent data collection format to other types of formats, such as Likert-type questionnaires 
(pen and pencil or computerized) or columnar lists of labels to check. The Emotion Wheel 
was originally designed to measure emotion reactions linked to emails sent and received39, 
thus in a computerized format. The Emotion Wheel was then used in management seminars in 
a paper and pencil format as a self-report instrument in the specific context of a business 
simulation. The instrument was well accepted by more than 500 managers and proved to be a 
convenient tool to measure emotions in a context where participants were under time pressure 
and where data had to be collected repeatedly over time, as it is the case in the present study. 
In order to determine that no particular bias was introduced either by the circular 
configuration of emotion labels or by the order in which they are presented, a study was 
conducted to demonstrate construct validity. This study is based on the ability of the 
participants to recognize the targeted emotions from 48 different scenarios, using different 
reporting formats. 
 
Method and measurements 
The sample consisted of 80 business students in an Organizational Behavior course at 
a Swiss university. Seventy-one students reported their gender and their nationality: 52.5% 
were male, 36.3% were female; 38 students were Swiss, 33 were of a different nationality. 
The average age was 24 years. 
Forty-eight vignettes were created in total (i.e. three vignettes for each of the 16 
emotions composing the Emotion Wheel). Twenty-one vignettes for the following seven 
emotions: joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt were created based on the 
antecedent circumstances triggering these emotions reported by respondents in the 
International Study of Emotion Reactions and Antecedents (ISEAR) (see Gehm & Scherer, 
1988). Twenty-seven vignettes for the following nine emotions: contempt, envy, surprise, 
interest, hope, relief, satisfaction, elation, and pride were created based on theoretical 
                                                   
38 The development of the Emotion Wheel was supported by a grant from the Gottlieb-Daimler-und- Karl-Benz-
Stiftung to Klaus Scherer. 
39 See Gottlieb-Daimler-und- Karl-Benz-Stiftung research report. 
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predictions made by emotion researchers (see Chapter 1, pp. 11-18). The vignettes were 
written in English. 
Seven experimental conditions were created. First, in the ‘Emotion Wheel’ condition, 
participants could select the emotion corresponding to each vignette by ticking the chosen 
emotion in one of the circles on the ‘Emotion Wheel’. In addition, respondents were provided 
with an additional sheet showing a more complete version of the Emotion Wheel, which 
included detailed labels indicating the intensities for each emotion. Twenty-seven participants 
received the corresponding response booklet (Appendix B1). Second, in the ‘Circle’ 
condition, emotion labels were displayed in a column, in a randomized order. To provide their 
responses, participants could answer on a scale of 1 to 4, with each point of the scale being 
illustrated by circles of increasing diameter. Twenty-six participants in total were in the 
‘Circle’ condition. This condition was split into three sub-samples with three different random 
orders of the emotion labels. There were respectively 5, 8 and 13 participants per sub-sample 
(the corresponding response booklets are shown as Appendices B2, B3, and B4). Third, in the 
‘Word’ condition, emotion labels were also displayed in a column and in a randomized order. 
In addition, verbal descriptions, adapted to each emotion label indicating the intensity, were 
placed under each point of the scale. For example, the first point on the scale for pride, 
indicating the smallest intensity, was labeled ‘gratified’; the second point, the second smallest 
level of intensity, ‘self-satisfied’, etc. Twenty-seven participants in total were in the ‘Word’ 
condition. This condition was also split into three sub-samples with three different random 
orders of the emotion labels. There were respectively 7, 14 and 6 participants per sub-sample 
(the corresponding response booklets are shown as Appendices B5, B6, and B7). 
 
Pilot study 
Twelve female students in psychology were asked to be participants for the pilot 
study. The 48 vignettes were separated in three sets (3 times 16), and for each sub-category, 
four participants were administered 16 vignettes, with the wheel condition only. The pilot test 
was performed in order to check if the vignettes were representative of the targeted emotions. 
The aim was also to time participants and estimate how much time it would take to administer 
48 vignettes. Results are displayed in Table B1. For 12 out of 48 vignettes, the targeted 
emotion was identified by 100% of the respondents. In 18 cases, the class of emotions was 
identified by 100% of the respondents (with different proportions, such as 75/25, 50/50, or 
25/75 respectively for the targeted emotion and an emotion of the same class). In 9 cases, the 
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targeted emotion was identified by 75% of the respondents. Thus, for 81.3% of the vignettes, 
the recognition of the emotion was appropriate. On the basis of these preliminary results, the 
decision was made to use all the vignettes as they were conceived in this pilot study. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that it is difficult to obtain a 100% response rate for any given 
vignette, due to inter-individual differences in appraisal processes (see Scherer, Schorr, & 
Johnstone, 2001 for a review). 
 
Results 
The objective of this validation study was to ensure that the participants would not be 
biased by the circular shape of the instrument or by the particular ordering of the emotion 
labels. First, the three sub-samples of the ‘Circle’ condition were compared to ensure that 
there was no effect due to the different orders. Chi-square tests revealed no statistically 
significant difference between the three sub-samples. Thus they were collapsed for further 
analyses into one single category called the ‘Circle’ condition. Second, the same procedure 
was followed for the ‘Word’ condition, with the same results. Thus they were collapsed into 
one single category, called the ‘Word’ condition. Consequently, the ‘Emotion Wheel’, the 
‘Circle’, and the ‘Word’ conditions were compared with Chi-square tests. 
Results are displayed in Table B2. Next to the column where results from Chi-Square 
analyses are reported, there is column split among the three conditions, for percentages of 
responses for the targeted emotion, for an emotion of the same class, and for an emotion of a 
different class. Numbers of respondents40 are shown in parentheses. 
In 46 cases out of 48, no statistically significant differences between the three 
conditions were found, with the exception of two cases, where the number of respondents was 
not large enough to perform the Chi-square test. In the case of vignette #32, only 6.3% of the 
respondents chose the targeted emotion (i.e. envy), but 87.3% chose another emotion in the 
same class (i.e. antagonistic emotions). Due to the small number of responses in favor of 
envy, it was not possible to perform the Chi-square test. Thus, envy scores were grouped with 
the ones for the three other antagonistic emotions (i.e. disgust, contempt, and anger), then 
yielding a Chi square of χ2 (2, N = 74) = .84 ns. This result demonstrated that for vignette #32, 
                                                   
40 Whenever the total per cell did not equal the total sample size for each condition (27 for the Wheel condition, 
26 for the Circle condition, and 27 for the Word condition), it was because some respondents, who appeared to 
have misunderstood the vignette and/or systematically selected an emotion opposite to the targeted emotion, 
were eliminated from the data. The researcher’s judgment was applied in this selection process. 
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there was also no statistically significant difference between the three conditions (i.e. 
‘Emotion Wheel’, ‘Circle’, and ‘Word’). In the case of vignette #46, only 16% of the 
respondents chose the targeted emotion (i.e. surprise), but 54.7% selected fear (and in total 
62.7% a resignation emotion), thus indicating that the vignette was interpreted with an 
appraisal of negative surprise (e.g.Teigen & Keren, 2002). 
In general, 64.5% of the vignettes, more than 50% of the respondents selected the 
targeted emotion. In 89.6% of the vignettes, more than 50% of the respondents selected an 
emotion belonging to the same class as the targeted emotion. 
In order to verify that the participants in the present study would appraise the vignettes 
congruently with the subjects of the validation study, 74 of them (i.e. three sub-groups of size 
varying between 23 and 27 persons) received a simplified version of the ‘Emotion Wheel’ 
response booklet described on p. 2, with 16 scenarios instead of 48 (one per emotion). A few 
words were changed to adapt to the population of interest. For example, in vignette #16, the 
word ‘cousins’ was replaced by the word ‘colleagues’; in vignette #11, the words ‘little sister’ 
were replaced by the word ‘customer’. The percentages of recognized emotions are displayed 
in Table B3 and compared to the results of the ‘Emotion Wheel’ condition of the present 
validation study. In 12 cases out of 16, the response pattern is very similar. In the 4 other 
cases, there was an opposite pattern between the responses to the ‘Emotion Wheel’ validation 
study condition and the three sub-groups of participants the present research. However, there 
was a consistent pattern of results among the three sub-groups, thus indicating a common 
appraisal of the vignettes among these participants. 
 
Conclusion 
This study contributed to demonstrate that there was no statistically significant 
difference between using the Emotion Wheel for data collection or any of the two alternatives 
formats, thus the Emotion Wheel can be used as a valid instrument to measure emotions. 
 
 Gehm, Th., & Scherer, K. R. (1988). Factors determining the dimensions of subjective 
emotional space. In K. R. Scherer (Ed.), Facets of- emotion: Recent research. (pp. 99-114). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: 
Theory, methods, research (pp. 350-365). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Teigen, K. H., & Keren, G. (2002). When are successes more surprising than failures? 
Cognition and emotion, 16(2), 245-268. 
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Vignettes Targeted 
emotion 
 Wheel condition 
(n) 
- on target 4 
- same class 0 
1: During the Christmas holidays this year, 
some friends that I hadn’t seen for 6 years 
came to visit me and we had a wonderful 
time together. 
Joy 
- other 0 
 
- on target 1 
- same class 3 
2: We have worked so hard, so our project 
should be a success. 
Hope 
- other  
 
- on target 4 
- same class 0 
3: I was coming back late from a party one 
night, and I was walking. All of the sudden, 
three men followed me, starting to yell at me, 
asking for money. They were drunk, so I ran 
as fast as I could. 
Fear 
- other 0 
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
4: My boss unfairly accused me of having 
mishandled a certain task that was actually 
supposed to be the responsibility of my 
colleague. 
Anger 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
5: I have successfully passed all the exams I 
needed to apply to an excellent university 
abroad. 
Pride 
- other 0 
 
- on target 2 
- same class 1 
6: After all the trauma caused by my son’s 
illness and stay at the hospital, the doctor 
finally gave some good news and we then 
knew he was going to recover. 
Relief 
- other 1 
 
- on target 2 
- same class 1 
7: The teacher started to make jokes about 
my behavior as I was presenting something at 
the blackboard, in front of all the other 
students. 
Shame 
- other 1 
 
- on target 1 
- same class 2 
8: Yesterday I read in the newspaper that a 
30 year-old woman had abused her 2 month-
old son and had caused his death. To abuse 
such a fragile creature cannot be considered 
as a human act and should not be forgiven. 
Contempt 
- other 1 
 
Table B1 
Frequencies by Emotion Vignette Reported by Subjects in Pilot Study 
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- on target 4 
- same class  
9: I had not seen my fiancé(e) for 3 months, 
it had been the first time we were separated 
for such a long time. And now I am standing 
at the airport, waiting… and I can see my 
fiancé(e) coming out of the door, we run in 
each other’s arms, and nothing else would 
matter. 
Elation 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
10: I could not stop reading this book, I was 
totally absorbed. 
Interest 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
11: I was supposed to pick up my little sister 
at school and I totally forgot. She stood all by 
herself in the street for two hours, anything 
could have happened to her. 
Guilt 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class  
12: I walked in the forest the other day, and 
my dog became very nervous. We discovered 
the dead body of a deer, starting to rot. I 
nearly fainted. 
Disgust 
- other 1 
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
13: I had done all the things I had to do on 
my list, so I left my work with a good 
impression. 
Satisfaction 
- other  
 
- on target 1 
- same class  
14: I came home yesterday night, the 
apartment was dark, and as I switch the light 
on, all my friends were standing in the 
living-room and sang “Happy Birthday” to 
me, holding a big cake in their hands. 
Surprise 
- other 3 
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
15: The day I lost my mother was the most 
horrible day in my life, I thought I would not 
overcome the pain. 
Sadness 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
16: I could not understand why my cousins 
could go on a trip to the Seychelles and 
enjoy the sun in the midst of the winter, and 
I had to stay in Switzerland to work on my 
exams. 
Envy 
- other  
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- on target 2 
- same class 2 
17: We had rehearsed that play for one 
year, and tonight was THE night, the 
premiere. We received a standing ovation 
and the public called us back five times! It 
was the most wonderful day of my life. 
Elation 
- other  
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
18: Anthropology was a course I would not 
miss for the world; I could listen and read 
about it for days. 
Interest 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class  
19: We had a party at work for a 
colleague’s birthday, and I drank too much, 
I started to dance on the tables. I didn’t 
remember I had done that, and my 
colleagues told me about it the next day. 
Shame 
- other 1 
 
- on target 3 
- same class  
20: I saw a documentary on TV yesterday 
on living conditions in some very poor 
regions: the people would drink, wash, and 
urinate, all in the same river water. 
Disgust 
- other 1 
 
- on target 1 
- same class 3 
21: I shopped all day and I found some very 
good bargains. 
Satisfaction 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class  
22: If only I would get that grant I have 
applied for, I could go on with my studies! 
Hope 
- other 1 
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
23: It is been four months that I have 
promised my grandmother to visit her, I 
know she is ill and that she may not live 
very long anymore, but I just have not taken 
the time. 
Guilt 
- other  
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
24: I was on holiday; somebody broke into 
my car, and stole my wallet. 
Anger 
- other  
 
- on target 2 
- same class 2 
1: My best friend came to see me, we had a 
wonderful afternoon sitting in the garden 
and having a drink. 
Joy 
- other  
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- on target 3 
- same class  
26: My cat had disappeared for two days. 
We finally found him in the next village. He 
had lost his way and had been taken care of 
by nice people who called us. 
Relief 
- other 1 
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
27: I was in the garden one evening and I 
saw a snake coming towards me. 
Fear 
- other  
 
- on target 2 
- same class 2 
28: I have to work with someone on this 
project but I have never seen someone so 
incompetent. 
Contempt 
- other  
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
29: A colleague asked me if I was 
interested to work on a special project, the 
boss had mentioned he needed “clever 
people” and my colleague had 
“immediately thought of me”. 
Pride 
- other  
 
- on target 1 
- same class  
30: During my stay at the hospital, a friend 
I really did not expect has visited me. 
Surprise 
- other 3 
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
31: I was devastated when my partner 
announced to me that our relationship was 
over. 
Sadness 
- other  
 
- on target 1 
- same class 3 
32: I work much longer hours than my 
colleague but get only half the money. 
Envy 
- other  
 
- on target 1 
- same class 3 
33: There were only three candidates left 
after a series of exams. I was among these 
three and I finally got chosen as the 
nominee. 
Pride 
- other  
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
34: A friend of mine had important things 
to confide to me. I listened to her very 
carefully. 
Interest 
- other  
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- on target 3 
- same class  
35: I was not able to answer a question on 
a topic I know very well, and I stayed 
dumb-founded in front of everyone. 
Shame 
- other 1 
 
- on target 1 
- same class 2 
36: I recently paid a visit to the tax 
authorities: they really know how to make 
you feel totally powerless, and treat you 
like you are at their service. 
Contempt 
- other 1 
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
37: I am going to move to California to 
continue my studies, I have been looking 
forward to this for a long time. 
Joy 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
38: I thought I was going to miss my train 
but I finally caught it, just in time. 
Otherwise I would have had to wait two 
hours. 
Relief 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class  
39: I am waiting in the room to pass an oral 
exam, my head is empty, my legs are 
trembling, I have the impression I know 
nothing. 
Fear 
- other 1 
 
- on target 4 
- same class  
40: I was two days away from an important 
exam, a colleague took the books I needed 
and when I told him that I would need 
them urgently, he told me he had lost them! 
Anger 
- other  
 
- on target 1 
- same class 3 
41: We have managed to rent exactly the 
house we want, right on the beach, for our 
next summer holidays. 
Satisfaction 
- other  
 
- on target 2 
- same class 1 
42: I wish I could see my parents to 
celebrate Christmas this year. 
Hope 
- other 1 
 
- on target 3 
- same class 1 
43: Last year, during my summer job, I 
was responsible to order some 
merchandise. I made a miscalculation, but 
didn’t tell anyone. I ordered too much and 
most of the things had to be thrown away. 
Guilt 
- other  
 
 322 
- on target 4 
- same class  
44: I really don’t like to see people spit on 
the sidewalks. 
Disgust 
- other  
 
- on target 1 
- same class 3 
45: I went to a concert of my favorite band. 
I was so energized I danced all night. 
Elation 
- other  
 
- on target 3 
- same class  
46: We were mountain hiking and all of the 
sudden, a huge thunder storm caught us off 
guard. 
Surprise 
- other 1 
 
- on target 3 
- same class  
47: We had a fire in the house, I lost all my 
belongings. 
Sadness 
- other 1 
 
- on target 1 
- same class 3 
48: My colleague was chosen to do a 
video-clip about the school, and I wanted 
to do this for months. I told our supervisor, 
but obviously he made his choice. 
Envy 
- other  
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Vignettes Targeted 
emotion 
Chi-square  Wheel 
condition 
Circle 
condition 
Word 
condition 
% on target 74% (20) 68% (17) 78% (21) 
% same class 26% (7) 20% (5) 15% (4) 
1: During the Christmas holidays this year, some 
friends that I hadn’t seen for 6 years came to visit me 
and we had a wonderful time together. 
Joy χ2 (2, N = 58) = .45 ns 
% other (0) 12% (3) %7 (2) 
% on target 37% (10) 50% (13) 37% (10) 
% same class 15% (4) 12% (3) 15% (4) 
2: We have worked so hard, so our project should be 
a success. 
Hope χ2 (2, N = 33) = .54 ns 
% other 48% (13) 38% (10) 48% (13) 
% on target 78% (21) 80% (20) 74% (20) 
% same class 4% (1) 4% (1) 0 
3: I was coming back late from a party one night, and 
I was walking. All of the sudden, three men followed 
me, starting to yell at me, asking for money. They 
were drunk, so I ran as fast as I could. 
Fear χ2 (2, N = 61) = .03 ns 
% other 8% (5) 16% (4) 26% (7) 
% on target 67% (18) 50% (13) 65% (17) 
% same class 26% (7) 23% (6) 23% (6) 
4: My boss unfairly accused me of having 
mishandled a certain task that was actually supposed 
to be the responsibility of my colleague. 
Anger χ2 (2, N = 48) = .87 ns 
% other 7% (2) 27% (7) 12% (3) 
% on target 48% (13) 54% (14) 70% (14) 
% same class 37% (10) 38% (10) 15% (3) 
5: I have successfully passed all the exams I needed 
to apply to an excellent university abroad. 
Pride χ2 (2, N = 41) = .05 ns 
% other 15% (4) 8% (2) 15% (3) 
% on target 63% (17) 72% (18) 82% (22) 
% same class 11% (3) 8% (2) 7% (2) 
6: After all the trauma caused by my son’s illness 
and stay at the hospital, the doctor finally gave some 
good news and we then knew he was going to 
recover. 
Relief χ2 (2, N = 57) = .74 ns 
% other 26% (7) 20% (5) 11% (3) 
 
Table B2 
Percentages of Emotion Identification per Questionnaire Format 
  324 
% on target 44% (12) 33% (8) 41% (11) 
% same class 0 0 0 
7: The teacher started to make jokes about my 
behavior as I was presenting something at the 
blackboard, in front of all the other students. 
Shame χ2 (2, N = 31) = .84 ns 
% other 56% (15) 67% (16) 59% (16) 
% on target 19% (5) 4% (1) 15% (4) 
% same class 70% (19) 84% (21) 81 % (22) 
8: Yesterday I read in the newspaper that a 30 year-
old woman had abused her 2 month-old son and had 
caused his death. To abuse such a fragile creature 
cannot be considered as a human act and should not 
be forgiven. 
Contempt χ2 (2, N = 72) = .33 ns 41 
% other 11% (3) 12% (3) 4% (1) 
% on target 45% (9) 38% (8) 43% (10) 
% same class 45% (9) 43% (9) 48% (11) 
9: I had not seen my fiancé(e) for 3 months, it had 
been the first time we were separated for such a long 
time. And now I am standing at the airport, waiting… 
and I can see my fiancé(e) coming out of the door, we 
run in each other’s arms, and nothing else would 
matter. 
Elation χ2 (2, N = 27) = .22 ns 
% other 10% (2) 19% (4) 9% (2) 
% on target 81% (21) 72% (18) 88% (23) 
% same class 0 0 0 
10: I could not stop reading this book, I was totally 
absorbed. 
Interest χ2 (2, N = 62) = .61 ns 
% other 19% (5) 28% (7) 12% (3) 
% on target 63% (17) 77% (20) 61% (16) 
% same class 26% (7) 23% (6) 31% (8) 
11: I was supposed to pick up my little sister at school 
and I totally forgot. She stood all by herself in the 
street for two hours, anything could have happened to 
her. 
Guilt χ2 (2, N = 53) = .50 ns 
% other 11% (3) 0 8% (2) 
% on target 37% (10) 54% (14) 37% (10) 
% same class 0 0 8% (2) 
12: I walked in the forest the other day, and my dog 
became very nervous. We discovered the dead body 
of a deer, starting to rot. I nearly fainted. 
Disgust χ2 (2, N = 74) = .45 ns 
% other 63% (17) 46% (12) 55% (15) 
 
                                                   
41 Due to the low number of respondents for the contempt column, I grouped the results for disgust, contempt and anger, based on Izard’s (1991) description of these 
3 emotions constituting a hostility triad. It is to be noted though that 62,5% of the respondents chose “disgust”. 
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% on target 85% (23) 81% (21) 55% (15) 
% same class 4% (1) 11% (3) 26% (7) 
13: I had done all the things I had to do on my list, 
so I left my work with a good impression. 
Satisfaction χ2 (2, N = 59) = 1.76 ns 
% other 11% (3) 8% (2) 19% (5) 
% on target 50% (13) 84% (21) 50% (13) 
% same class 0 0 0 
14: I came home yesterday night, the apartment was 
dark, and as I switch the light on, all my friends 
were standing in the living-room and sang “Happy 
Birthday” to me, holding a big cake in their hands. 
Surprise χ2 (2, N = 47) = 2.72 ns 
% other 50% (13) 16% (4) 50% (13) 
% on target 96% (25) 92% (23) 96% (26) 
% same class 4% (1) 4% (1) 0 
15: The day I lost my mother was the most horrible 
day in my life; I thought I would not overcome the 
pain. 
Sadness χ2 (2, N = 74) = .19 ns 
% other 0 4% (1) 4% (1) 
% on target 75% (18) 72% (18) 85% (17) 
% same class 21% (5) 12% (3) 5% (1) 
16: I could not understand why my cousins could go 
on a trip to the Seychelles and enjoy the sun in the 
midst of the winter, and I had to stay in Switzerland 
to work on my exams. 
Envy χ2 (2, N = 53) = .04 ns 
% other 4% (1) 16% (4) 10% (2) 
% on target 37% (10) 19% (5) 26% (6) 
% same class 63% (17) 81% (21) 74% (17) 
17: We had rehearsed that play for one year, and 
tonight was THE night, the premiere. We received a 
standing ovation and the public called us back five 
times! It was the most wonderful day of my life. 
Elation χ2 (2, N = 25) = 1.04 ns 
% other 0 0 0 
% on target 88% (23) 92% (22) 92% (23) 
% same class 0 0 4% (1) 
18: Anthropology was a course I would not miss for 
the world; I could listen and read about it for days. 
Interest χ2 (2, N = 68) = .03 ns 
% other 12% (3) 8% (2) 4% (1) 
% on target 78% (21) 65% (17) 78% (21) 
% same class 0 4% (1) 0 
19: We had a party at work for a colleague’s 
birthday, and I drank too much, I started to dance on 
the tables. I didn’t remember I had done that, and 
my colleagues told me about it the next day. 
Shame χ2 (2, N = 59) = .54 ns 
% other 22% (6) 31% (8) 22% (6) 
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% on target 52% (13) 28% (7) 33% (9) 
% same class 0 12% (3) 4% (1) 
20: I saw a documentary on TV yesterday on living 
conditions in some very poor regions: the people 
would drink, wash, and urinate, all in the same river 
water. 
Disgust χ2 (2, N = 29) = 1.93 ns 
% other 48% (12) 60% (15) 63% (17) 
% on target 70% (19) 56% (14) 74% (20) 
% same class 22% (6) 40% (10) 22% (6) 
21: I shopped all day and I found some very good 
bargains. 
Satisfaction χ2 (2, N = 53) = 1.17 ns 
% other 8% (2) 4% (1) 4% (1) 
% on target 57% (12) 61% (14) 65% (15) 
% same class 5% (1) 0 0 
22: If only I would get that grant I have applied for, 
I could go on with my studies! 
Hope χ2 (2, N = 41) = .34 ns 
% other 38% (8) 39% (9) 35% (8) 
% on target 74% (20) 54% (14) 46% (12) 
% same class 18% (5) 42% (11) 42% (11) 
23: It is been four months that I have promised my 
grandmother to visit her, I know she is ill and that 
she may not live very long anymore, but I just have 
not taken the time. 
Guilt χ2 (2, N = 46) = 2.26 ns 
% other 8% (2) 4% (1) 12% (3) 
% on target 89% (24) 84% (21) 85% (23) 
% same class 11% (3) 12% (3) 15% (4) 
24: I was on holiday; somebody broke into my car, 
and stole my wallet. 
Anger χ2 (2, N = 68) = .21 ns 
% other 0 4% (1) 0 
% on target 70% (19) 65% (17) 74% (20) 
% same class 30% (8) 35% (9) 26% (7) 
25: My best friend came to see me, we had a 
wonderful afternoon sitting in the garden and 
having a drink. 
Joy χ2 (2, N = 55) = .25 ns 
% other 0 0 0 
% on target 74% (20) 62% (16) 81% (21) 
% same class 0 11% (3) 0 
26: My cat had disappeared for two days. We 
finally found him in the next village. He had lost his 
way and had been taken care of by nice people who 
called us. 
Relief χ2 (2, N = 57) = .74 ns 
% other 26% (7) 27% (7) 19% (5) 
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% on target 81% (22) 64% (16) 74% (20) 
% same class 4% (1) 0 0 
27: I was in the garden one evening and I saw a 
snake coming towards me. 
Fear χ2 (2, N = 58) = .97 ns 
% other 15% (4) 36% (9) 26% (7) 
% on target 20% (5) 42% (11) 40% (8) 
% same class 60% (15) 46% (12) 60% (12) 
28: I have to work with someone on this project but 
I have never seen someone so incompetent. 
Contempt χ2 (2, N = 24) = 1.25 ns 
% other 20% (5) 12% (3) 0 
% on target 96% (26) 81% (21) 81% (22) 
% same class 0 11% (3) 19% (5) 
29: A colleague asked me if I was interested to work 
on a special project, the boss had mentioned he 
needed “clever people” and my colleague had 
“immediately thought of me”. 
Pride χ2 (2, N = 69) = .61 ns 
% other 4% (1) 8% (2) 0 
% on target 30% (8) 42% (11) 48% (13) 
% same class 0 4% (1) 0 
30: During my stay at the hospital, a friend I really 
did not expect has visited me. 
Surprise χ2 (2, N = 32) = 1.19 ns 
% other 70% (19) 54% (14) 52% (14) 
% on target 78% (21) 68% (17) 73% (19) 
% same class 4% (1) 12% (3) 0 
31: I was devastated when my partner announced to 
me that our relationship was over. 
Sadness χ2 (2, N = 57) = .42 ns 
% other 18% (5) 20% (5) 27% (7) 
% on target 4% (1) 9% (2) 8% (2) 
% same class 92% (25) 86% (19) 92% (25) 
32: I work much longer hours than my colleague but 
get only half the money. 
Envy χ2 (2, N = 5)42 
% other 4% (1) 5% (1) 0 
% on target 48% (13) 52% (13) 81% (22) 
% same class 48% (13) 40% (10) 19% (5) 
33: There were only three candidates left after a 
series of exams. I was among these three and I 
finally got chosen as the nominee. 
Pride χ2 (2, N = 48) = 3.38 ns 
% other 4% (1) 8% (2) 0 
 
                                                   
42 Given the too small number of responses for envy, the Chi-Square cannot be calculated. However, if one groups the envy scores together with the ones for disgust, 
 contempt, and anger (emotions corresponding to the class of antagonistic emotions), the result would be χ2 (2, N = 74) = .84 ns 
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% on target 72% (18) 76% (19) 77% (20) 
% same class 0 12% (3) 0 
34: A friend of mine had important things to confide 
to me. I listened to her very carefully. 
Interest χ2 (2, N = 57) = .10 ns 
% other 28% (7) 12% (3) 23% (6) 
% on target 77% (17) 56% (14) 48% (13) 
% same class 9% (2) 24% (6) 4% (1) 
35: I was not able to answer a question on a topic I 
know very well, and I stayed dumb-founded in front 
of everyone. 
Shame χ2 (2, N = 44) = .60 ns 
% other 14% (3) 20% (5) 48% (13) 
% on target 38% (10) 22% (5) 35% (9) 
% same class 62% (16) 74% (17) 65% (17) 
36: I recently paid a visit to the tax authorities: they 
really know how to make you feel totally powerless, 
and treat you like you are at their service. 
Contempt χ2 (2, N = 24) = 1.75 ns 
% other 0 4% (1) 0 
% on target 35% (9) 25% (6) 52% (14) 
% same class 46% (12) 46% (11) 33% (9) 
37: I am going to move to California to continue my 
studies; I have been looking forward to this for a 
long time. 
Joy χ2 (2, N = 29) = 3.38 ns 
% other 19% (5) 29% (7) 15% (4) 
% on target 62% (16) 73% (19) 76% (19) 
% same class 0 8% (2) 0 
38: I thought I was going to miss my train but I 
finally caught it, just in time. Otherwise I would 
have had to wait two hours. 
Relief χ2 (2, N = 54) = .33 ns 
% other 38% (10) 19% (5) 24% (6) 
% on target 81% (22) 80% (20) 85% (23) 
% same class 0 8% (2) 4% (1) 
39: I am waiting in the room to pass an oral exam, 
my head is empty, my legs are trembling, I have the 
impression I know nothing. 
Fear χ2 (2, N = 65) = .21 ns 
% other 19% (5) 12% (3) 11% (3) 
% on target 85% (23) 83% (20) 85% (23) 
% same class 4% (1) 4% (1) 7,5% (2) 
40: I was two days away from an important exam, a 
colleague took the books I needed and when I told 
him that I would need them urgently, he told me he 
had lost them! 
Anger χ2 (2, N = 66) = .28 ns 
% other 11% (3) 13% (3) 7,5% (2) 
% on target 31% (8) 38% (9) 41% (11) 
% same class 65% (17) 50% (12) 59% (16) 
41: We have managed to rent exactly the house we 
want, right on the beach, for our next summer 
holidays. 
Satisfaction χ2 (2, N = 28) = .50 ns 
% other 4% (1) 12% (3) 0 
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% on target 48% (13) 64% (16) 78% (21) 
% same class 4% (1) 12% (3) 0 
42: I wish I could see my parents to celebrate 
Christmas this year. 
Hope χ2 (2, N = 50) = 1.96 ns 
% other 48% (13) 24% (6) 22% (6) 
% on target 64% (16) 61% (14) 44% (11) 
% same class 32% (8) 26% (6) 52% (13) 
43: Last year, during my summer job, I was 
responsible to order some merchandise. I made a 
miscalculation, but didn’t tell anyone. I ordered too 
much and most of the things had to be thrown away. 
Guilt χ2 (2, N = 41) = .93 ns 
% other 4% (1) 13% (3) 4% (1) 
% on target 56% (14) 74% (17) 81% (22) 
% same class 28% (7) 22% (5) 15% (4) 
44: I really don’t like to see people spit on the 
sidewalks. 
Disgust χ2 (2, N = 53) = 1.85 ns 
% other 16% (4) 4% (1) 4% (1) 
% on target 58% (1) 52% (12) 37% (10) 
% same class 42% (11) 44% (10) 63% (17) 
45: I went to a concert of my favorite band. I was so 
energized I danced all night. 
Elation χ2 (2, N = 37) = 1.03 ns 
% other 0 4% (1) 0 
% on target 15% (4) 21% (5) 12% (3) 
% same class 0 4% (1) 0 
46: We were mountain hiking and all of the sudden; 
a huge thunderstorm caught us off guard. 
Surprise χ2 (2, N = 12)43 
% other 85% (22) 75% (18) 88% (22) 
% on target 59% (16) 68% (17) 59% (16) 
% same class 0 0 11% (3) 
47: We had a fire in the house and I lost all my 
belongings. 
Sadness χ2 (2, N = 49) = .04 ns 
% other 41% (11) 32% (8) 30% (8) 
% on target 26% (7) 17% (4) 27% (7) 
% same class 48% (13) 71% (17) 46% (12) 
48: My colleague was chosen to do a video-clip 
about the school, and I wanted to do this for months. 
I told our supervisor, but obviously he made his 
choice. 
Envy χ2 (2, N = 18) = 1.0 ns 
% other 26% (7) 12% (3) 27% (7) 
                                                   
43 There are not enough respondents in the surprise column, but it is to be noted that 54.7% of them chose fear (the vignette was “We were mountain hiking and all of the 
sudden, a huge thunder storm caught us off guard.”). 
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Vignettes 
 
Targeted 
emotion 
 Wheel 
condition 
(n = 27) 
Class #1 
(n = 27)44 
Class #2 
(n = 23) 
Class #3 
(n = 24) 
% on target 74% (20) 81.5% (22) 73.9% (17) 79.2% (19) 
% same class 26% (7) 11.1% (3) 21.7% (5) 20.8% (5) 
1: During the Christmas holidays this year, some friends that I 
hadn’t seen for 6 years came to visit me and we had a wonderful 
time together. 
Joy 
% other (0) 3.7%(1) 4.3% (1) 0 
% on target 37% (10) 40.7% (11) 47.8% (11) 54.2% (13) 
% same class 15% (4) 7.4% (2) 8.6% (2) 0 
2: We have worked so hard, so our project should be a success. Hope 
% other 48% (13) 51.9% (14) 43.5% (10) 45.8% (11) 
% on target 78% (21) 88.9% (24) 87.0% (20) 91.7% (22) 
% same class 4% (1) 0 0 0 
3: I was coming back late from a party one night, and I was 
walking. All of the sudden, three men followed me, starting to yell 
at me, asking for money. They were drunk, so I ran as fast as I 
could. 
Fear 
% other 8% (5) 11.1% (3) 13% (3) 8.4% (2) 
% on target 67% (18) 77.8% (21) 60.9% (14) 79.2% (19) 
% same class 26% (7) 14.8% (4) 17.4% (4) 16.7% (4) 
4: My boss unfairly accused me of having mishandled a certain 
task that was actually supposed to be the responsibility of my 
colleague. 
Anger 
% other 7% (2) 7.4% (2) 21.7% (5) 4.2% (1) 
% on target 48% (13) 25.9% (7) 26.1% (6) 41.7% (10) 
% same class 37% (10) 59.2% (16) 65.2% (15) 41.6% (10) 
5: I have successfully passed the assessment center I needed to get 
a promotion in a affiliated company abroad. 
Pride 
% other 15% (4) 14.8% (4) 8.7% (2) 16.7% (4) 
 
                                                   
44 For situation #1 (joy) and situation #14 (surprise), n = 26; for situation #15 (sadness), n = 25. 
Table B3 
Comparative Results between ‘Emotion Wheel’ Condition in the Validation Study and Emotion Recognition Exercise with Participants of the Main 
Study Sample 
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% on target 63% (17) 51.9% (14) 56.5% (13) 62.5% (15) 
% same class 11% (3) 14.8% (4) 4.3% (1) 8.3% (2) 
6: After all the trauma caused by my child’s illness and stay at the 
hospital, the doctor finally gave some good news and we then 
knew he was going to recover. 
Relief 
% other 26% (7) 33.3% (9) 39.1% (9) 29.2% (7) 
% on target 44% (12) 18.5% (5) 17.4% (4) 25.0% (6) 
% same class 0 11.1% (3) 4.3% (1) 8.3% (3) 
7: My boss started to make jokes about my behavior as I was 
presenting a new concept in front of all the other colleagues. 
Shame 
% other 56% (15) 70.4 % (19) 78.3% (18) 66.7% (16) 
% on target 19% (5) 3.7% (1) 8.7% (2) 4.2% (1) 
% same class 70% (19) 74.0% (20) 69.5% (16) 75.0% (18) 
8: Yesterday I read in the newspaper that a 30 year-old woman 
had abused her 2 month-old son and had caused his death. To 
abuse such a fragile creature cannot be considered as a human act 
and should not be forgiven. 
Contempt 
% other 11% (3) 18.5% (6) 21.7% (5) 20.9% (5) 
% on target 45% (9) 22.2% (6) 17.4% (4) 16.7% (4) 
% same class 45% (9) 77.7% (21) 82.6% (19) 83.3% (20) 
9: My team and I had worked day and night to ensure a successful 
launch of this new product. And the news came: we did it!! 
Market share was exploding, orders fully loaded!!”  
Elation 
% other 10% (2) 0 0 0 
% on target 81% (21) 74.10% (20) 78.3% (18) 75.0% (18) 
% same class 0 0 4.3% (1) 0 
10: I could not stop reading this book as I was totally absorbed. Interest 
% other 19% (5) 22.2% (6) 17.3% (4) 20.9% (5) 
% on target 63% (17) 33.3% (9) 43.5% (10) 45.8% (11) 
% same class 26% (7) 66.7% (18) 56.5% (13) 54.2% (13) 
11: I was supposed to pick up this important customer at the 
airport and I totally forgot. He was still standing there at the 
arrival level when I finally came two hours later. 
Guilt 
% other 11% (3) 0 0 0 
% on target 37% (10) 44.4% (12) 60.9% (14) 79.2% (19) 
% same class 0 7.4% (2) 0 0 
12: I walked in the forest the other day, and my dog became very 
nervous. We discovered the dead body of a deer, starting to rot. I 
nearly fainted. 
Disgust 
% other 63% (17) 48.2% (13) 39.1% (9) 20.8% (5) 
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% on target 85% (23) 74.1% (20) 73.9% (17) 79.2% (19) 
% same class 4% (1) 18.5% (5) 21.7% (5) 12.5% (3) 
13: I had done all the things I had to do on my list, so I left my 
work with a good feeling.. 
Satisfaction 
% other 11% (3) 3.7% (1) 4.3% (1) 8.3% (2) 
% on target 50% (13) 48.1% (13) 56.5% (13) 54.2% (13) 
% same class 0 0 4.3% (1) 0 
14: I came home yesterday night, the apartment was dark, and as I 
switch the light on, all my friends were standing in the living-room 
and sang “Happy Birthday” to me, holding a big cake in their 
hands. 
Surprise 
% other 50% (13) 48.1% (13) 39.0% (9) 45.8% (11) 
% on target 96% (25) 88.9% (24) 95.7% (22) 100% (24) 
% same class 4% (1) 3.7% (1) 0 0 
15: The day I lost my mother was the most horrible day in my life, 
I thought I would not overcome the pain. 
Sadness 
% other 0 0 4.3% (1) 0 
% on target 75% (18) 48.1% (13) 52.2% (12) 50.0% (12) 
% same class 21% (5) 40.7% (11) 43.5% (10) 41.7% (10) 
16: I could not understand why my colleague could go on a trip to 
the Seychelles as an incentive reward, and I have to stay at the 
office. We are in the same team and we both worked hard to get 
there. 
Envy 
% other 4% (1) 7.4% (2) 4.3% (1) 8.4% (2) 
 
Note: the red numbers indicate a similarity in the responses. 
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Appendix C: Instruction Booklet for Participants to the Study 
 
 
 
The Influence of Emotion in 
Managerial Group Decision-
Making 
 
 
Creativity
and Idea
Generation
Decision
Making
Learning
processes
Emotions
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Véronique Tran 
Geneva Emotion Research Group 
University of Geneva 
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Dear Participants, 
 
The objective of this exercise is to be able to identify the influence of emotion in 
managerial group decision-making. We suggest that emotions may affect processes 
such as idea generation, sharing of information, decision-making, facilitation or 
inhibition of learning processes (Fig.1). Hence, it influences performance, both 
individual and organizational. 
 
Creativity
and Idea
Generation
Decision
Making
Learning
processes
Emotions
 
Fig. 1 
 
Although it has not been the habit to integrate the emotional dimension into 
management practices, the awareness of its importance is growing. 
For example, when Jack Welch, CEO of General Electric, dedicated his shareholders’ 
letter in GE’s 1991 Annual Report to the theme of building GE’s future on “mutual 
trust and respect”, he was met with considerable surprise and skepticism. Welch added: 
“. . . getting ideas to flow means thawing out those parts of the company still frozen by 
fear.” And: “. . . Inside and outside the company, trust creates the invisible ties that 
bind people and companies together and convert mere transactions into personal 
relationships.” 
Trust is not an emotion per se, but constitutes the ground base for an array of emotions 
to develop. 
 
Andy Grove, the CEO of Intel, said in an interview for Fortune on July 8, 1996: “ (at 
Microsoft), they are terribly defensive (…). Unless it’s a particularly benign set of 
circumstances, the slightest difference of opinion will create very defensive emotional 
responses out of them, that kind of shutdown productive discussions for a while. After 
doing this together for 15 years, we’ve learned that it will blow over; just stay cool, let 
them sputter away, and sooner or later they’ll listen.” 
 
It seems important to us to understand how individual emotions may converge towards 
a group emotion, which in turn influences the decisions the team will make. 
 
We have developed a tool to measure emotions in a group or in an organization. This 
instrument is called the “Emotion Wheel”, composed of 16 main emotions represented 
by color circles, arranged in the order of increasing intensity. The 16 words are like the 
heads of a ‘family’ of emotions and each circle corresponds to a particular emotion 
label. We have 64 labels in total (an A3 sheet will be posted in your study room). 
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We are also providing definitions of the 16 main emotions, so that each participant has 
a common and clear idea of what is meant by each of the main labels. 
 
Here are the instructions regarding this exercise: 
· We provide you with a one-page document with 3 black and white “Emotion 
Wheels” and a few lines for comments, for you to individually rate how YOU feel. 
· The letters B, M, and E at the left upper corner of each emotion wheel stand for 
Beginning, Middle, and End. 
· Beginning means that you select maximum 2 emotions by placing a tick mark 
inside the appropriate circles at the beginning of the simulation, right after you 
received the results from the facilitator. 
· Then, approximately half way through, which will correspond to the Middle, please 
select two emotions again. 
· At the End, once the decision is made and the diskette given back to the facilitator, 
select two emotions one more time. 
 
When the decision is printed and copied to the diskette, the group gathers, and decides 
collectively which emotions (you tick 2 emotions on an A4 black and white emotion 
wheel) represent the group emotions of your study group during this decision period. 
This is the result of a consensus. 
 
The 8 sequential numbers at the upper right corner of each “Emotion Wheel” 
correspond to the number of periods in the simulation. When you are in Period 1, you 
circle 1, when you are Period 2, you circle 2, etc. This process will be repeated 8 times, 
i.e. the 8 years/periods of the simulation. 
 
We will reveal insights into the underlying importance of emotions in the decision-
making process in a diverse management team, as in daily situations. 
 
We thank you in advance for your collaboration. 
The Emotion Wheel
Elation
Pride
Joy
Satisfaction
Hope
Interest
Relief
Surprise
Anger
Disgust
Contempt
Envy
Fear
Sadness
Guilt
Shame
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Appendix D: Emotion Wheel Formatted for Data Collection During Simulation 
 
 
 
 
 
The Emotion Wheel
Elation
Pride
Joy
Satisfaction
Hope
Interest
Relief
Surprise
Anger
Disgust
Contempt
Envy
Fear
Sadness
Guilt
Shame
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
B
The Emotion Wheel
Elation
Pride
Joy
Satisfaction
Hope
Interest
Relief
Surprise
Anger
Disgust
Contempt
Envy
Fear
Sadness
Guilt
Shame
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
M
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The Emotion Wheel
Elation
Pride
Joy
Satisfaction
Hope
Interest
Relief
Surprise
Anger
Disgust
Contempt
Envy
Fear
Sadness
Guilt
Shame
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
E
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Appendix E: Decision-Making Questionnaire 
 
Decision-Making in Teams 
 
My group number is: _____ My initials are: _____ 
 
Please answer the following questions (circle the appropriate number). 
 
1. How many alternatives do you think your team generated, compared to what one 
would expect? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 less than expected  as expected  more than expected 
 
2. To what extent do you think your team may have thoroughly reviewed all 
alternatives before making the decision? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not reviewed  somewhat reviewed  thoroughly reviewed 
 
3. To what extent did team members contribute their relevant expertise / experience / 
insights? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 very few did  some did  everyone did 
 
4. How satisfied are you with the way decisions were reached in your team? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not satisfied  quite satisfied  very satisfied 
 
5. To what extent do you think your team jumped too quickly to a conclusion? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not at all  a little  very much so 
 
6. To what extent do you think team members withhold their relevant knowledge? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 didn’t withhold  withheld  withheld a lot 
 
7. Did you enjoy working with the group on the decisions? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not at all  pretty much  very much 
 
8. To what extent did team members restrict themselves to a limited set of 
alternatives? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not at all  quite a bit  a lot 
 
 Please turn over 
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9. To what extent did team members ignore important information that was brought 
in? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not much  pretty much  a lot 
 
10. To what extent do you feel committed to your team’s decisions? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not committed at all  quite committed  very committed 
 
11. To what extent do you think your team generated non-obvious alternatives? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not at all  quite a bit  a lot 
 
12. To what extent did you look at the costs and benefits of the alternatives you finally 
considered? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not at all  quite a bit  a lot 
 
13. To what extent would you want to be a member of this team again? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 never again  only for selective activities  any time, for any project 
 
14. To what extent did your team try to find innovative solutions? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not at all  quite a bit  a lot 
 
15. How effective was your team at focusing its attention on crucial information and 
ignoring irrelevant information? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not effective  quite effective  very effective 
 
16. How many team members seem to hear only the things supporting their present 
opinion? 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 not at all  a little  a lot 
 
 
Thank you! 
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Appendix F: Examples of Emotion Maps for 5 Teams Extracted from the Sample, 
Comparing Emotions in the First Period and in the Fourth Period of the Simulation 
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Appendix G: Examples of Reports of Decision-Making Data Provided to Participants in 
the Present Study 
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Appendix H: Classes of Emotions and Decision-Making Variables 
This section presents the results of the regression analyses in which all four 
classes of emotion were entered at the same time in each equation (a model was tested 
for each different type of scores and for each phase) to assess the relative weight of 
each class of emotions in predicting responses about decision-making processes. 
A stepwise procedure was used for these regression analyses. To increase the chances 
for any variable to be entered in the model, the entry criterion was defined as the 
probability for the F values to reach significance at p<.10, and the removal criterion 
was defined as the probability for the F values to reach significance at p<.20. However, 
only results at a p < .10 level which are congruent with the hypotheses outlined in 
section 2.2. will be reported. 
 
Multiple regressions at the individual level 
First, the potential influence of control variables (age, company, and 
nationality) had to be verified, and eventually eliminated. Three dummy variables were 
created for the type of company (Company 1: ‘yes’ = 1, ‘no’ = 0; etc.) and four dummy 
variables were created for the type of nationality. Because two out of the 3 companies 
have a Dutch headquarters, there was a greater number of Dutch participants (40.6% of 
the total sample, see Method p. 81), therefore one nationality category was devoted to 
Dutch (‘yes’ = 1, ‘no’ = 0). The second largest group was German (‘yes’ = 1, ‘no’ = 0). 
The third group was labeled ‘European’ (‘yes’ = 1, ‘no’ = 0), and the fourth ‘Other’ 
(‘yes’ = 1, ‘no’ = 0), which would include nationalities such as North American, South 
American, Asian, and African. Control variables were entered in the regression model 
in a first block, and emotion variables in a second block, and then both regressed on 
each decision-making variable with a stepwise procedure. The variables ‘Dutch’ and 
‘Age’ had a strong influence (e.g. the variable ‘Dutch’ was a statistically significant 
predictor in most models), which had to be eliminated. Thus, all control variables were 
regressed on each class of emotions. Non-standardized residuals were saved for 
subsequent analyses. Twenty-four regression models were tested, using the four classes 
of emotions as the independent variables, which were regressed on each decision-
making variable, for each of the types of emotion scores (Mean Scores, Maximum 
Scores, and Last Scores). Betas, R2s and adjusted R2s are displayed in Table H1. 
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There was only one instance where two classes of emotions remained in the 
final regression model. It occurred when regressing the four classes of emotions on 
alternative evaluation in the Developing Phase: achievement and antagonistic emotions 
were positive predictors of alternative evaluation. These two variables explained 10% 
of the variance in alternative evaluation during the Developing Phase. Betas are 
provided below. 
Table H1 
Regression Analyses for Classes of Emotions and Decision-Making Processes at the 
Individual Level 
 Mean 
Over 
all 
Mean 
Developing 
Phase 
Max 
Over 
all 
Max 
Star-
ting 
Phase 
Last of Starting Phase Last of 
Develo
ping 
Phase 
 TC AE AG AE AG AE TC AE 
Independent 
Variables 
        
Achievement  .19+       
Approach -.20*        
Resignation     .20*    
Antagonistic  .30** .19+ -.20*  -.25* -.20* .30** 
         
R2 .04 .10 .04 .04 .04 .06 .04 .09 
Adjusted R2 .03 .09 .03 .03 .03 .06 .03 .08 
 
Note. N = 106; AG = Alternative Generation; AE = Alternative Evaluation; TC = Team 
Cohesion. 
* = p < .05; + = p < .10. 
In all remaining models tested, only one class of emotions remained in the final 
regression. 
The main finding was that antagonistic emotions were the most constant 
predictor of decision-making processes, primarily of alternative evaluation, secondarily 
of team cohesion, and marginally of alternative generation. First, the same trend was 
found in the regression analyses as in the simple correlations, where antagonistic 
emotions were negatively related to alternative evaluation in the Starting Phase _ 
Maximum scores and Last scores in the Starting Phase were negative predictors of 
alternative evaluation (respectively b = -.20, p < .05, and b = -.25, p < .05) _, and 
became positively related to it in the Developing Phase _ Mean scores and Last scores 
  345
in the Developing Phase were positive predictors of alternative evaluation (in both 
cases, b = .30, p < .01). 
Second, Last scores of antagonistic emotions in the Starting Phase were 
negative predictors of team cohesion (b = -.20, p < .05). 
Third, Maximum Overall scores of antagonistic emotions were predictors of 
alternative generation (b = .19, p < .053). This result is similar to the one obtained with 
the simple correlation but slightly weaker. In both cases, one can suppose that 
maximum intensities are associated with “heated” discussions, perhaps giving the 
impression that more alternatives were generated. 
Secondary findings pertaining to the three other classes of emotions are: 1) 
Mean scores of achievement emotions were a marginal predictor of alternative 
evaluation in the Developing Phase (b = .19, p = .055); 2). Mean Overall scores of 
approach emotions were significant predictors of team cohesion (b = .20, p < .05): it 
may be that the mixed influence of each of the four emotions composing approach 
emotions needs to be reconsidered one by one, especially in a team context; and 3) Last 
scores of resignation emotions were significant predictors of alternative generation in 
the Starting Phase (b = .20, p < .05). 
 
Summary and comments 
The objective of performing multiple regressions was to assess the relative 
contribution of each class of emotions in predicting decision-making processes. The 
focus of this section was placed on the influence of classes of emotions on team 
decision-making variables at the individual/psychological level, after the possible 
influence of control variables had been eliminated. It appeared that antagonistic 
emotions were the most consistent predictor of decision-making processes across time, 
even though the percentage of variance explained is very small. The interpretation 
proposed here remains consistent with the one proposed for the correlational analyses: 
the results in the Starting Phase are consistent with predictions, and reflect the idea that 
a certain degree of frustration occurred at the beginning of the simulation; in the 
Developing Phase, results are opposite to predictions: the energy released by 
antagonistic emotions may have been focused to better analyze alternatives, with team 
members in a competitive mindset. Concerning the other classes of emotions, results 
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were generally congruent with correlations, except when approach emotions were 
found to be a negative predictor of team cohesion for Mean scores Overall. Table H2 
summarizes findings compared to predictions. Three results were confirming 
hypotheses, and four were in opposition to predictions. 
Table H2 
Summary of findings for classes of emotions in relation to decision-making processes 
at the individual level 
 Mean 
Over all 
Mean 
Develo-
ping 
Phase 
Max 
Over 
all 
Max 
Star-
ting 
Phase 
Last of Starting Phase Last of 
Develo-
ping 
Phase 
 TC AE AG AE AG AE TC AE 
Independent 
Variables 
        
Achievement  o+       
Approach O*        
Resignation     O*    
Antagonistic  O** o+ Y*  Y* Y* O** 
 
Note. Y = Hypothesis confirmed; O = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .05 (*) or 
p < .01 (**);o+ = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .10. 
 
Multiple regressions at the aggregated team level 
Regressions were performed without taking control variables into consideration. The 
influence of average age, company and nationality at the team level was not partialled 
out as it was not meaningful to do so at the team level. Eighteen regression models 
were tested, using the four classes of emotions as the independent variables, which 
were regressed on each decision-making variable, for each of the types of emotion 
scores (Mean Scores, Maximum Scores, and Last Scores). Betas, R2s, and adjusted R2s 
are displayed in Table H3. There were no significant results obtained for Last scores. 
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Table H3 
Regression Analyses for Classes of Emotions and Decision-Making Processes at the 
Aggregated Team Level 
 Mean Overall Mean 
Star- 
ting 
Phase 
Mean 
Developing 
Phase 
Max 
Overall 
Max 
Star- 
ting 
Phase 
Max Developing 
Phase 
 AG AE TC AE AG TC AE TC TC AG AE TC 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
           
Achievement    .47*         
Approach .42+    .51* .42+   -.53*    
Resignation             
Antagonistic  -.42+ -.41+    -.55* -.56*  -.42+ -.61** -.64** 
             
R2 .17 .17 .17 .22 .26 .17 .30 .31 .28 .18 .37 .41 
Adjusted R2 .13 .13 .12 .18 .21 .13 .27 .27 .24 .13 .33 .38 
 
Note. ** = p < .01; * = p < .05; + = p < .10; N = 20. 
 
Mean and Last scores. Mean scores of achievement emotions were significant 
predictor of alternative evaluation in the Starting Phase (β = .47, p<.05). The same 
phenomenon occurred when regressing achievement emotions together with the other 
classes of emotions on alternative evaluation at the individual level, but at the team 
level, the effect was stronger (the percentage of variance explained at the team level is 
22%, whereas it was 10% at the individual level). Team members were probably under 
the influence of an “enthusiasm” effect associated with achievement emotions, which 
perhaps made them rate their evaluating abilities higher. 
Mean Overall scores of approach emotions were marginal predictors of 
alternative generation (β = .42, p<.067). Mean scores of approach emotions in the 
Developing Phase were positive predictors of alternative generation (β = .51, p<.05), 
and marginal predictors of team cohesion (β = .42, p<.067). Mean Overall scores of 
antagonistic emotions were marginal predictors of alternative evaluation (β = -.42, 
p<.068); and of team cohesion (β = -.41, p<.071). These four marginal findings were 
reported because they were in the predicted direction. 
Maximum Scores. Maximum scores of approach emotions in the Starting Phase 
were negative predictors of team cohesion (β = -.53, p<.05). These results are reverse 
of the ones found for Mean scores in the Developing Phase. 
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Maximum Overall scores, and Maximum scores of antagonistic emotions in the 
Developing Phase were significant predictors of alternative evaluation (respectively β = 
-.55, p < .05, and β = -.61, p < .01); and of team cohesion (respectively, β = -.56, p < 
.05, and β = -.64, p < .01). Maximum scores in the Developing Phase were marginal 
predictors of alternative generation (β = -.42, p < .10), in the predicted direction. 
 
Summary and comments 
The percentages of variance explained are higher at the aggregated team level than they 
were at the individual level, ranging from 17% to 26% for Mean Scores, and ranging 
from 15% to 41% for Maximum Scores. The pattern of results is different from the 
regressions performed at the individual level: 1) Mean scores of achievement emotions 
were a positive predictor of alternative evaluation in the Starting Phase (which was not 
the case at the individual level, and not the case for correlations); 2) Mean scores of 
approach emotions were a positive predictor of alternative generation and team 
cohesion in the Developing Phase; in contrast, Maximum intensities of approach 
emotions in the Starting Phase were a negative predictor of these two variables 
(whereas at the individual level, approach emotions were a negative predictor of team 
cohesion for Overall Mean scores); 3) Maximum intensities of antagonistic emotions 
were a consistent negative predictor of alternative evaluation and of team cohesion, 
during the whole simulation, including the Developing Phase (whereas at the individual 
level, antagonistic emotions were a positive predictor during the Developing Phase). 
These results demonstrate that what may be occurring at the group level is distinct from 
individual level processes, as suggested by George (1990). Table H4 summarizes 
findings compared to predictions. 
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Table H4 
Summary of findings for classes of emotions in relation to decision-making processes 
at the aggregated team level 
 Mean Overall Mean 
Star- 
ting 
Phase 
Mean 
Develo-
ping Phase 
Max Overall Max 
Star-
ting 
Phase 
Max Developing 
Phase 
 AG AE TC AE AG TC AE TC TC AG AE TC 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
           
Achievement    O*         
Approach y+    Y* y+   O*    
Resignation             
Antagonistic  y+ y+    Y* Y*  y+ Y** Y** 
 
Note. Y = Hypothesis confirmed; O = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .05 (*) or 
p < .01 (**);o+ = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .10. 
 
Multiple regressions at the group consensus level 
The same regression models as at the aggregated team level were tested at the 
group consensus level. The main finding was that Maximum scores of achievement 
emotions in the Starting phase were a positive predictor alternative evaluation (β = .49, 
p < .05). This result departed from the one found at the aggregated team level, in which 
case maximum intensities were a negative predictor of alternative generation. At the 
group consensus level, maximum intensities of achievement emotions appeared to 
enhance alternative evaluation. 
A secondary finding consisted of Mean Scores of approach emotions in the 
Developing Phase, which marginally predicted alternative evaluation (β = .43, p < 
.056), but was consistent with the main finding (see Table H5). Both findings 
confirmed the hypothesis formulated about the relationship between approach emotions 
and alternative evaluation (see Table H6). 
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Table H5 
Regression Analyses for Classes of Emotions and Decision-Making Processes at the 
Aggregated Team Level 
 Mean Developing 
Phase 
Max Starting 
Phase 
 AE AE 
Independent 
Variables 
  
Achievement   
Approach .43+ .49* 
   
R2   
Adjusted R2   
 
Note. * = p < .05; + = p < .10; N = 20. 
 
Table H6 
Summary of findings for classes of emotions in relation to decision-making processes 
at the group consensus level 
 Mean Developing 
Phase 
Max Starting 
Phase 
 AE AE 
Independent 
Variables 
  
Approach y+ Y* 
 
Note. Y = Hypothesis confirmed; O = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .05 (*) or 
p < .01 (**);o+ = Result opposite to hypothesis with p < .10. 
 
In summary, regression analyses at the individual, at the aggregated team level, 
and at the group consensus level brought limited additional information, compared to 
Pearson correlations. 
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Appendix I1: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Achievement 
Emotions in the Starting Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
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Note. Q1 = achievement emotions; P12 = Starting Phase. 
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Appendix I2: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Achievement 
Emotions in the Developing Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
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Note. Q1 = achievement emotions; P36 = Developing Phase. 
 
 
  353
Appendix J1: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Approach 
Emotions in the Starting Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
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Note. Q2 = approach emotions; P12 = Starting Phase. 
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Appendix J2: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Approach 
Emotions in the Developing Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
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Note. Q2 = approach emotions; P36 = Developing Phase. 
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Appendix K1: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Resignation 
Emotions in the Starting Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
 
 
SADP12
2.001.501.00
SADP12
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
0.0
Std. Dev = .58  
Mean = 1.33
N = 3.00
 FEARP12
3.002.502.001.501.00
FEARP12
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = .62  
Mean = 1.86
N = 25.00
 
SHAMP12
3.002.502.001.501.00
SHAMP12
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
0.0
Std. Dev = .84  
Mean = 1.80
N = 5.00
 GUILTP12
3.002.502.00
GUILTP12
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
0.0
Std. Dev = .58  
Mean = 2.33
N = 3.00
 
Q3P12
3.002.502.001.501.00
Q3P12
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = .66  
Mean = 1.81
N = 31.00
 
 
Note. Q3 = resignation emotions; P12 = Starting Phase. 
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Appendix K2: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Resignation 
Emotions in the Developing Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
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Note. Q3 = resignation emotions; P36 = Developing Phase. 
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Appendix L1: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Antagonistic 
Emotions in the Starting Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
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Note. Q4 = antagonistic emotions; P12 = Starting Phase. 
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Appendix L2: Histograms Representing Means of Non-Standardized Scores for Antagonistic 
Emotions in the Developing Phase (Emotion by Emotion plus a Summary per Class) 
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Note. Q4 = antagonistic emotions; P36 = Developing Phase. 
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Appendix M1: Histograms Representing Mean Distribution of Non-Standardized Decision-
Making Scores in the Starting Phase 
 
alternative generation time 1
8.00
7.50
7.00
6.50
6.00
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
alternative generation time 1
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
30
20
10
0
Std. Dev = 1.21  
Mean = 4.71
N = 104.00
alternative evaluation time 1
9.08.07.06.05.04.03.02.0
alternative evaluation time 1
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
30
20
10
0
Std. Dev = 1.31  
Mean = 5.2
N = 104.00
team cohesion time 1
9.00
8.50
8.00
7.50
7.00
6.50
6.00
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
team cohesion time 1
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
30
20
10
0
Std. Dev = 1.29  
Mean = 6.31
N = 104.00
 
 
 
 
  360
Appendix M2: Histograms Representing Mean Distribution of Non-Standardized Decision-
Making Scores in the Developing Phase 
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Appendix N: Procedure for Data Standardization 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, a small number of outliers was found but not eliminated 
from the data. Preliminary results from a first series of correlations showed that these outliers 
were apparently caused by systematic biased response tendencies on the part of these 
participants. To correct for these tendencies, intra-individual z-scores were computed. This 
procedure, which will be explained below, was first applied to both the emotion and the 
decision-making variables. 
Classes of emotions 
Data exploration revealed that 20 participants out of 106 systematically reported 
emotion scores with intensities of 3 or 4 (4 is the maximum) for positive emotions; 7 out of 
these 20 participants scored also high on negative emotions. Thirteen participants out of 78 
who reported negative emotions gave scores with intensity above 3. This may be explained 
either by the fact that events causing these emotions were salient enough for the participants 
that they felt the emotions with strong intensity or these participants were systematically 
using the highest end of the scale, thus introducing a bias. Thus, it was decided to perform 
intra-individual z-scores in order to correct for within-subject variability (Scherer, personal 
communication, July 2001). It is justified especially when there are multiple repeated 
measures. It eliminates the bias in use of scale, without eliminating the variability due to 
events or social interactions. The means and standard deviations for classes of emotions after 
standardization are displayed in Table N1. Figures A and B illustrate the percentage of 
classes of emotion felt. 
Table N1 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Classes of Emotion by Phase, Before and After 
Standardization 
  Before 
standardization 
 After 
standardization 
Phase  Mean Sd  Mean Sd 
Starting       
Achievement  1.04 .43  .17 .19 
Approach  1.33 .67  .36 .28 
Resignation   .08 .16   .005  .003 
Antagonistic   .07 .16   .009  .004 
Developing       
Achievement  1.09 .50  .28 .17 
Approach  1.17 .53  .34 .23 
Resignation   .13 .18   .001  .004 
Antagonistic   .08 .12   .007  .003 
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Decision-making variables 
The results reported for the first questionnaire administered after Period 2 will be 
called Time 1, and the results for the second questionnaire administered after Period 6 will be 
called Time 2. Two subjects did not turn their questionnaire in at Time 1, thus the means for 
their respective teams is calculated on the basis of 5 subjects instead of 6 in one case, and on 
the basis of 6 subjects instead of 7 in the other case. At Time 2, all participants responded, 
thus there is no missing data. 
Given the widespread occurrence of response bias in the use of scales, the procedure 
of computing intra-individual z-scores was also applied for the decision-making variables. 
First, intercorrelations between raw scores were performed: they were positive and 
statistically significant, ranging from .21 to .73. Second, data exploration was performed in 
order to identify the participants who systematically gave higher scores, with the potential of 
biasing these results. Figure N1 shows the relationship between Alternative Generation at 
Time 1 and Alternative Evaluation at Time 1. 
 
 
 
Figure N1. Relationship between Alternative Generation 
and Alternative Evaluation at Time 1 
Note . Participants are represented by their initials. 
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For example, the participant “RDE”, located on the upper right corner of the graph, 
had a minimum score of 6.67 (scale of 0 to 9), and a maximum of 7.75 (M = 7.3) for all his 
responses (Time 1 and Time 2). His score on Alternative Generation at Time 1 was 7.50 and 
on Alternative Evaluation was 6.67. Second example, the participant “JCN”, placed above 
RDE in the upper right corner of the graph, had a minimum score of 5.50 and a maximum of 
7.75 (M = 7.04). His score on Alternative Generation was 7.75 and on Alternative Evaluation 
was 7.67. Thus, intra-individual z-scores were performed to correct for the use of extreme 
values on the scale. Figure N2 shows the new relationships pattern between Alternative 
Generation and Alternative Evaluation at Time 1. 
 
The means and standard deviations for decision-making variables before and after 
standardization are displayed in Table N2. 
 
Figure N2. Relationship between Z-scores of  Alternative Generation
and Alternative Evaluation at Time 1 
Note. Participants are represented by their initials. 
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Table N2 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Decision-Making Variables by Phase Before and After 
Standardization 
  Before 
standardization 
 After 
standardization 
Phase  Mean Sd  Mean Sd 
Starting       
Alternative 
generation 
 4.71 1.21  -.46 .50 
Alternative 
evaluation 
 5.22 1.31  -.16 .60 
Te m cohesion  6.30 1.29  .51 .48 
Developing       
Alternative 
generation 
 4.84 1.23  -.35 .50 
Alternative 
evaluation 
 5.37 1.43  -.05 .51 
Te m cohesion  6.22 1.43  .46 .53 
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Appendix O: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Standardized Mean, Last, and Maximum Emotion Scores Across Time Periods 
at the Individual Level 
 
 Mean Overall  Mean Starting Phase  Mean Developing Phase 
 Mean Sd 1 2 3  Mean Sd 1 2 3  Mean Sd 1 2 3 
AC  .008 .05     -.03 .08      .03 .06    
AP  .03 .07 -.63**     .02 .12  .09     .02 .07 -.17*   
RE -.02 .03 -.35** -.34**   -.02 .04 -.03 .02   -.02 .04 -.24** -.17*  
AN -.01 .02 -.26** -.27** .03  -.01 .04  .08 .04 -.06  -.01 .03 -.15 -.08 .16* 
 
 Last of Starting Phase  Last of Developing Phase 
 Mean Sd 1 2 3  Mean Sd 1 2 3 
AC -.04 .12      .03 .12    
AP  .07 .16  .28**     .02 .15 .16+   
RE -.02 .08 -.02 -.11   -.03 .08 .04  .08  
 
AN -.005 .07 -.03 -.01 .05  -.01 .07 .10 -.01 .22* 
 
 Max Overall  Max Starting Phase  Max Developing Phase 
 Mean Sd 1 2 3  Mean Sd 1 2 3  Mean Sd 1 2 3 
AC 1.07 .58     .56 .60     1.02 .60    
AP 1.2 .66 -.18*    .92 .61  .03    1.04 .66 -.16+   
RE  .14 .39  .13 -.12   .03 .21  .16+ -.10     .12 .34 -.01 -.02  
AN  .11 .36  .13 -.02 .22*  .05 .24 -.10  .17* -.03    .07 .29  .14 -.21* .11 
 
 
 
Note. AC = Achievement emotions; AP = Approach emotions; RE = Resignation emotions; AN = Antagonistic emotions; bold italic r = p < .01 (1-tailed); bold r = p < .05 (1-
tailed); italic r = p < .10 (1-tailed). N = 106. 
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Appendix P: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Standardized 
Decision-Making Variables in the Starting Phase and in the Developing Phase at the 
Individual Level 
 
 
 Starting Phase  Developing Phase 
 Mean SD 1 2  Mean SD 1 2 
1. AG -.46 .50    -.35 .50   
2. AE -.16 .60 .12   -.05 .51   .20*  
3. TC .51 .48 .13 .10  .46 .53 -.02 .22* 
 
Note. * p < .05 level. One–tailed bivariate correlations. N = 104. 
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Appendix Q1: Means of Non-standardized Emotion Scores per Team in the Starting 
Phase 
 
 ACa APb REc ANd AG
e AEf TCg 
Team 1 .66 .54 .03 .08 4.5 5.4 6.2 
Team 2 .61 .96 .00 .01 4.1 4.8 6.5 
Team 3 .99 .57 .00 .05 4.4 6.1 6.6 
Team 4 .58 .86 .008 00 4.2 5.1 5.4 
Team 5 .55 .97 .06 .00 5.0 6.2 7.2 
Team 6 .51 .72 .08 .02 5.3 5.0 6.4 
Team 7 .38 .57 .05 .05 3.4 5.5 6.3 
Team 8 .28 1.1 .07 .00 4.8 5.7 5.2 
Team 9 .23 1.1 .02 .03 4.8 4.3 6.5 
Team 10 .49 .78 .03 .01 6.3 6.5 7.9 
Team 11 .35 .93 .07 .17 4.1 3.8 5.2 
Team 12 .53 .49 .03 .01 4.7 4.9 5.8 
Team 13 .17 .74 .01 .00 4.2 4.5 6.1 
Team 14 .10 .15 .00 .00 4.1 4.8 6.0 
Team 15 .44 .54 .01 .03 4.3 4.4 5.0 
Team 16 .37 .73 .08 .008 4.8 5.2 7.0 
Team 17 .32 .62 .008 .03 5.6 5.4 7.0 
Team 18 .55 .68 .04 .00 5.8 6.3 7.8 
Team 19 .33 .49 .00 .03 6.3 6.7 7.4 
Team 20 .54 .83 .04 .00 5.0 4.7 6.3 
 
Note. a AC = Achievement emotions; b Approach emotions; c Resignation emotions; d 
Antagonistic emotions; eAG = Alternative generation; f AE = Alternative evaluation; g 
TC = Team cohesion. 
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Appendix Q2: Means of Non-standardized Emotion Scores per Team in the 
Developing Phase 
 
 ACa APb REc ANd AG
e AEf TCg 
Team 1 .85 .52 .00 .00 5.3 6.3 7.2 
Team 2 .83 .50 .03 .11 4.3 4.4 5.4 
Team 3 .83 .71 .03 .01 4.2 5.7 5.5 
Team 4 .75 .75 .02 .008 4.3 4.5 5.8 
Team 5 .82 .74 .08 .00 5.5 7.5 7.7 
Team 6 .75 .73 .03 .02 4.2 4.7 6.1 
Team 7 .60 .40 .02 .06 4.3 5.1 6.2 
Team 8 .33 .87 .07 .02 4.5 5.1 5.5 
Team 9 .33 1.2 .03 .04 5.3 5.5 6.8 
Team 10 .53 .76 .14 .06 5.4 6.2 7.3 
Team 11 .58 1.03 .07 .03 5.6 4.8 5.9 
Team 12 .66 .38 .05 .04 4.5 4.9 5.2 
Team 13 .42 .48 .08 .02 4.1 4.4 5.6 
Team 14 .28 .28 .10 .02 4.2 5.0 6.0 
Team 15 .71 .26 .06 .05 4.4 4.0 5.1 
Team 16 .53 .75 .13 .008 5.2 5.6 7.0 
Team 17 .50 .71 .00 .03 6.0 6.9 7.0 
Team 18 .34 .78 .04 .03 5.6 6.4 7.0 
Team 19 .29 .46 .02 .04 5.7 5.7 7.0 
Team 20 .77 .64 .03 .00 5.1 6.1 6.9 
 
Note. a AC = Achievement emotions; b Approach emotions; c Resignation emotions; d 
Antagonistic emotions; eAG = Alternative generation; f AE = Alternative evaluation; g 
TC = Team cohesion. 
 
 
 
